By Mark Kantor
Last week, the Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals issued one of the rare rulings addressing the authority of an arbitral institution to make decisions.
In the case, the appeals court considered the authority of an American Arbitration Association administrator to make what the court considered a “gateway” decision under the AAA’s Healthcare Policy Statement and rules rather than allowing that decision to be made by arbitrators.
The 2-1 majority opinion ruled that only an arbitrator could make the decision, not the administrator. That ruling has significant implications for the administrability of due process protocols and policy statements in patient healthcare, consumer and employment disputes.
In Ciccio, et al. v. SmileDirectClub LLC, No. 20-5833 (6th Cir. June 25, 2021) (available at https://bit.ly/2U8OqZ8), Senior Circuit Judge David W. McKeague authored the majority Sixth Circuit panel opinion overturning an AAA decision to apply the AAA’s policy against accepting a claim that “implicated various AAA policies that precluded arbitration unless the parties signed a post-dispute arbitration agreement or a court otherwise ordered arbitration.”
The AAA’s Consumer Arbitration Rules, Healthcare Policy Statement and Healthcare Due Process Protocol bar the AAA from arbitrating a patient healthcare dispute unless either (1) all parties have agreed to submit the matter to arbitration after the dispute has arisen or(2) a court has ordered the disputing parties to arbitrate the matter. The AAA Healthcare Policy Statement describes this policy succinctly:
In 2003, the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) announced that it would not administer healthcare arbitrations between individual patients and healthcare service providers that relate to medical services, such as negligence and medical malpractice disputes, unless all parties agreed to submit the matter to arbitration after the dispute arose. . . . However, the AAA will administer disputes between patients and healthcare providers to the extent a court order directs such a dispute to arbitration where the parties’ agreement provides for the AAA’s rules or AAA administration.
The dispute in this case arose out of a false advertising claim brought by plaintiffs and former patients Dena Nigohosian, Dr. Joseph Ciccio, Dr. Arthur Kapit, and Dr. Vishu Raj, and joined by Dana Johnson and others, against SmileDirect, originally in federal court. The U.S. District Court first held that an arbitration agreement in SmileDirect’s customer contract applied and ordered Nigohosian to arbitrate. The other plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed their court claims.
The arbitration clause in question read:
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE – I hereby agree that any dispute regarding the products and services offered [b]y SmileDirectClub and/or affiliated dental professionals, including but not limited to medical malpractice disputes, will be determined by submission to arbitration and not [b]y lawsuit filed in any court, except claims within the jurisdiction of Small Claims Court . . . . I agree that the arbitration shall be conducted by a single, neutral arbitrator selected by the parties and shall be resolved using the rules of the American Arbitration Association.
Johnson thereafter filed a class arbitration claim against SmileDirect with the AAA on behalf of consumer claimants who had been SmileDirect patients.
At that point, the AAA itself became involved in deciding whether the class arbitration should proceed in light of AAA policies and rules. An AAA administrator advised the parties that that AAA’s Healthcare Due Process Protocol and Healthcare Policy Statement in the circumstances required healthcare providers and their consumers to sign post-dispute arbitration unless a court order has compelled arbitration, according to the Sixth Circuit opinion:
An AAA administrator informed the parties that AAA’s Healthcare Due Process Protocol and Healthcare Policy Statement applied, which require healthcare providers and their patients to sign an arbitration agreement after a dispute arises in certain cases unless a court order has compelled arbitration. SmileDirect’s counsel asked the AAA administrator to reverse this decision but the AAA administrator maintained his “initial, administrative determination [that] the Protocol [and the Healthcare Policy Statement] appl[y].” . . . SmileDirect’s counsel objected again, noting that the district court had already compelled Nigohosian to arbitrate “whether the claims themselves are arbitrable” and argued that “AAA’s administrative decision to apply the Protocol [and the Healthcare Policy Statement] to these consumer claims is erroneous. ***
The AAA administrator “reaffirm[ed] [his] administrative determination” that the Healthcare Policy Statement applied to Johnson’s claims. . . . He concluded that arbitration could only proceed following a court order (seemingly like the court order already entered for Nigohosian) or a post-dispute arbitration agreement.
Johnson refused to sign a post-dispute agreement consenting to arbitration, while Nigohosian (who was bound by the earlier District Court order compelling arbitration) never initiated arbitration herself. When claimants renewed their court proceedings in the U.S. District Court, however, “SmileDirect responded that they couldn’t rejoin the case because the Agreement required an arbitrator to decide the merits of any dispute, including any gateway issues about whether the dispute was arbitrable.” (Emphasis added.)
The district court, though, decided that SmileDirect and Johnson “got what they bargained for” because the dispute had been “resolved using the rules of the [AAA].” Consequently, the court determined that Johnson could renew the dispute before the judicial forum:
The district court interpreted the Agreement to fully incorporate Rule 1(d), the Consumer Due Process Protocol, and the Healthcare Policy Statement. The court’s interpretation of these rules and policies next led it to conclude that Johnson had discharged his obligations under the Agreement and could “submit [his] dispute to the appropriate court for resolution.” . . . Under the district court’s reasoning, Rule 1(d) incorporates the Consumer Due Process Protocol, which in turn states that AAA has subject-specific policies (incorporating the Healthcare Due Process Protocol and Healthcare Policy Statement by implication), and the Healthcare Policy Statement requires a post-dispute arbitration agreement or a court order. Therefore, the court held that “the AAA process to which the parties mutually agreed ha[d] been completed in Johnson’s case.”
With respect to Nigohosian, however, the Court decided that she was bound by the existing Court order compelling arbitration. The District Court therefore stayed her claims, pending arbitration.
SmileDirect thereafter appealed the decision regarding Johnson to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals did not resolve the substantive arbitrability issue. Rather, Judge McKeague held on behalf of a majority of a divided appellate panel that “The text of the [parties’ arbitration agreement] confirms that the parties didn’t intend to allow an administrator to short-circuit arbitration by refusing to appoint an arbitrator to answer this initial gateway question. Accordingly, we don’t have anything further to say on the matter until and unless a party asks us to review an arbitrator’s decision under 9 U.S.C. § 10.”
To reach this result, the appellate panel started with basic principles in U.S. arbitration jurisprudence that “[w]hether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy” are gateway arbitrability questions.” The parties may decide to send these gateway issues to an arbitrator rather than a court, but only upon a showing of “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties did indeed intend to delegate those issues to an arbitrator under the ruling in the U.S. Supreme Court’s First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
In the Sixth Circuit, like almost all other federal circuit courts, the incorporation of AAA rules authorizing the arbitrator to decide on the scope or validity of the arbitration agreement or the arbitrability of a claim satisfies the First Options standard.
Thus far, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning paralleled the U.S. District Court’s reasoning on gateway arbitration questions. But, stated the McKeague opinion, “What remains is the related question of whether the parties intended to allow an AAA administrator to apply the Healthcare Policy Statement before sending any gateway-arbitrability questions to the arbitrator,” explaining that
The Agreement dictates that “any dispute . . . will be determined by submission to arbitration,” not by litigation, and “that the arbitration shall be conducted by a single, neutral arbitrator selected by the parties.” The parties never got that far here because an AAA administrator “ma[d]e an initial, administrative determination [that] the [Healthcare Policy Statement] applie[d].”
The appeals court read the arbitration agreement between the parties to show that they intended to send gateway questions of arbitrability “exclusively” to an arbitrator, not to an AAA administrator. Senior Circuit Judge McKeague expressed confusion as to the basis relied upon by the AAA administrator to take this decision rather than referring the question to an arbitral panel:
It is unclear what the administrator was doing. There are two ways to view his decision. Perhaps the administrator independently interpreted the Agreement and read it to incorporate the Healthcare Policy Statement, which led the administrator to conclude that the parties did not intend to arbitrate the instant dispute without a post-dispute agreement or court order. Or perhaps the administrator was simply applying AAA’s Healthcare Policy Statement because he concluded that this case concerns healthcare and the AAA follows this policy no matter what a particular agreement says or what particular parties intended.
“Either way,” wrote Judge McKeague, “the end result was contrary to the text of the Agreement and the FAA.” Arbitrators and arbitral administrators “are distinct.” Under AAA instruments, he wrote, administrators do not decide the merits of a dispute.
The opinion notes, “The arbitrator decides the merits of a dispute. And if an administrator could preempt a final merits ruling by an arbitrator, the administrator would effectively run afoul of the provision that administrators ‘cannot overrule or change an arbitrator’s decisions or rulings.’” It continues later:
Under AAA’s rules, an arbitrator and an administrator are distinct. “The [a]dministrator’s role is to manage the administrative aspects of the arbitration, such as the appointment of the arbitrator. . . . [T]he [a]dministrator does not decide the merits of a case or make any rulings on issues such as what documents must be shared with each side.” . . . Unsurprisingly, the administrator helps disputes get to an arbitrator and doesn’t make merits rulings. On the other hand, “[a]rbitrators are neutral and independent decision makers who . . . make the final, binding decision on the dispute. . . . The [a]rbitrator makes all the procedural decisions on a case not made by the administrator.” …. The arbitrator decides the merits of a dispute. And if an administrator could preempt a final merits ruling by an arbitrator, the administrator would effectively run afoul of the provision that administrators “cannot overrule or change an arbitrator’s decisions or rulings.”
Therefore, concluded the Sixth Circuit, “the arbitrability of Johnson’s claim, thus should’ve gone to an arbitrator for a ‘final, binding decision.’”
The appellate court also considered whether the issue of compliance with the AAA’s post-dispute agreement requirement for consumer healthcare arbitrations is a “procedural decision” delegated to an AAA administrator rather than an arbitral panel. The appeals panel stated, “We don’t see how it could be.”
In so deciding, the appellate judges reminded the parties that contract interpretation is a legal question. Procedural decisions, stated the Court of Appeals, are more like administrative aspects of the arbitration such as appointment of arbitrators, location of hearings and fees:
The procedural decisions AAA administrators make, in turn, are more akin to “administrative aspects of the arbitration, such as the appointment of the arbitrator, . . . preliminary decisions about where hearings might take place, and . . . handl[ing] the fees.” *** So it generally wouldn’t make sense to require clear intent to delegate arbitrability questions to an arbitrator but then allow either arbitrators or administrators to decide that legal question. [Citation and footnote omitted.]
The appellate court distinguished in this regard a Fourth Circuit decision upholding resolution by AAA administrators of a dispute as to how many arbitrators would be appointed, Dockser v. Schwartzberg, 433 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2006).
Not only were the clauses in the two disputes different, said the Sixth Circuit majority, but the issue in that latter case was procedural. “Dockser dealt with ‘what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to,’ whereas here the relevant question is arbitrability—what the Agreement itself means.”
If, instead of interpreting the parties’ arbitration agreement, the AAA was applying its own “sound policy,” then according to Judge McKeague that conduct too would contravene applicable law. Nor did the arbitration agreement grant the AAA administrator the authority to make this policy choice for the parties. The majority opinion states:
Although the AAA may choose for itself which claims it will arbitrate, it is not at liberty to “impose its own view of sound policy” regarding when or how parties should be allowed to arbitrate independent of the parties’ own choices in their contract.
We also see nothing in the Agreement that gives the administrator the right to make this policy choice for the parties. To be sure, the Agreement incorporates the AAA rules, which perhaps could be read to include the AAA’s due process review under Consumer Rule 1(d). And Consumer Rule 53 says that “[t]he arbitrator shall interpret and apply these Rules as they relate to the arbitrator’s powers and duties” but that “[a]ll other Rules shall be interpreted and applied by the AAA.” . . . But Consumer Rules 1(d) and 53 must be read together with the Agreement and the other rules to ascertain the parties’ intent. . . . When an arbitration agreement and its incorporated rules seem to conflict, our job is to find the “best way to harmonize” them. [Emphasis is the court’s.]
“We won’t,” stated the appellate majority, “interpret this agreement to arbitrate to permit Johnson to avoid arbitration.”
Moreover, the appeals panel pointed out that its decision to require an arbitrator to decide the gateway question, rather than an administrator, was not inconsistent with AAA policy. The court’s resulting order would satisfy the AAA Healthcare Policy alternative that the AAA will arbitrate consumer healthcare disputes if so directed by a court order. The opinion notes:
The Healthcare Policy Statement also does not stand in the way of such an appointment. It makes clear that “the AAA will administer disputes between patients and healthcare providers” either when the parties enter into a post-dispute agreement or when “a court order directs such a dispute to arbitration where the parties’ agreement provides for the AAA’s rules or AAA administration.” . . . Our decision will lead to such a court order—seemingly clearing the administrative path. Here, to give effect to both the parties’ agreement that “the arbitration shall be conducted by a single, neutral arbitrator” and that the arbitration “shall be resolved using the rules of the American Arbitration Association,” we can’t read the AAA rules to preclude decision by an arbitrator.
.The Sixth Circuit opinion also drew attention to the fact that the approach taken by the majority will result in a different, narrower judicial review standard by the federal courts–review for vacatur of an arbitral decision rather than de novo review:
The district court effectively reviewed the Agreement de novo. In doing that, the district court relied on a court’s interpretation of the same set of AAA rules and policies to hold that the AAA rules effectively nullified an arbitration agreement. . . . But by agreeing, clearly and unmistakably, to send the arbitrability question to the arbitrator, the parties here bargained for the narrow 9 U.S.C. § 10 review, not de novo review. . . .
This is where the Agreement’s requirement that the dispute would not be determined by litigation comes in. The district court determined the contract-interpretation question, so the dispute was determined by litigation contrary to the intent of the parties. But once an arbitrator interprets the Agreement, any judicial review under 9 U.S.C. § 10 wouldn’t be review of the arbitrability question de novo but under the limited grounds identified (for fraud, corruption, etc.). Because the parties bargained for an arbitrator to interpret the Agreement and for the courts to have a very limited role, it wouldn’t make sense to allow an administrator’s preemptive contract interpretation to be a portal to de novo judicial review.
Circuit Judge Eric L. Clay dissented, noting “I agree with the majority’s statement at the onset of its opinion that “this case is about whether the Agreement incorporates the Healthcare Policy Statement,” even though it then proceeds to repudiate the Healthcare Policy Statement.” The parties, Circuit Judge Clay reasoned, “made their decision to abide by the rules when they signed the contract incorporating rules that included the Healthcare Policy Statement.” He added:
Turning to the plain language of the agreement, the threshold question of what the agreement incorporated is readily apparent: [disputes] shall be resolved using the rules of the American Arbitration Association. . . . As part of the AAA rules, the AAA maintains consumer protocols that ensure a fair process in healthcare disputes. The Healthcare Policy Statement’s incorporation into the agreement was clear to anyone who read the AAA’s rules. The parties made their decision to abide by the rules when they signed the contract incorporating rules that included the Healthcare Policy Statement, but in my colleagues’ view, those rules may simply be disregarded if they interfere with requiring the parties to proceed with the arbitration.
Here, the AAA determined that proceeding to arbitration would violate their due process rules without its mandatory post-dispute agreement. When the parties agreed that the dispute “shall be resolved using the rules of the AAA,” they were aware that those rules called for an administrator to render the AAA’s initial determination regarding the requirements of the organization’s own rules before proceeding to arbitration. That was not an unusual decision, nor a decision out of lockstep with the rules of the AAA. Quite the contrary, that decision followed the process by which the AAA typically administers all of its arbitrations. That provides the “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties intended to have these gateway issues decided in accordance with the AAA’s procedures and policies.
The majority opinion addressed Circuit Judge Clay’s dissent in footnotes 3 and 4. Notably, in footnote 4 the Court of Appeals stated, “we interpret the words of this Agreement in conjunction with AAA’s rules without deference to AAA’s ‘typical’ practice.” The footnotes state:
3The dissent agrees that AAA’s rules specifically assign arbitrability questions to the arbitrator while reserving AAA’s “administrative duties” for the administrator as detailed in the arbitration agreement and the AAA’s rules themselves. . . . Where we differ is whether the AAA rules include an initial arbitrability decision among these “administrative duties.” The dissent points to no rule granting the administrator such authority, but instead locates the authority in the general requirement that “the AAA will administer the arbitration.” . . . Our decision to follow the AAA’s rule granting such authority to an arbitrator doesn’t mean that the parties “contract[ed] the AAA’s administrator out of the process,” but instead means the parties intended the administrator to have the role the AAA’s rules mandate: “to manage the administrative aspects of the arbitration, such as the appointment of the arbitrator, preliminary decisions about where hearings might take place, and handling the fees associated with the arbitration.”
4The dissent suggests that requiring an administrator to determine arbitrability “was not an unusual decision” but is rather “the process by which the AAA typically administers all of its arbitrations”—a fact that “any party doing their due diligence would have seen.” . . . But we interpret the words of this Agreement in conjunction with AAA’s rules without deference to AAA’s “typical” practice. The Agreement or the AAA Rules could grant the administrator that authority, but in this case they do not.
Judge Clay volleyed back at the majority by arguing in his own footnote 1 that “The majority claims that we agree that the AAA’s rules assign arbitrability to the arbitrator, and ‘administrative duties’ to the administrator, but that is not the case. To the contrary, the AAA’s rules do not clearly delineate these roles as the majority alleges. Instead, as stated in the rule cited above, the AAA has the final decision on who administers cases under its rules.”
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Whether one agrees with Senior Circuit Judge McKeague’s opinion on behalf of the majority or with Circuit Judge Clay’s dissent, this ruling has significant implications for many disputes in the U.S. involving healthcare, consumer and employment matters.
The AAA has adopted due process protocols for those areas, as well as making policy statements regarding how the AAA will handle applications for arbitration in many areas. The reasoning by the Ciccio majority could vitiate the authority of an AAA administrator to apply those instruments to decline to accept cases that do not comply with those protocols and policy statements.
Instead, application of those instruments would be allocated to an arbitral panel, resulting in significant delay and expense while the panel is constituted and briefed before a decision on the applicability of due process protocols and policies crystallizes.
Given the dissent, it is worth wondering whether this case is headed toward en banc review by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals or will be the subject of a certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Mark Kantor is a member of CPR-DR’s Panels of Distinguished Neutrals. Until he retired from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, he was a partner in the firm’s Corporate and Project Finance Groups. He currently serves as an arbitrator and mediator. He teaches as an Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center (Recipient, Fahy Award for Outstanding Adjunct Professor). He also is Editor-in-Chief of the online journal Transnational Dispute Management. He is a frequent contributor to CPR Speaks, and this post originally was circulated to a private list serv and adapted with the author’s permission.