Henry Schein Redux – The Appeals Court Decides “The Placement of the Carve-Out is Dispositive”

By Mark Kantor

Kantor Photo (8-2012)You may recall that the US Supreme Court last term in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc. rejected a “wholly groundless” exception to its general principles allocating arbitrability issues between court and arbitrator (the First Options rule that “Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”).  The Supreme Court then sent the case back to the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling.

Yesterday, the Fifth Circuit issued its new opinion in that case (Archer and White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., No. 16-41674, Aug. 14, 2019, available on TDM at https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/legal-and-regulatory-detail.asp?key=22906, subscription required).  In that opinion, the Appeals Court concluded that the arbitration clause in question did not clearly and unmistakably allocate the relevant question to the arbitrators.  The Court then held that, based on the exclusion for “actions seeking injunctive relief” from arbitration under the relevant clause, the dispute in question was not arbitrable.  As explained more fully below, the appeals court relied on contract interpretation principles to reach this result.  The court thereby emphasized the importance of precise drafting of the arbitration clause and any exceptions – “the placement of the carve-out here is dispositive.”

The underlying court proceeding brought by Archer and White Sales, Inc. is an antitrust complaint against Henry Schein, Inc. and others relating to alleged anticompetitive agreements entered into among the defendants with respect to sales of dental equipment.  Complainant Archer and White Sales “alleges violations of federal and Texas antitrust law and seeks money damages and injunctive relief.”  The defendants argued that an exclusion in the relevant arbitration clause of “actions seeking injunctive relief” operated to prevent arbitrability of the dispute.

The arbitration clause in the underlying contract reads as follows (emphasis added):

Disputes. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of North Carolina.  Any dispute arising under or related to this Agreement (except for actions seeking injunctive relief and disputes related to trademarks, trade secrets, or other intellectual property of Pelton & Crane), shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association [(AAA)].  The place of arbitration shall be in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Under AAA Commercial Arbitration  Rule 7(a), “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”  However, the Fifth Circuit interpreted this arbitration clause in the agreement to exclude actions seeking injunctive relief from arbitration.  By doing so, the parties, said the appeals court, had placed the relevant dispute entirely outside the AAA arbitration rules.  Thus, Rule 7(a) did not come into play, and the parties had not clearly and unmistakably delegated the issue of arbitrability of an action seeking injunctive relief to the arbitrator.

Finding that the exclusion in the arbitration clause was itself clear, the Court of Appeals itself then determined that the dispute was not arbitrable because the court claims sought injunctive relief in addition to damages.

The decision of the Fifth Circuit avoids reconsidering the issue raised by amicus and discussed by Justice Ginsburg in her separate Supreme Court opinion – do provisions in arbitration rules such AAA Rule 7(a) in fact constitute a clear and unmistakable delegation of arbitrability decisions to the arbitrator.  As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in footnote 11, “While both parties read the tea leaves in the questions asked by the Justices at oral argument, attempting to shepherd them to support their own positions, the Court declined to decide whether this agreement in fact delegated the arbitrability question.”

In the Fifth Circuit, precedent holds that an arbitration rule such as AAA Rule 7(a) satisfies the First Options test; “As we held in [Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012)], an arbitration agreement that incorporates the AAA Rules “presents clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.””  That issue, as to which the ALI Restatement of The U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration takes the contrary position, therefore remains the subject of a circuit split among Circuit Courts of Appeals in the US to be resolved in the future by the US Supreme Court.

The manner in which the Fifth Circuit judges reached this conclusion is particularly relevant to patent licensing disputes, where the parties to a patent license agreement or similar IP agreement often provide for arbitration but contractually exclude patent validity, infringement and similar disputes from arbitration.

The Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Patrick Higginbotham writing for a unanimous court) began its analysis in the customary two-step fashion, asking first if there is any arbitration agreement at all and thereafter considering whether “this claim is covered by the arbitration agreement” (footnotes omitted here and elsewhere).

We review a ruling on a motion to compel arbitration de novo.  Our inquiry proceeds in two steps.  The first is a matter of contract formation—“whether the parties entered into any arbitration agreement at all.”  Next we turn to the question of contract interpretation and ask whether “this claim is covered by the arbitration agreement.”

Judge Higginbotham then restated the well-known First Options “clearly and unmistakably” formulation for allocating the second question between court and arbitrator.

While ordinarily both steps are questions for the court, the parties can enter into an arbitration agreement that delegates to the arbitrator the power to decide whether a particular claim is arbitrable. The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that “parties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.”

When considering whether there was a valid delegation, “the court’s analysis is limited.” As always, we ask if the parties entered into a valid agreement. If they did, we turn to the delegation clause and ask “whether the purported delegation clause is in fact a delegation clause—that is, if it evinces an intent to have the arbitrator decide whether a given claim must be arbitrated.”  When determining that intent, “[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence that they did so.” If there is a valid delegation, the court must grant the motion to compel.

Here, the disputing parties had agreed that a valid arbitration agreement existed, leaving only the second step for consideration – was the particular claim covered by that agreement.  Archer and White argued that decision was for the courts to make.

Archer asserts that the AAA rules (and resulting delegation) only apply to disputes that fall outside of the arbitration clause’s carve-out for actions seeking injunctive relief. Under their reading, if a case falls within the carve-out, the agreement does not incorporate the AAA rules and the gateway arbitrability question is not delegated to an arbitrator.

Henry Schein argued in response that, by operation of AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule 7(a), the parties had expressly delegated that issue to the arbitrator.

[D]efendants argue that the agreement’s incorporation of the AAA rules ends the inquiry.  They maintain that the carve-out for actions seeking injunctive relief does not trump the parties’ delegation.  Defendants warn that to read the contract as Archer suggests would require the court to make a merits determination about the scope of the carve-out—whether this is indeed an action seeing injunctive relief—to answer the delegation question, precisely the category of inquiries a court is precluded from making in answering the delegation question.

The Fifth Circuit agreed with claimant Archer and White, holding that the “plain language” of the arbitration clause did not incorporate the AAA rules for disputes “under the carve-out”.

that is precisely the point—the placement of the carve-out here is dispositive. We cannot re-write the words of the contract. The most natural reading of the arbitration clause at issue here states that any dispute, except actions seeking injunctive relief, shall be resolved in arbitration in accordance with the AAA rules. The plain language incorporates the AAA rules—and therefore delegates arbitrability—for all disputes except those under the carve-out.  Given that carve-out, we cannot say that the Dealer Agreement evinces a “clear and unmistakable” intent to delegate arbitrability.

The appellate court then considered whether the “backdrop of a strong presumption in favor of arbitration” would result in referring the dispute to arbitration.  But the language of the exclusion in the arbitration clause, said the judges, was clear.  Moreover, the court noted that the clause excluded “actions seeking injunctive relief,” not “actions seeking only injunctive relief.”  The appellate court therefore refused to compel arbitration, even of only the claim for damages.

We note first that the arbitration clause creates a carve-out for “actions seeking injunctive relief.” It does not limit the exclusion to “actions seeking only injunctive relief,” nor “actions for injunction in aid of an arbitrator’s award.” Nor does it limit the carve-out to claims for injunctive relief. Such readings find no footing within the four corners of the contract. Under North Carolina law, “[w]hen the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to its terms, and the court, under the guise of construction, cannot reject what the parties inserted or insert what the parties elected to omit.” The mere fact that the arbitration clause permits Archer to avoid arbitration by adding a claim for injunctive relief does not change the clause’s plain meaning. “While ambiguities in the language of the agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration, we do not override the clear intent of the parties, or reach a result inconsistent with the plain text of the contract, simply because the policy favoring arbitration is implicated.” Fundamentally, defendants ask us to rewrite the unambiguous arbitration clause. We cannot.

It is noteworthy that the appeals court did not consider severing Archer and White’s remedial request for injunctive relief from its remedial request for damages, which might have resulted in sending the latter to arbitration but keeping the former in court.

The appellate panel’s decision in Henry Schein is of particular importance to intellectual property practitioners.  It is common in the marketplace for patent licensing and similar agreements to contain arbitration clauses.  However, those clauses often expressly exclude from arbitration a dispute for example, “concerning the validity, scope, infringement and essentiality of a patent or a patent claim.”  Moreover, it is extremely common in all sorts of contracts for an arbitration clause to include as well an express authorization for a disputing party to seek injunctive relief from the courts.

Thus, the Fifth Circuit has previously compelled arbitration of the scope question in another precedent, Crawford Professional Drugs, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 748 F.3d 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2014), under  an arbitration clause stating inter alia “nothing in the arbitration provision “shall prevent either party from seeking injunctive relief for breach of th[e Agreement.”

In the Ninth Circuit, though, the appeals court there has concluded that the scope of arbitrability was for the arbitrator to decide under an arbitration clause providing that “all” disputes arising out of or relating to the subject license agreement were to be arbitrated, and then containing a carve-out for certain IP and licensing claims.

The Ninth Circuit considered a similar agreement in Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Group A.G.  The arbitration clause adopted arbitration rules delegating arbitrability issues to the arbitrator and contained a carve-out for certain intellectual property and licensing claims.  Because the claims carved-out by that agreement “ar[ose] out of or relat[ed] to” the Source License, and the agreement explicitly provided that any claim arising out of the Source License was subject to arbitration, the Ninth Circuit held that Oracle’s carve-out argument “conflate[ed] the scope of the arbitration clause . . . with the question of who decides arbitrability.30

****

30.  ****  The court noted that the issue with Oracle’s carve-out argument was that the two categories of exempted claims by definition were claims arising out of or relating to the Source License, which were explicitly subject to arbitration. Id. at 1076.  No such circularity exists in the contract at issue here.

Where, though, the meaning of a carve-out clause is ambiguous, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has previously allocated to the courts the scope question in NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Securities, LLC, 770 F.3d 1010 (2d Cir. 2014).

the parties in NASDAQ had not clearly and unmistakably delegated arbitrability “where a broad arbitration clause is subject to a qualifying provision that at least arguably covers the present dispute.”  Because there was ambiguity as to whether the parties intended to have arbitrability questions decided by an arbitrator—because the dispute arguably fell within the carve-out—the court held the arbitrability question was for the court to decide.

These varying precedents emphasize the point made by the Fifth Circuit in Henry Schein that the parties must take care in the drafting of their exclusionary clauses; “But that is precisely the point—the placement of the carve-out here is dispositive.  We cannot re-write the words of the contract.”

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Mark Kantor is a CPR Distinguished Neutral. Until he retired from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Mark was a partner in the Corporate and Project Finance Groups of the Firm. He currently serves as an arbitrator and mediator. He teaches as an Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center (Recipient, Fahy Award for Outstanding Adjunct Professor). Additionally, Mr. Kantor is Editor-in-Chief of the online journal Transnational Dispute Management.

This material was first published on OGEMID, the Oil Gas Energy Mining Infrastructure and Investment Disputes discussion group sponsored by the on-line journal Transnational Dispute Management (TDM, at https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/), and is republished with consent.

Ready to Sign: The Singapore Convention, An International Mediation Treaty, Opens for Ratification

By Hew Zhan Tze

After years of negotiations, the Singapore Convention on Mediation last week reached the signature phase.

That means that countries around the globe can sign on, and ratify, a treaty designed to boost the use and support for mediation in cross-border transactions.

The convention is officially known as the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, and is available at https://bit.ly/2YWbHKN.

On Aug. 7, more than 1,500 international delegates from 70 countries attended a Singapore signing ceremony.

A total of 46 countries–including the United States and China–signed the convention on the first day. (The full list is available from the United Nations at http://bit.ly/2ZPFGFl.)

The convention is a product of the efforts of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group II to alleviate the difficulties of enforcing a cross-border settlement agreement reached from mediation. It can only come into effect after six months, and after three signatory countries ratify the treaty. See Article 14(1) of the Singapore Convention at the first link above.

Ratification is a signatory country’s domestic procedure where treaty approval is sought, and necessary legislation is enacted to give effect to the convention.

Generally, in the United States, a treaty can only be ratified by the president after receiving the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. The Senate must pass a ratification resolution, requiring a two-thirds approval.  See U. S. Const. Art. II, § 2 (available at https://bit.ly/2zBgoge).

The Singapore Convention’s goals have been likened to a mediation version of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, best known as the New York Convention. (Available at http://bit.ly/2KHaa5W.)

The large number of initial signatories to the Singapore Convention appears to show a positive reception toward easing enforcement of a settlement agreement obtained from other similarly bound jurisdictions. This is in comparison to the 10 signatures received at the launch of the New York Convention six decades ago. The increase in numbers likely reflects an increased recognition of the effectiveness of ADR methods.

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More analysis on the Singapore Convention on Mediation will appear in the September Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, available soon at altnewsletter.com.

The author was a CPR Institute Summer 2019 intern.

 

Gov Cuomo Signs New Legislation Barring Use of Mandatory Arbitration to Resolve Workplace Discrimination and Harassment in New York State

By Anna Hershenberg

As expected, on Monday, August 12, 2019, Governor Cuomo signed new legislation that, among other things, purports to bar the use of mandatory arbitration to resolve discrimination and harassment cases in the workplace in New York state.

The prior version of this law, New York CPLR § 7515, which went into effect last year, aimed to prohibit mandatory arbitration of workplace sexual harassment claims only; this version expands the prohibition to claims of other types of discrimination.

In June, Judge Denise Cote (SDNY) found the prior version of  § 7515 to be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act and therefore invalid. (Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC et al. (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (available at http://bit.ly/2y9w6AL)) Her ruling should apply with equal force to the amended version of § 7515, at least with respect to interstate matters.

CPR covered this issue earlier this month on CPRSpeaks:

https://blog.cpradr.org/2019/08/01/update-legislatures-on-invalidating-pre-dispute-arbitration-agreements/

The full text of the newly enacted § 7515 is pasted below (revisions in blue).

Section 7515: Mandatory arbitration clauses; prohibited

(a) Definitions. As used in this section:

1. The term “employer” shall have the same meaning as provided in subdivision five of section two hundred ninety-two of the executive law.

2. The term “prohibited clause” shall mean any clause or provision in any contract which requires as a condition of the enforcement of the contract or obtaining remedies under the contract that the parties submit to mandatory arbitration to resolve any allegation or claim of an unlawful discriminatory practice of sexual harassment. discrimination, in violation of laws prohibiting discrimination, including but not limited to, article fifteen of the executive law.

3. The term “mandatory arbitration clause” shall mean a term or provision contained in a written contract which requires the parties to such contract to submit any matter thereafter arising under such contract to arbitration prior to the commencement of any legal action to enforce the provisions of such contract and which also further provides language to the effect that the facts found or determination made by the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators in its application to a party alleging an unlawful discriminatory practice based on sexual harassment in violation of laws prohibiting discrimination, including but not limited to, article fifteen of the executive law shall be final and not subject to independent court review.

4. The term “arbitration” shall mean the use of a decision making forum conducted by an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators within the meaning and subject to the provisions of article seventy-five of the civil practice law and rules.

(b) (i) Prohibition. Except where inconsistent with federal law, no written contract, entered into on or after the effective date of this section shall contain a prohibited clause as defined in paragraph two of subdivision (a) of this section.

(ii) Exceptions. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to impair or prohibit an employer from incorporating a non-prohibited clause or other mandatory arbitration provision within such contract, that the parties agree upon.

(iii) Mandatory arbitration clause null and void. Except where inconsistent with federal law, the provisions of such prohibited clause as defined in paragraph two of subdivision (a) of this section shall be null and void. The inclusion of such clause in a written contract shall not serve to impair the enforceability of any other provision of such contract.

(c) Where there is a conflict between any collective bargaining agreement and this section, such agreement shall be controlling.

Anna Hershenberg is CPR’s Vice President of Programs and Public Policy

More Class: Fifth Circuit Sends Arbitrability to the Court, Not the Tribunal

By Hew Zhan Tze

The Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that class arbitrability is to be determined by the Court instead of the arbitrators in a class arbitration case.  20/20 Comms. Inc. v. Lennox Crawford, No. 18-10260 (5th Cir. July 22, 2019). The case appears to add a level of inquiry in the subject matter that may run counter to a U.S. Supreme Case earlier this year.

Several employees of 20/20 Communications, a marketing firm based in Fort Worth, Texas, filed individual arbitration claims against the employer. The arbitrator commenced a class arbitration despite an arbitration agreement contract clause prohibiting the consolidation of individual claims, “on the theory that the parties’ class arbitration bar is prohibited by federal law.”

Following the views of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the Fifth Circuit held that where class arbitration is an issue, a legal presumption arises that the Court will determine the availability of class arbitration unless the arbitration agreement contained clear and unmistakable language to the contrary.

The Fifth Circuit, in a unanimous opinion written by Circuit Judge James C. Ho, reversed the decisions of two district courts. In one case, the district court held that the arbitration agreement authorized the arbitrator to determine class arbitrability instead of the court. See 20/20 Comms. Inc. v. Randall Blevins, No. 4:16-cv-00810-Y (N.D. Tex.) (Means, J.). In the other case, the district court held that the class arbitration bar was unenforceable under the National Labor Relations Act. See 20/20 Comms. Inc. v. Lennox Crawford, No. 4:17-cv-929-A (N.D. Tex.) (McBryde, J.).

The Fifth Circuit determined that class arbitrability is a gateway issue for the court. It rejected the employee’s arguments that the delegation provisions in the arbitration agreement clearly and unmistakably delegated the determination of class arbitrability to the arbitrator.

The circuit court said class arbitrability falls under the category of a gateway issue which would presumptively be determined by the courts because (i) the increased size and complexity of the dispute, (ii) the due process concerns that are raised and (iii) the privacy and confidentiality of the parties may be compromised.

While these factors point toward class arbitrability being a gateway issue, the appeals court stops short of elaborating on why arbitrators are not well-equipped to handle these concerns. An arbitrator could undertake these considerations and determine not to consolidate the individual claims.

Regardless, it means that the court could be involved despite the parties’ attempt to resolve the dispute via arbitration. Additionally, to the extent the employee can bargain, the individual may not reach an agreement with the employer to use the “clear and unmistakable” language sought by the courts to override the legal presumption that the court is to decide class arbitrability.

Having raised the legal presumption that class arbitrability is to be determined by the court, not the arbitrator, the court’s next task, according to the Fifth Circuit, would be to assess whether the arbitration agreement contained delegation provisions in clear and unmistakable language that would override the legal presumption. The circuits courts are currently split on whether traditional delegation provisions are sufficient to override this legal presumption.

The Arbitration Nation blog points out that in the Second, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, traditional delegation provisions which submits any dispute to the arbitrator were held to be sufficient to overcome the presumption, citing Wells Fargo Advisors LLC v. Sappington, 884 F. 3d 392 (2nd Cir. 2018) and Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes, 899 F. 3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2018). See Henry Allen Blair, “The Fifth Circuit Weighs in About Who Decides Class Arbitrability,” Arbitration Nation (July 28) (available at http://bit.ly/2KqcIFu). It is noted that the Tenth Circuit held similarly in Dish Network L.L.C. v. Matthew Ray, 900 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2018).

On the other hand, Blair’s Arbitration Nation post notes that the Third, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits concluded that notwithstanding traditional delegation provisions or provisions incorporating institutional rules which delegates the decision of class arbitrability to the arbitrator, the decision of class arbitrability still lies with the Court. See Opalinski v. Robert Half Intern Inc., 761 F. 3d 326 (3rd Cir. 2014); Dell Web Communities Inc. v. Carlson, 817 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2016); Reed Elsevier Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F. 3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013), and Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy, 864 F. 3d 966 (8th Cir. 2017), among others.

In the Fifth Circuit Crawford opinion, typical delegation provisions were included in the arbitration provision. Interestingly, after a brief discussion of the delegation provisions at issue, the court stated that it ultimately need not make a conclusion on “[w]hether these provisions, standing alone, clearly and unmistakably empower the arbitrator to decide questions of class arbitrability.” Instead, the Court considered it sufficient to compare the class arbitration bar at issue with the delegation provisions to reach the conclusion that none of the provisions “state with the requisite clear and unmistakable language that arbitrators, rather than courts, shall decide questions of class arbitrability.”

The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion raises an important question: What language used in the arbitration agreement would be clear and unmistakable enough to overcome the legal presumption that it is the courts that will decide class arbitrability instead of the arbitrators when there is a contractual clause barring class arbitration?

“[T]here is tension in this decision,” notes Philip J. Loree Jr., of New York’s Loree & Loree, who closely watches class arbitration cases, “and I think the culprit is the Court’s ruling that the clarity of the class arbitration waiver should be considered as evidence that the parties did not clearly and unmistakably  intend arbitrators to decide arbitrability.”

Loree notes in an email, “Whether or not the class arbitration waiver is clear and unmistakable says nothing about who is supposed to interpret and apply the waiver. This, he notes, gives the impression that the Fifth Circuit is —perhaps unintentionally— making an end around this year’s U.S. Supreme Court rejection of the “wholly groundless” exception to the clear and unmistakable rule set out in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer And White Sales, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 524 (2019) (available at http://bit.ly/2YLDkWQ) (see Mark Kantor, “Implications of Henry Schein and New Prime US Supreme Court Decisions,” CPR Speaks (Jan. 22) (available at http://bit.ly/33d5nSo).

Loree notes that where an arbitrator ignores the parties’ clear and unmistakable class arbitration waiver, the award would presumably be vacated under Federal Arbitration Act Section 10(a)(4), following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stolt-Nielsen S.A v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010) and Oxford Health Plans LLC v. John Ivan Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (2013).

“But rather than allow that scenario to play itself out,” he continues, “the Fifth Circuit has effectively conflated the clarity of the contract on the merits issue (class arbitration consent) with the clarity of the contract on the issue of who gets to decide class arbitration consent.”

This, according to Loree, runs counter to the Supreme Court’s Schein decision.

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The author is a CPR Institute summer intern.

 

Update: Legislatures on Invalidating Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements

By Andrew Garcia

A federal court has slowed the momentum by legislatures—in this case, New York state’s—to bar arbitration in employment cases. A New York U.S. District Court judge has struck down the application of a recent state law which allowed employees to avoid mandatory pre-dispute employment agreements to arbitrate sexual harassment claims.

The statute at issue, NYCPLR § 7515, originally passed and signed into law a year ago, aimed to void arbitration clauses in employment contracts that require the use of arbitration proceedings to resolve workplace sexual harassment claims in New York state. In June, the New York Senate and Assembly passed amendments to § 7515 that expanded this prohibition to agreements that sought to arbitrate all workplace discrimination claims.

This year’s bill, awaiting Gov. Andrew Cuomo’s expected signature (see http://bit.ly/2SKnH0c), was a victory for lawmakers like the sponsor, State Democratic Senator Alessandra Biaggi. (She wrote on Twitter on June 19: “6 months & 2 public hearings later, we passed #BiaggiBill S6577 to expand protections for survivors, & hold New York employers, agencies, & organizations liable for all forms of workplace sexual harassment and discrimination.” See @SenatorBiaggi.)

But any victories may be short-lived. A federal court found that the currently enacted version of § 7515 was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act and therefore invalid about a week after the amendments passed both New York houses.

On June 26, U.S. District Court Judge Denise Cote issued an opinion that deemed a recently modified New York State law preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.  Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC et al., No. 18cv11528 – Document 52 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (available at http://bit.ly/2y9w6AL). In Latif, the plaintiff filed a suit against his employer, alleging discrimination and sexual assault claims. At the beginning of his employment, Latif signed an offer letter that incorporated by reference Morgan Stanley’s CARE Arbitration Program Arbitration Agreement.

Judge Cote found that the application of § 7515 to invalidate the parties’ agreement to arbitrate Latif’s claims would be inconsistent with the FAA. The opinion states that § 7515 does not displace the FAA’s presumption that arbitration agreements are enforceable. Judge Cote did not address the viability of § 7515 in purely an intrastate matter where the FAA would not be implicated.

The recently passed amendments to § 7515 are part of a growing trend in state and federal legislatures to pass laws that ban pre-dispute arbitration agreements for sexual harassment claims and more. In 2018, the Maryland legislature passed the Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act, which prohibited employers from enforcing arbitration agreements for sexual harassment or retaliation claims. In Vermont, the legislature passed “An Act Relating to the Prevention of Sexual Harassment,”  which prohibited agreements that prevent an employee from filing a sexual harassment claim in court.

The states have moved faster than Congress, but there is no shortage of proposals at the federal level. In the current session, there have been at least 11 new bills introduced to amend the FAA, the Fair Labor Standards Act, or the National Labor Relations Act to prohibit most employment and consumer pre-dispute arbitration agreements.

Table 1: 116th Legislative Session Bills Pertaining to Arbitration (Senate = S; House = HR)

Bill Name Bill Number Sponsors Current Status
Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act S. 610 Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D., Conn. 2/28/19: Introduced
H.R. 1423 Rep. Hank Johnson, D., Ga. 4/8/19: Referred to the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law
Bringing an End to Harassment by Enhancing Accountability and Rejecting Discrimination (BE HEARD) in the Workplace Act S. 1082 Sen. Patty Murray, D. Wash. 4/9/19: Introduced
H.R. 2148 Rep. Katherine Clark, D. Mass. 5/3/19: Referred to the Subcommittee on the Constitution Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties
Restoring Justice for Workers Act S. 1491 Sen. Patty Murray D., Wash. 5/15/19: Introduced and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
H.R. 2749 Rep. Jerrold Nadler, D., N.Y. 6/26/19: Referred to the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act H.R. 1443 Rep. Cheri Bustos, D. Ill. 4/8/19: Referred to the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law
Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act S. 635 Sen. Patrick Leahy, D., Vt. 2/28/19: Introduced
Preventing Risky Operations from Threatening the Education and Career Trajectories of (PROTECT) Students Act S. 867 Sen. Margaret Wood Hassan, D. N.H. 3/26/19: Referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
Court Legal Access and Student Support (CLASS) Act S. 608 Sen. Richard Durbin, D., Ill. 2/28/19: Referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
H.R. 1430 Rep. Maxine Waters, D. Calif. 4/8/19: Referred to the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law
Safety Over Arbitration Act S. 620 Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, D., R.I. 2/28/19: Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
Arbitration Fairness for Consumers Act S. 630 Sen. Sherrod Brown, D., Ohio 2/28/19: Referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Justice for Servicemembers Act H.R. 2750 Rep. David Cicilline, D. R.I. 6/26/2019: Referred to the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law

 

Ending Forced Arbitration for Victims of Data Breaches Act H.R. 327 Rep. Ted Lieu, D. Calif. 1/25/19: Referred to the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce

The bill with the most co-sponsors (215 House members and 34 Senators) and the most prominent media coverage is the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act, which would ban pre-dispute arbitration in employment, consumer, antitrust, and civil rights disputes. Introduced in both the House and the Senate, the FAIR Act was recently referred to the House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law.

Another bill with growing support (96 House members and 18 Senators co-sponsoring) is the Bringing an End to Harassment by Enhancing Accountability and Rejecting Discrimination (BE HEARD) in the Workplace Act. The BE HEARD in the Workplace Act bans all pre-dispute arbitration agreements that require arbitration of a work dispute, and all post-dispute arbitration agreements where an employee’s consent was coerced, or if the agreement was not in sufficiently plain language likely to be understood by the average worker.

The BE HEARD in the Workplace Act would also amend the NLRA to expand “Unfair Labor Practices” to situations where an employer enters into or attempts to enforce any agreement that prevents litigation, or support of joint, class, or collective claims arising from or relating to the employment of a worker, coerces the worker to enter into such an agreement, and retaliates against a worker for refusing to enter into such an agreement. The House bill, sponsored by Rep. Katherine Clark, D., Mass., is currently in the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties.

Another key bill, with 48 members of the House and 18 Senators co-sponsoring, is the Restoring Justice for Workers Act. This bill would amend the NLRA to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements that require arbitration of work disputes, retaliation against workers for refusing to enter into arbitration agreements and ensure that post-dispute arbitration agreements are “truly voluntary.” The House bill, sponsored by Rep. Jerrold Nadler, D., is currently in the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law.

The Latif holding that the FAA preempts § 7515 might push federal and state lawmakers to accelerate the momentum of the pending federal legislation. Judge Cote in Latif notes that the law already had been cited by the U.S. Supreme Court, in dissent, as an example of state action that seeks to protect workers’ ability to bring sexual harassment suits in court in the wake of other top court decisions backing employment arbitration. See Lamps Plus v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1422 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (available at http://bit.ly/2GxwFbC).

Although legislation that has sought to ban fully pre-dispute arbitration agreements has not been successful, this could change given the political landscape and outcome of the 2020 election.

The author, a Summer 2019 CPR Institute intern, is a law student at Brooklyn Law School.

 

 

CMS Finalizes Rule on Nursing Home Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements

By Mark Kantor

Kantor Photo (8-2012)

You will recall the controversy during the Obama Administration over the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements by nursing homes.  Last week, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services finalized a revised rule (the 2019 Final Rule) removing the prohibition in the 2016 Rule on pre-dispute arbitration agreements for long-term healthcare facilities but keeping provisions from the 2016 rule “banning facilities from requiring that residents sign arbitration agreements as a condition of admission to a facility” and “specifying that a resident’s right to continue to receive care at the facility must not be contingent upon signing an arbitration agreement.”

Many thanks to Beth Graham and Karl Bayer’s Disputing Blog for following these developments – see www.disputingblog.com/cms-issues-final-rule-allowing-pre-dispute-nursing-home-arbitration-agreements/ .

As M-and-A participants will recall, CMS promulgated a rule in October 2016 barring long-term care facilities (e.g., nursing homes) from Medicare and Medicaid programs unless the facility gave up provisions requiring pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements between LTC facilities and their residents.  The 2016 Rule:

“prohibit[ed] LTC facilities from entering into pre- dispute, binding arbitration agreements with any resident or his or her representative, or requiring that a resident sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of admission to the LTC facility. It also required that an agreement for post-dispute binding arbitration be entered into by the resident voluntarily, that the parties agree on the selection of a neutral arbitrator, and that the arbitral venue be convenient to both parties. The arbitration agreement could be signed by another individual only if allowed by the relevant state’s law, if all of the other requirements in this section were met, and if that individual had no interest in the facility. In addition, a resident’s right to continue to receive care at the facility post-dispute could not be contingent upon the resident or his or her representative signing an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement could not contain any language that prohibited or discouraged the resident or anyone else from communicating with federal, state, or local officials, including but not limited to, federal and state surveyors, other federal and state health department employees, and representatives of the Office of the State Long-Term Care Ombudsman. In addition, when a LTC facility and a resident resolved a dispute through arbitration, a copy of the signed agreement for binding arbitration and the arbitrator’s final decision was required to be retained by the facility for 5 years and be available for inspection upon request by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) or its designee.

The 2016 Rule was preliminarily enjoined nationwide by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in November 2016 as a result of litigation brought by the American Health Care Association and a group of affiliated nursing homes.  Promptly thereafter, CMS issued an instruction calling for non-enforcement of the 2016 Rule’s pre-dispute arbitration agreement provisions.  In 2017, the new Trump Administration issued proposed revisions to the 2016 Rule.  CMS sought public comment on the 2017 proposed rule, receiving over 1,000 comments including many from groups that advocate for the rights of older adults, residents in nursing homes or people with disabilities, as well as State Offices of the Long-Term Care Ombudsman.

Last week, CMS finalized and issued a revised 2019 Final Rule at 84 Fed. Reg. 34718 (July 18, 2019, available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-07-18/pdf/2019-14945.pdf), making some changes to its proposed revised rule but retaining the removal of the core prohibition on pre-dispute arbitration agreements for long-term healthcare facilities.  Significantly, the final rule keeps important provisions from the 2016 Rule “banning facilities from requiring that residents sign arbitration agreements as a condition of admission to a facility” or “specifying that a resident’s right to continue to receive care at the facility must not be contingent upon signing an arbitration agreement.”  The 2019 Final Rule also modifies in some respects the transparency requirements offered in the 2017 proposed rule.  The CMS short summary of the Final Rule states as follows.

We have reviewed all of the comments received and considered the concerns raised by all stakeholders. As a result, we have made some revisions to the proposed rule in response to public comments. Specifically, as discussed in detail below, we are finalizing our proposals to remove the requirement at § 483.70(n)(1) precluding facilities from entering into pre-dispute, binding agreements for binding arbitration with any resident or his or her representative, and the provisions at § 483.70(n)(2)(ii) regarding the terms of arbitration agreements. We are not finalizing the proposed removal of the provision at § 483.70(n)(2)(iii) banning facilities from requiring that residents sign arbitration agreements as a condition of admission to a facility. Therefore, facilities will continue to be prohibited from requiring any resident or his or her representative to sign an agreement for binding arbitration as a condition of admission to the facility. In addition, to address commenters’ concerns that facilities may still coerce or intimidate the resident and his or her representative into signing the agreement, the facility must explicitly inform the resident or his or her representative that signing the agreement is not a condition of admission and ensure that this language is also in the agreement. We are finalizing provisions requiring that arbitration agreements be in a form and manner that the resident understands. However, we are not finalizing the proposed transparency related provisions that the facility must ensure that the agreement for binding arbitration is in ‘‘plain language’’ and that the facility post a notice regarding the use of agreements for binding arbitration in an area that is visible to residents and visitors. We are not finalizing the proposed removal of the provision specifying that a resident’s right to continue to receive care at the facility must not be contingent upon signing an arbitration agreement. Finally, based on comments, we are adding a requirement that facilities grant to residents a 30 calendar day period during which they may rescind their agreement to an arbitration agreement.

The full revised Final Rule can be found here – https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-07-18/pdf/2019-14945.pdf.  It will be interesting to see if the nursing home industry opposes this Rule as well, in reliance on the reasoning of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.  Whether or not there is a potential conflict between Epic Systems and CMS’ 2019 Final Rule, the industry may simply believe it has won enough in the political battle to step away from the legal battle.

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Mark Kantor is a CPR Distinguished Neutral. Until he retired from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Mark was a partner in the Corporate and Project Finance Groups of the Firm. He currently serves as an arbitrator and mediator. He teaches as an Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center (Recipient, Fahy Award for Outstanding Adjunct Professor). Additionally, Mr. Kantor is Editor-in-Chief of the online journal Transnational Dispute Management.

This material was first published on OGEMID, the Oil Gas Energy Mining Infrastructure and Investment Disputes discussion group sponsored by the on-line journal Transnational Dispute Management (TDM, at https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/), and is republished with consent.

New Report Comparing Arbitration and Litigation in Employment Disputes Sparks Backlash

By Andrew Garcia

In May, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce affiliate, the Institute for Legal Reform, released a report praising the results of arbitration in encouraging settlement, providing more wins for employees, higher awards, and faster outcomes versus litigation in employment disputes.

The Chamber’s report, “Fairer, Faster, Better: An Empirical Assessment of Employment Arbitration,” authored by Nam D. Pham and Mary Donovan, researchers at Washington, D.C., consulting firm NDP Analytics, seemed awash in good news.

It was based on a five-year review between 2014 and 2018 of 10,000 employment arbitrations with data from arbitration providers American Arbitration Association and JAMS. The report compared the arbitrations with more than 90,000 employment lawsuits in federal courts between 2014-2018. It found that employees were three times more likely to prevail in arbitration than in litigation, arbitrations lasted on average 96 days shorter than litigated cases, and the average amount awarded was almost twice as much in employment arbitration, at more than $520,000,  compared to litigation.

Twitter erupted. Critics slammed the report saying that it ignored key data, failed to account for cases cut off by compulsory alternative dispute resolution processes, and flat-out cooked the awards data conclusions by using the mean to skew the size of awards, rather than the median.

More significantly, labor forces moved to debunk the Chamber’s  report saying it was designed for a May Congressional hearing, Justice Denied: Forced Arbitration and the Erosion of our Legal System, where it was the crux of the Chamber’s pro-arbitration argument.

A principle criticism is the report doesn’t cite the contrary significant data that emerged over the past decade from the Economic Policy Institute, a Washington, D.C., nonprofit that researches economic data from low- and middle-income workers’ perspective. The 2015 EPI report criticized arbitration as a litigation alternative in employment cases.

That December 2015 EPI report, “The Arbitration Epidemic,” authored by UCLA School of Law Prof. Katherine Stone, and Alexander Colvin, who is dean and the Martin F. Scheinman Professor of Conflict Resolution at Cornell University’s ILR School, argued that employees who are contractually bound to arbitrate disputes are less likely to receive favorable outcomes or substantial awards compared to employees that initiate disputes through litigation.

Stone and Colvin compared two separate studies that examined outcomes in arbitration and litigation actions, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes (2011), and Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison (2003).  They found that employee arbitration win rates were 59% as often as in federal court actions, and 38% as often in state court actions.

A subsequent 2015 study on employment litigations indicated that the employee win rates in federal court cases lowered to an average of 29.7%, while another 2015 study on employment arbitrations found that employee win rates in arbitrations also lowered to an average of 19.1%. The EPI report commented that even though the outcome gap narrowed in 2015 compared to the 59% gap in 2011, the employee win rate in arbitration was still 35.7% lower than in federal court actions.

A subsequent 2018 report by Alexander Colvin found that only one in 10,400 employees subject to arbitration files a claim, which is a rate 35 to 80 times less than employees who file claims in federal and state courts.

So the new Chamber Institute for Legal Reform report served to reignite fights that have taken place over the past decade in courts and legislatures over employment and consumer arbitration. Yet despite the recurring arguments, there may be middle ground. Myriam Gilles, a professor at Cardozo School of Law in New York,  stated in her testimony at the May Congressional hearing that advocates opposed to mandatory arbitration are not arguing that arbitration be banned altogether, but that mandatory arbitration in a consumer or employment context that bars class actions is unworkable.

In addition, the Stone and Colvin report offers an in-house ADR solution that companies can adopt. The report cites that the former TRW Inc. in the 1990s adopted successful internal dispute resolution procedures that included local management complaint procedures, peer review panels, and then mediation. A 2004 study by Colvin found that only 72 TRW cases even reached mediation over the first three years of the program, and only three of the cases reached arbitration. In addition, TRW set up the process to be binding on the company but not on the employee, who would then be able to go to court after arbitration if the employee was not pleased with the outcome.

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The author, a Summer 2019 CPR Institute intern, is a law student at Brooklyn Law School.

 

Update: ADR Breakfast on New York State’s Presumptive Mediation Implementation

By Savannah Billingham-Hemminger

An official of the New York state court system introduced new efforts on boosting the use of alternative dispute resolution, and especially mediation, at a regular gathering of practitioners last week.

Lisa Denig, Special Counsel for ADR Initiatives for the NY State Office of Court Administration, spoke about the moves, characterized by what the state is calling “presumptive ADR,” at the monthly New York City John Jay College of Criminal Justice ADR Breakfast on July 11.

In attendance were attorneys, neutrals, and representatives of organizations who are interested in how the ADR steps, part of New York State Chief Judge Janet DiFiore’s Excellence Initiative, would affect their practices. The effort will push litigants to using ADR in an effort to expedite and improve the quality of outcomes in the state court system.

Full details on the presumptive ADR and mediation efforts are in the new issue of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, at “‘Presumptive Mediation’: New York Moves to Improve Its Court ADR Game,” 37 Alternatives 107 (available at http://bit.ly/2GbCWdK).

Denig opened the briefing with background on the effort. Earlier this year, Chief Judge DiFiore introduced the idea as a way to reduce court backlogs. While many pilot programs had already been conducted, the move is designed to ensure full participation and cement ADR as an option—as well as a focus—in all state courts.

While many perceive the efforts as a mediation-based program, it is officially termed “Presumptive ADR” because not every court will focus on mediation. Courts in the state’s 13 judicial districts are being given freedom to adopt programs in accordance with local demand. The districts are making ADR plans based upon their typical cases, and matching that with the ADR methods that work best for these cases.

The plans, which are being drafted by the administrative judge of each judicial district, are due to be submitted by Sept. 1. Denig said that the hope is that implementation will roll out by the end of the year. There are certain types of civil cases that are not conducive to ADR methods, but she assured the audience that presumptions will not change, but rather, the ADR approach will be adjusted.

The culture shift in New York state courts’ approach to cases has already brought up some challenges. Denig noted the biggest issues to be addressed included language diversity of neutrals; power imbalances in mediation; opt-out provisions for certain cases, and neutrals’ compensation.

She stated that these challenges are being worked out this summer. The administrative judges are looking at other states as models in addressing these issues, formulating their plans and developing their local rules. There will be statewide and local rules for the initiative, and they are being developed on parallel tracks.

The breakfast audience brought up many scenarios that members currently face in their ADR practices. The biggest concern—not surprising in a gathering that is often heavily attended by neutrals–is the state’s hiring process, requirements, and neutral compensation.

The answer to the questions was: Stay tuned.  Lisa Denig listened to the concerns, and assured the group that once the plans roll out in September, the presumptive ADR path will be much clearer.

The New York state court system’s May 14 announcement on the presumptive ADR moves is available at http://bit.ly/32lhjkq.

 

The author, a Summer 2019 CPR Intern, is a law student at Pepperdine University School of Law in Malibu, Calif.

 

 

 

Experiences & Impact from CPR’s 2019 International Mediation Competition

By Ibrahim Godofa (A member of the University of Nairobi Team)

The 2019 CPR International Mediation Competition has definitely been one of the key opportunities that I have been lucky enough to participate in this year and arguably for the entirety of my law school period. I believe it was an incredible opportunity for my teammates as well.

My attention was first drawn to this competition on LinkedIn where the poster was shared by Mr. Olivier André from the CPR Institute. I immediately shared the information with like-minded colleagues at the university and a team was formed, whereupon we applied for participation as well as a partial scholarship that had just been instituted to aid disadvantaged teams. Upon assessment, we were selected alongside 17 other teams from across the globe as the only team from the African continent. Additionally, we were granted the partial scholarship to participate!

“The role all of these takeaways will play in enhancing the position of mediation in Kenya, especially among our fellow students, cannot be underestimated.”

The competition period that took place between the 4th and 6th of April in São Paulo, Brazil was probably the most intensive and beneficial learning opportunity throughout the process. Coming from a jurisdiction where mediation is still a progress in motion, the first evening of the training session, featuring short lectures about the various emerging aspects of mediation, was an incredible way to start a learning curve that would last for the following two days. It was quite an eye-opening kick-off and equally interesting to be introduced to emerging technologies as well as business aspects, such as agricultural ones, in the practice of mediation. While this training session served as an effective way to expand the participants’ views on the evolving practice of mediation, we also found it to be a helpful approach to preparing for the actual competition, whose themes revolved around these emerging aspects.

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The Nairobi team, receiving their award for best teamwork. The author, Ibrahim Godofa, is pictured on the right, along with his teammates Edgar Usagi Alema (left) and Sumaiyah Abdi Omar (center).

The first day of the competition provided many different kinds of lessons, as my team and I got the chance to go up against excellent teams from world class universities all around the world. My team had the rare chance to go up against teams from three different continents: South America, Asia and North America on this first day. It was quite an awesome experience trying out our preparation against teams that had different approaches and internal qualification processes to get to this stage of the competition, and some of which even had coaches, unlike my team. It was also an interesting experience to compete in the style in which the competition was set up—which was new to me, and (as I learned from speaking to them) to several of the other participants as well.

Additionally, as a team we had always known mediation to be a conflict resolution process that is not bent towards a win-lose outcome. While retaining the important values of a mediation, this competition allowed us to simultaneously act upon the rush of competitiveness coming from all the teams while maintaining a respectful and professional sportsmanship, which was one of the highlights of this phase of the competition observable from all the teams present.

The first day of the competition culminated quite memorably for us, with an announcement that our negotiating team was through to the quarter finals the following day. Being part of our negotiating team, this presented serious excitement for me and also meant continued work within the limited time we had to prepare for the quarter finals round. The quality of the competition in this round was even a notch higher than the previous day’s, and so were the stakes. However, my team would learn later in the day that our impressive run would end at this round, albeit against a worthy opponent, the Harvard Law School team.

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The team from the University of Nairobi, School of Law, taking a well-deserved break

Outside the competition rooms, there was an extended opportunity to interact and network with current and future voices in global mediation. This ranged from top-of-their-class students from the various participating universities as well as other professionals who were present in different capacities as judges, coaches and other volunteers. Interacting with these individuals and exchanging contacts provided an invaluable door to long-lasting partnerships and collaborations that are particularly priceless coming from a jurisdiction such as ours, where borrowing from global best practices brings a special kind of difference in an under-developed field such as mediation.

At the end of the competition, my team was recognized with the “Best Teamwork” Award, upon the completion and compilation of feedback from the excellent judging panels that we came across in the various rounds. This feedback from the judges, which continued to come to our attention even after the competition was long finished, has been a very important part of the competition’s learning process and my team is incredibly proud to have emerged with an award testament to the positive and constructive feedback that the judges had on our performance.

One of the main attractions of this competition to our team lay in the impact that the experience would have on mediation back in our circles at home, both in general and at our school in particular. The lessons taken home by our team from this experience are numerous. Some of the key takeaways from the wholesome experience of the competition include:

  • Best practices from other universities as far as student activities centered around mediation is concerned in their schools, especially for the universities from the United States
  • Valuable feedback from the judging panel, some of which contain long-term lessons for our future practices
  • And, most importantly, a model mediation practice procedure that can be employed to sharpen the skills of eager students back at our school through student-led trainings

It is important to also note that our team’s participation in this edition of the competition was the first of its kind at our school as far as any international Alternative Dispute Resolution competitions are concerned. Our participation has therefore paved way for other students to look for and take up similar opportunities, and to benefit from the connections that our team acquired internationally which can be leveraged to create a ripple of opportunities to others who will come after us. The role all of these takeaways will play in enhancing the position of mediation in Kenya, especially among our fellow students, cannot be underestimated. With all signs indicating the rise of mediation practice around the world, we are certainly committed to advancing this important dispute resolution resource within our immediate circle of friends and fellow students, starting from our school. And a big thank you goes to the CPR Institute for the invaluable role that it continues to play in driving a global mediation culture.

Our team’s appreciations go to Olivier André, the amazing Chris Silva and Franco Gevaerd from the CPR Institute, all of whom played a key role in making our experience of this competition, alongside their other colleagues, so memorable.

And oh! Brazil was an awesome place and the Paulistas were very friendly and welcoming residents of a great city! We had a wonderful time.

 

NJ’s Top Court Backs Arbitration in Car Sales Fraud Cases

By Brian Chihera

In Janell Goffe v. Foulke Management Corp (A-3/4-18/081258 ) (N.J. S.Ct.  June 5) (available at http://bit.ly/2X8njco), a unanimous N.J. Supreme court recently stated that two sales fraud claims against auto dealers must be decided through arbitration.

The Court followed longstanding U.S. Supreme Court law in holding that the plaintiffs’ challenges to their sales agreements were attacks on the contract formation, but not on the language used in the agreements to arbitrate.

Justice Jaynee LaVecchia wrote for the 7-0 Court, “Those rulings do not permit threshold issues about overall contract validity to be resolved by the courts when the arbitration agreement itself is not specifically challenged.”

The plaintiffs, who were customers of two Cherry Hill, N.J., auto dealerships, challenged the sales agreements they had entered into because they claimed that the contracts were concluded through fraud—at least one of which appeared to be a bait-and-switch scheme.

Previously, New Jersey’s top Court in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 99 A.3d 306, 311 (N.J. 2014) (available at http://bit.ly/2NpTG6W), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2804 (2015), backed a plaintiffs’ challenge to an arbitration agreement because “ the wording of the service agreement did not clearly and unambiguously signal to plaintiff that she was surrendering her right to pursue her statutory claims in court.”

But the Goffe court found that the challenge was to the overall contract’s formation, not the arbitration agreement.

The first plaintiff, Janell Goffe, had gone to Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, where she was told that she could get a Buick for a trade-in.  She paid $250 the same day and then would pay $750 two weeks later. Goffe was also told that the financing had been approved.  She then signed the sales contract, which included an arbitration clause.

After a few days, however, she was told that the financing had been declined and had she had to make a larger down payment and higher monthly payments, but she opted to return the Buick to the dealership, canceling the deal.

Sasha Robinson, the second plaintiff, asked about buying a car with Mall Chevrolet, and was told that she would have two days to change her mind about the purchase. She signed the contract, including the arbitration clause, the same day. When she tried to return the car to the dealership, Robinson was told that there was a mistake and she was bound by the contract, which meant that the matter would be taken for arbitration.

Goffe did not involve any challenge to the arbitration clause nor the language that was used in it. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been made to sign the contracts through fraudulent means, which constitutes challenges to the entirety of the contracts. They wanted the courts to nullify the contracts because they alleged fraud was committed.

In reaching its decision, the N.J. Supreme Court looked at how the U.S. Supreme Court had dealt with such issues. “The United States Supreme Court has held that when a plaintiff raises a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract as a whole–rather than fraud in the making of the arbitration agreement itself–the Federal Arbitration Act requires that the dispute be resolved by the arbitrator,” stated Justice LaVecchia in the opinion, citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).

She concluded, “based on the complaint and the certifications provided to the trial court, it is apparent to us that the parties’ claims are subject to an enforceable arbitration agreement. Therefore, the arbitration agreement is severable and enforceable. Plaintiffs must arbitrate their claims. Before the arbitrator, plaintiffs can raise any arbitrability issues consistent with the delegation clauses in these agreements.”

The Court reversed its Appellate Division, reinstating the trial courts’ orders to compel.

 

The author, a CPR Institute Summer 2019 intern, graduated in May with an LLM in dispute resolution from the University of Missouri School of Law in Columbia, Mo.