United States Submits Amicus Brief in Servotronics International Arbitration Supreme Court Case

By Cai Phillips-Jones

Multiple parties have filed briefs concerning arbitration discovery rules in a case now before the U.S. Supreme Court for fall argument, Servotronics v. Rolls Royce, No. 794 (see the Court’s official docket at https://bit.ly/3ysbMrL).  

In the case, the Court will decide the question of whether federal district courts can assist with obtaining evidence in foreign arbitration cases at the parties’ request. The argument date has not yet been set.

The U.S. Solicitor General’s office in the Justice Department has filed an amicus brief advocating on behalf of the U.S. government for a narrow interpretation of 28 U.S.C. 1782, a law that has created a split among federal circuit courts. The law allows circuit courts to authorize discovery for litigation originating in “foreign tribunals,” including compelling testimony from witnesses residing in the United States. 

But circuit courts have not been able to agree about whether the law pertains to arbitration taking place in foreign countries: The Fourth and Sixth U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals support court involvement in discovery for these arbitrations under Section 1782, and the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits reject this interpretation of the law.

The Fourth and Seventh Circuits both heard the same Servotronics case that is now on the Supreme Court docket. The circuit courts reached opposite conclusions. For background on the cases’ paths and how the current Seventh Circuit case made it to the Supreme Court, see Amy Foust, “The Next Arbitration Matter: Supreme Court Agrees to Decide Extent of Foreign Tribunal Evidence Powers,” CPR Speaks (March 22) (available at https://bit.ly/36cp27K), and “YouTube Analysis: What Happens Next with the 3/22 Servotronics Cert Grant on Foreign Arbitration Evidence,” CPR Speaks (March 22) (available at https://bit.ly/3jLbVT3).

CPR, which publishes CPR Speaks, submitted an amicus brief in support of the Servotronics certiorari request in January, which also was the subject of an amicus brief by the Atlanta International Arbitration Society. Since the petition was granted, 11 additional amicus briefs, including the brief of the Solicitor General’s office, have been filed.

Of the group, two state that they do no support either party–those of Prof. Yanbai Andrea Wang, of Philadelphia’s University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, who asks the Court to clarify the scope of Section 1782, previously interpreted in the Intel case discussed below; and the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, which discusses the ICC’s international law views.

Two briefs support the petitioner, submitted on behalf of Columbia Law School Prof. George A. Bermann; and Palo Alto, Calif.-based ADR provider Federal Arbitration Inc.

Seven of the briefs support the respondent in seeking a narrow scope for Section 1782 discovery to exclude international arbitrations. In addition to the U.S. government’s brief, they include briefs submitted on behalf of China and Hong Kong-based arbitrators Dr. Xu Guojian, Li Hongji, Zhu Yongrui, Tang Qingyang, Chi Manjiao, Ronald Sum, and Dr. Zhang Guanglei; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable; International Arbitration Center in Tokyo;  the General Aviation Manufacturers Association Inc. and the Aerospace Industries Association; Halliburton Co., which is facing a Section 1782 issue in a separate case, and the Institute of International Bankers, a New York City-based industry association of international banks operating in the United States.

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In its brief, the government reviews the history of requests for discovery from foreign parties.

According to the amicus brief, prior to 1855, federal courts did not have the authority to compel a witness to testify in a case involving a foreign state party. In 1855, an act was passed by Congress to remedy this, but in a strange twist this law was subsequently “buried in oblivion” due to “a succession of errors in indexing and revising the statutes” and lost to the courts. A similar law was passed in 1877 and, in 1948, the law was broadened to include discovery for non-state parties.

In 1964, the language in the law was broadened again, applying to “a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal” compared to the previous version’s “any judicial proceeding in any court in a foreign country.” Since then, only one Supreme Court case has discussed the scope of the law, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).

The case concerned the distinction between judicial and administrative processes and whether Section 1782 applied to the latter. The Court found it applied. But recently, disagreement  has sprung up about whether the “foreign tribunal” language includes arbitrations involving foreign parties. The U.S. government has now taken the position that the law should not apply to private foreign arbitrations.

In its brief, United States argues (1) that such discovery functions were not within the scope of Congress’ intent when it passed 28 U.S.C 1782; (2) that interpreting the law to apply to international commercial arbitrations would create asymmetry with the domestic rules of arbitration incorporated in the Federal Arbitration Act; and (3) such an interpretation would create additional problems if extended to investor-state arbitration.

Noting that previous versions of the law clearly referred to only courts, the government acknowledges that the 1964 revision changed this language from “any judicial proceeding in any court in a foreign country,” to “a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” This change, according to the government, and in contrast to the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation, was “only a measured expansion of the provision’s scope to capture quasi-judicial entities (such as investigating magistrates) and certain intergovernmental bodies (such as state-to-state claims commissions).” As the government points out, at the time the 1964 law was passed, international commercial arbitration was still novel, and thus likely outside Congress’s intent.

The government’s second argument discusses the incongruence of the limited discovery available under the FAA to arbitrators, in contrast to the discovery requests available to parties under Section 1782. Interpreting the law to apply to commercial arbitrations would “[allow] more expansive discovery in foreign disputes than what is permitted domestically,” the government’s amicus brief states.

While the court acknowledges that Section 1782 is not coextensive with domestic discovery rules, the “stake asymmetry” produced by a broad interpretation of the law “should [be taken] into account” in determining the law’s scope.

Finally, the government discusses a particular type of arbitration, investor-state arbitration, which gives investors who have claims against a foreign state in which they held an investment a private remedy for losses allegedly caused by the state. Arbitration in this context replaced a more time-consuming and expensive process, diplomatic protection, involving a government negotiating a resolution on behalf of one of its citizens who has suffered an economic injury.

The solicitor general’s amicus brief argues that investor-state arbitrations would be hampered by additional discovery procedures and “upset settled expectations” of investor and state parties entering contracts.

The U.S. government, in addition to filing a brief, has requested permission from the court to argue the case with the parties this fall The Court has not yet acted on the oral argument request, which is expected to be granted.

Meantime, the underlying arbitration in Servotronics has been conducted in London the week of May 10. If a decision emerges before the Court hears the arguments, the existence of an arbitration award could raise questions of mootness.

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The author, a J.D. student who will enter his third year this fall at Yeshiva University’s Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York, is a 2021 CPR Summer Intern.

[END]

Supreme Court Again Declines a “Who Decides?” Case in Class Arbitration

By Russ Bleemer

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning declined to hear a case that would have covered two issues that are familiar arbitration turf at the nation’s top court—whether rules incorporated into an ADR agreement are a specific-enough designation for the arbitration to go forward, and whether arbitrators can invoke class processes.

The court denied cert in Shivkov v. Artex Risk Solutions Inc., 20-1313, where an appeals court, compelling arbitration, also held that “the availability of class arbitration is a gateway issue that a court must presumptively decide,” but because the agreements “do not clearly and unmistakably delegate that issue to the arbitrator,” and “[b]ecause the Agreements are silent on class arbitration, they do not permit class arbitration.” Shivkov v. Artex Risk Sols. Inc., 974 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (available at https://bit.ly/3y6e9jL).

This morning’s order can be found here.

The issues presented challenging the Ninth Circuit petition to the Supreme Court by the petitioners—more than 80 individual and business plaintiffs who had filed suit against insurance management companies that set up captive insurance firms for the petitioners that were audited and held liable for unpaid federal taxes—covered the incorporation by reference rules question, and class arbitration.  The specific questions presented by the petitioners that the Court declined today were:

1. The parties’ arbitration clause expressly designates the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) as their default dispute-resolution method. The clause did not also specifically mention the AAA Rules themselves, which, according to the AAA, apply whenever parties select a AAA arbitration. Must an agreement that specifies arbitration before the AAA as the default dispute-resolution method also specifically mention the AAA Rules to avoid being considered ambiguous about whether the parties intended to apply the AAA Rules?

2. Under the plain text of the Federal Arbitration Act, courts—not arbitrators—decide gateway issues, such as whether there is an agreement to arbitrate and what controversies does it cover. Procedural questions, however, are reserved for arbitrators. Is the availability of class arbitration a matter for an arbitrator to decide, or for a court to decide?

The Shivkov cert denial isn’t surprising because the incorporation of AAA rules issue that the petitioner attempted to have the Court examine already was rejected, indirectly, in a startling move earlier this term.  The Court heard arguments in December in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc., No. 19-963 on whether a contract’s delegation agreement sending a matter to arbitration “clearly and unmistakably” designated the case for arbitration because the contract had a carve-out provision from arbitration for injunctions.

But in January, just a month after the oral arguments, the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted, after justices at the hearing appeared to get stuck on whether the incorporation by reference to the AAA rules was sufficient for the clear and unmistakable delegation to arbitration.

The Court a year ago, in focusing on the Henry Schein contract carve-out language in granting certiorari, had denied a cross petition in the case on the incorporation-by-reference issue. The cross petition had asked the Court to address the AAA rules that encompassed a provision that arbitrators decide arbitrability. That denial appeared to have a hand in the Court’s January dismissal of the carve-out language interpretation issue.

At the same time in Shivkov, on the petitioners’ second issue, there have been attempts to revisit class arbitration at the U.S. Supreme Court periodically since the Court’s recent seminal cases reviewing and restricting arbitrators’ power to use a class process without a contract authorization. See Lamps Plus Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).

The Shivkov petitioners contended that the Court has left open the class arbitration determination. They urged the Court to preserve the decision for judges.

For example, last year, the Court declined to hear a case asking whether an arbitrator may compel class arbitration—binding the parties and absent class members—without finding actual consent, instead based only on a finding that the agreement does not unambiguously prohibit class arbitration and should be construed against the drafter. See Cristina Carvajal, “Supreme Court Rejects Decade-Old Class Arbitration Employment Discrimination Case,” CPR Speaks (Oct. 5, 2020) available at https://bit.ly/35WsvHm) (discussing the Court’s second cert denial in the history of Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 942 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2019) (available at https://bit.ly/30yP3eZ)).

The Shivkov petition contended that the agreement to use the AAA means agreeing to the AAA rules, which put the arbitrability question in the arbitration tribunal’s hands–a cousin to the Jock argument, and which achieved the same cert-denied result. 

The Ninth Circuit Shivkov decision linked above stands, and the case, at least for now, is headed for arbitration under the AAA rules, with the appeals court, not the arbitration tribunal, determining that there will not be a class process.

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The author edits Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, which CPR Speaks’ owner, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution publishes with John Wiley & Sons.

[END]

Supreme Court Denies Review on the Interplay Between the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Arbitration Act

By Amy Foust

The Supreme Court today denied certiorari in GE Capital Retail Bank v. Belton, No. 20-481, an arbitration case in a bankruptcy matter.  The question presented by petitioner GE Capital, and rejected in this morning’s order list by the Court, was “whether provisions of the Bankruptcy Code providing for a statutorily enforceable discharge of a debtor’s debts impliedly repeal the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.”

The U.S. Bankruptcy Code section in question, 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2), provides in part:

A discharge in a case under this title— …

(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived[.]

The case, on cert petition from the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New York, suggests a tension between this section of the bankruptcy code and the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides that written agreements to arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” (9 U.S.C. §2), and that if there is no issue with the making of the agreement, a court “shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. §4. 

The underlying dispute was a putative class action related to GE Capital’s efforts to collect debts discharged in bankruptcy.  The plaintiffs–the discharged debtors–brought contempt proceedings under § 524 arguing a violation of the injunction against continued recovery.  GE Capital moved to have the dispute referred to arbitration. 

The case of Respondent Belton and two others similarly situated were addressed in a consolidated decision by the federal bankruptcy court in New York’s Southern District, finding that referring these cases to arbitration would defeat the purpose of seeking bankruptcy protections.  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District reversed the bankruptcy court and sent Belton’s case to arbitration. 

But around the same time, the Second Circuit decided Anderson v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 884 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2018), a case involving similar facts to GE Capital. In Anderson, an appeals panel found an inherent conflict between § 524 and the FAA because the discharge injunction is critical to the bankruptcy code’s purpose; the contempt claim requires the bankruptcy court’s continuing supervision, and denying the court the power to enforce its own injunctions would undermine bankruptcy code enforcement. 

In response to a request for reconsideration in view of Anderson, the U.S. District Court reversed itself and denied the motion to compel arbitration.  GE Capital appealed to the Second Circuit, which affirmed the district court. 

GE Capital then appealed to the Supreme Court, framing the issue as an implied repeal of the FAA, citing the Court’s support from Epic Systems v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 (2018), where the Court rejected a request to have the National Labor Relations Act override the Federal Arbitration Act. 

In a response to GE Capital’s request asking the nation’s top court to decline to hear the case, Respondent Belton had argued that the Second Circuit was correct in its analysis of this narrow issue, which is not the subject of any circuit split and did not merit the Court’s attention.

So the Second Circuit decision stands, allowing the respondents to proceed with contempt sanctions against major banks for continuing attempts to recover debts that had been subject of a bankruptcy discharge.

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The author is an LLM candidate studying dispute resolution at the Straus Institute, Caruso School of Law at Malibu, Calif.’s Pepperdine University, and an intern with the CPR Institute through Spring 2021.

[END]

Let’s Schein Again!

The International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution presents a CPR Speaks blog discussion of the 1/25/2021 U.S. Supreme Court per curiam decision dismissing Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc., No. 19-963, and a same-day order declining to hear Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 20-695. Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation Editor Russ Bleemer hosts Prof. Angela Downes, University of North Texas-Dallas College of Law, and arbitrator-advocates contributors Richard Faulkner, also of Dallas, and Philip J. Loree Jr. in New York.

By Russ Bleemer

The panel returns to CPR Speaks and YouTube to analyze the Monday Henry Schein dismissal–a one-line decision–just a month after the Court heard oral arguments on the issue of how a contract carve-out removing injunctions from arbitration affects the delegation of the entire matter to arbitration.

In fact, the Dec. 8, 2020, Henry Schein oral argument repeatedly turned to an issue in the rejected Piersing case on the effectiveness of the incorporation by reference of arbitration rules in designating an arbitration tribunal to decide whether a case is arbitrated, rather than a court deciding whether the matter is to be arbitrated. A cross-petition by Archer and White asking for review of the incorporation by reference of the arbitration contract’s American Arbitration Association rules was declined by the Supreme Court the same day it agreed to hear the carve-out issue last June.

Our panel discussed these issues after the oral argument on this blog.  See “Schein II: Argument in Review,” CPR Speaks (Dec. 9) (available at http://bit.ly/2VXfyIa) (in which the panelists also discuss their work on an amicus brief in the case, a subject that arose in this post’s video).

You can see today’s per curiam decision on the Supreme Court’s website here.

Monday’s Henry Schein dismissal ends a long period of Supreme Court litigation in the case that also included a 2019 U.S. Supreme Court decision. For now, the case returns to the Fifth Circuit for proceedings on whether the parties properly intended to arbitrate the case.

Details on the Supreme Court’s Monday cert denial in Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 20-695, are available on CPR Speaks here.

For more analysis on the Henry Schein dismissal, see Ronald Mann, “Justices dismiss arbitrability dispute,” Scotusblog (Jan. 25, 2021) (available at http://bit.ly/2Yh9U4O), in which the Columbia University professor and Scotusblog analyst concludes that

it seems likely that the justices ultimately decided that they couldn’t sensibly say anything about this matter without addressing the question of whether the contract called for arbitration of the gateway question. Because they had declined to call for briefs on that question, it did not make sense to address it here. A logical course of action, then, was to dismiss the matter from the docket, providing a rare victory for a party opposing arbitration.

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The author edits Alternatives for the CPR Institute.

Scotus’s Henry Schein No-Decision

By Russ Bleemer

If the U.S. Supreme Court appeared frustrated at last month’s arbitration argument in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc., No. 19-963, this morning’s one-line decision confirmed it.

The Court today dismissed the entire case without a decision on the merits.  The entire per curiam decision:  “The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.”

You can view it on the Supreme Court’s website here.

The immediate effect is that respondent Archer and White Sales sees a big win:  It will get the determination of whether its long-running case over a medical equipment contract dispute is to be arbitrated made by a judge, not an arbitrator.  A Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision now stands. See Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 935 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2019) (available at http://bit.ly/2NC7EmL).

Archer and White contended that a delegation agreement sending a matter to arbitration did not “clearly and unmistakably” send the case to arbitration because of a contract carve-out for injunctions.

With a one-line dismissal, it’s unknown why the Court did what it did. In shutting down the case, it may be backing Archer and White’s and the Fifth Circuit’s view. 

Or it may have reconsidered a point that Henry Schein’s successor status to the contract didn’t sustain its arbitration demand.

Or, in a point returned to repeatedly in last month’s argument, the Court may have botched the case on its own. When it granted Henry Schein’s cert petition on June 15 on the carve-out issue, the Supreme Court simultaneously rejected Archer and White’s cross petition challenging the determination of arbitrability of the case on a question of incorporation by reference. The cross petition contended that the “clear and unmistakable” evidence of an intent to arbitrate was insufficient; the contract incorporated American Arbitration Association rules that include a provision that arbitrators decide arbitrability.

Even though the Court rejected the cross-petition, the issue returned in the December arguments, at times overwhelming the discussion of the question of the carve-out’s effect. For more on the argument, see “Schein II: Argument in Review,” CPR Speaks (Dec. 9) (available at http://bit.ly/2VXfyIa).

One thing is certain:  The Court won’t use a follow-up petition to address the incorporation-by-reference issue, which would have interpreted the standard from the Court’s seminal decision on arbitrability, First Options of Chicago Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (available at https://bit.ly/39fAwcR).

That’s because a case that a petitioner and an amicus stated presented the issue cleanly—unencumbered by the carve-out issue and Henry Schein’s long history, including a 2019 U.S. Supreme Court decision—was denied certiorari 30 minutes ahead of today’s one-line opinion. Details on the Court’s cert denial in Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 20-695, are available on CPR Speaks here.

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The author edits Alternatives for the CPR Institute.

[END]

Court Again Rejects Review on Incorporating Rules that Define Arbitrability

By Temitope Akande & Russ Bleemer

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning declined to hear a case that presented a persistent arbitration issue: whether the incorporation of a set of arbitration rules that state that an arbitrator decides whether a case goes to arbitration, instead of a court making the arbitrability decision, provides sufficient “clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties agreed for the tribunal to make the decision.

It was the second time in eight months that the Court has rejected a significant case on the issue.

Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 20-695, would have analyzed the clear-and-unmistakable evidence standard for delegation to arbitrability from the Court’s First Options of Chicago Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (available at https://bit.ly/39fAwcR).  

The question presented by the petitioner, a former employee of two Domino’s franchisers who had a claim against the parent company, was:

In the context of a form employment agreement, is providing that a particular set of rules will govern arbitration proceedings, without more, “clear and unmistakable evidence” of the parties’ intent to have the arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability?

Last June, the Court declined to hear the question on arbitrability in a cross-petition in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer & White Sales Inc., No. 19-1080 (June 15, 2020), while accepting the case on the original cert petition on another, close issue involving the reach of carve-out provisions in arbitration agreements. 

In its December arguments in Schein, which awaits decision, the discussion of incorporation by reference on arbitrability arose.  See “Schein II: Argument in Review,” CPR Speaks (Dec. 9) (available at http://bit.ly/2VXfyIa). In its brief in Piersing, the petitioner “acknowledges that [the] Court recently denied certiorari of a cross-petition presenting a similar question,” citing Schein, adding, “however, the question is presented in this case cleanly and as a stand-alone question.”

In Piersing, the petitioner worked as a delivery driver for a franchisee of respondent Domino’s, and later got an employment offer from Carpe Diem, another Washington state Domino’s franchisee. While the petitioner intended to increase his hours and earnings, the first franchisee fired him based on a no-poach clause in his employment agreement.

He eventually brought a U.S. District Court class-action suit against Domino’s alleging that the hiring rules violated, among other things, antitrust laws.

Domino’s sought to compel arbitration of Piersing’s claims based on the arbitration agreement between the employee and Carpe Diem.  Domino’s asked for arbitration, according to the Sixth Circuit opinion in the case that was the subject of the cert petition (see Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, 962 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2020) (available at http://bit.ly/3sWDlrg)), “because the agreement’s reference to the AAA rules constituted a delegation clause in that the AAA rules supposedly provide for delegation.”

The district court held that equitable estoppel applies to permit franchiser Domino’s to enforce franchisee Carpe Diem’s agreement against Piersing and, according to the petitioner’s cert petition brief, “that the clause providing the AAA rules would govern any arbitration amounted to ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence of Piersing’s and Carpe Diem’s intent to delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.”

Piersing appealed the district court’s decision. Relying on Rent-a-Center, West Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010), and more, the Sixth Circuit held that the incorporation of arbitration rules that permit the arbitrator to resolve questions of arbitrability is sufficient to delegate those questions to the arbitrator.

Piersing’s Supreme Court cert petition brief analyzed the holdings in First Options, Rent-a-Center, West, and the first Henry Schein decision, Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer & White Sales Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019), which wrestled with the question of and the standard for who decides arbitrability, the tribunal or the court.

Based on these precedents, the petitioner argued that the existing circuit court analysis allowing for incorporation of rules that included arbitrators determining arbitrability wasn’t “clear and unmistakable evidence” of the parties’ intent to arbitrate.  It emphasized that, particularly for consumers and employees, the cases weren’t sufficiently thorough in light of the First Options standard. The petitioner also noted that the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with the holdings of several state high courts.

Domino’s countered that an agreement incorporating privately promulgated arbitral rules that assign questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator clearly and unmistakably show the parties’ agreement that an arbitrator, not the court, will resolve whether the case is suitable for arbitration.

Domino’s successfully argued for the nation’s top Court to reject the petition and thereby uphold the Sixth Circuit.

An amicus brief in support of the petitioner was filed by Columbia University Law School Prof. George Bermann, who described the issue in the appeal as “a central but unsettled issue of domestic and international arbitration.” Echoing the petitioner, the brief noted the importance of the issue in both Henry Schein Supreme Court cases, but stated that “the delegation question is presented front and center for review in this case.” It also cited the divergence between state and federal court views.

The amicus brief discussed the principle of “competence-competence” in international commercial law—the international equivalent of the arbitrability question under which the tribunal is presumed to be in a position to determine its jurisdiction, and which the Sixth Circuit invoked.  Bermann’s brief discussed the concept under the “clear and unmistakable” agreement standard of parties to arbitrate.

The amicus noted that the competence-competence language does not constitute “clear and unmistakable” evidence. “[A]ll modern arbitral procedure rules contain a ‘competence-competence’ clause,” the brief argued, “so that treating such language as clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation means that parties will almost invariably lose their right to a judicial determination of what this Court has multiple times referred to as the very cornerstone of arbitration, viz. consent to arbitrate.”

Noting the state-federal divide in the interpretation of whether the incorporation of rules satisfies First Options, the brief concluded, “Only this Court can definitively resolve that issue and ensure that parties do not forfeit their right to a judicial determination of arbitrability unless they manifest that intention clearly and unmistakably.”

For more information on the case and an in-depth discussion of the issues involved, see the Supreme Court’s docket page at http://bit.ly/39Zxed1.

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Akande, who received a Master of Laws in Alternative Dispute Resolution last May at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law in Los Angeles, is volunteering with the CPR Institute through Spring 2021. Bleemer edits Alternatives for the CPR Institute.

[END]

Supreme Court Rejects Decade-Old Class Arbitration Employment Discrimination Case

By Cristina Carvajal

A contentious employment discrimination case now focusing on whether an arbitrator is within her authority to bind a class of employees who did not affirmatively opt-in or consent to class arbitration will not resurface now at the Supreme Court.

This morning, in its first 2020-2021 term order list (available at https://bit.ly/3la3Y72), declined to hear Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 942 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2019) (available at https://bit.ly/30yP3eZ).

The Second Circuit decision in the case last year will return the case to federal district court in New York for more proceedings ahead of arbitration in the 12-year-old-case.

The nation’s top Court today denied cert in Sterling Jewelers Inc. v. Jock, No. 1382 (Supreme Court case page available at https://bit.ly/3lgflL2). While the opt-in is the issue most recently litigated, the Court considered and rejected today a petition by the national jewelry chain on an event broader question presented,

Whether an arbitrator may compel class arbitration—binding the parties and absent class members—without finding actual consent, and instead based only on a finding that the agreement does not unambiguously prohibit class arbitration and should be construed against the drafter.

The employment case’s gender-based discrimination claim was first filed in 2008 by then-present and former women Sterling Jewelers employees. All workers were required to sign its Resolve agreement subject to American Arbitration Association rules, which included a mandatory arbitration clause, as well as a litigation waiver. For more, see Anne Muenchinger, “Still No Arbitration: In Its latest Jock decision, Second Circuit Reverses for More Contract Interpretation,” 38 Alternatives 77 (2020) (available at https://bit.ly/2GuxplA).

Not only has this case been moved from New York’s Southern U.S. District Court to the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals four times, but today’s rejection was its second at the Supreme Court. Today’s decision puts the case back on a road to the case’s arbitrator, former New York Southern District magistrate Kathleen A. Roberts, now a JAMS Inc. neutral in the firm’s New York office.

David Bouffard, vice president of corporate affairs at Signet Jewelers Ltd.in Akron, Ohio, notes in a statement,

While we respect the Court’s decision, we believe the claims in this matter are without merit and are not substantiated the relevant facts and statistics. We will continue to vigorously defend against these claims, which do not accurately reflect our company or our culture. Indeed, we have long been committed to fostering a culture of respect, integrity, diversity, and inclusion where all employees feel safe, supported, and empowered—this is a tenet of who we are. In particular, Signet is a recognized leader among companies for gender diversity, with women filling 74% of store management positions and gender parity in both the C-Suite and Board of Directors. Under the leadership of our CEO, Gina Drosos, we continue to champion diversity and inclusion as a strategic priority, as we have been honored to be included on the Bloomberg Gender Equality Index for two consecutive years.

Plaintiffs’ attorney, Joseph M. Sellers, a Washington, D.C., partner in Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, declined to comment on the cert denial.

In its latest decision last year, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s judgment and held “that the arbitrator was within her authority in purporting to bind the absent class members to class proceedings because, by signing the operative arbitration agreement, the absent class members no less than the parties, bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement with respect to class arbitrability.” Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 942 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2019) (available at https://bit.ly/30yP3eZ).

The Second Circuit referred to its previous decisions as Jock I, Jock II and Jock III. (For more on the case’s knotty procedural history, see the Alternatives’ link above). Noting that a court’s standard of review of arbitrator decisions is highly deferential, the unanimous panel in the opinion written by Circuit Judge Peter W. Hall reasoned that the arbitration agreement’s incorporation of the AAA Rules, in particular the Supplementary Rules which give an arbitrator authority to decide if an arbitration clause permits class arbitration, makes it clear that the arbitrator can decide on the question of class arbitrability.

The panel further noted the arbitration agreement itself provides that “’[q]uestions of arbitrability’ and ‘procedural questions’ shall be decided by the arbitrator.” Id.at 624.

The decision underscored that while in Jock II the panel pointed out that Jock I did not address “whether the arbitrator had the power to bind absent class members to class arbitration given that they . . . never consented to the arbitrator determining whether class arbitration was permissible under the agreement in the first place.” (Quoting an earlier decision in the case.)

That fact, however, was not a basis to alter the Second Circuit’s analysis given that class actions in arbitration and courts may bind absent class members as part of mandatory or opt-out classes.

 The Second Circuit noted that its “use of ‘consent’ as shorthand” left unclear “the possibility that the absent class members consented in a different way to the arbitrator’s authority to decide class arbitrability.” Id.at 626.

In remanding the case, the Second Circuit left open for the District Court to decide “whether the arbitrator exceeded her authority in certifying an opt-out, as opposed to a mandatory, class for injunctive and declaratory relief.” The Second Circuit already reversed an affirmative determination on that issue, but in the 2019 decision, the panel states that the lower court may revisit the issue “after allowing the parties an opportunity to present renewed argument in light of any subsequent developments in the law.”

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The author, a third-year student at the City University of New York School of Law, is a Fall 2020 CPR Institute student intern.  Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation editor Russ Bleemer assisted with reporting for this post.

[END]

A Look Ahead: The Supreme Court’s Arbitration Docket in Focus

In a preview of the September issue of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, author Heather Cameron discusses the arbitration year at the U.S. Supreme Court with editor Russ Bleemer.

The article wraps up the Court year ended this summer, and previews the new fall 2020-2021 term. [UPDATE: The article is now available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/alt.21852.]

The subject, of course, is the Court’s seemingly favorite business topic, arbitration. 

In this video preview of the article, which will be available at altnewsletter.com on or around Sept. 1, Heather first looks at the GE Energy case, the sole Supreme Court arbitration opinion issued in the last term. GE Energy, which was decided June 1, is about international arbitration practice, an area the Court doesn’t visit often. Heather discusses why the opinion’s guidance is intertwined with the factor the Court avoided discussing, arbitration costs.

Next, Heather looked ahead to the term that starts in October, to the Schein case.  Schein was just decided last year, and now the same case is back on another similar arbitration point.  See our most recent CPR Speaks blog post on the case here.

Finally, in the video and the article, Heather fills us in on a case the Court rejected, and tell us why maybe the Court shouldn’t have declined the case and why its effects are a crucial practice point for arbitration advocates and, especially, neutrals.

Will the U.S. Supreme Court Allow Discovery in Private International Arbitrations?

By Russ Bleemer

Under federal circuit court case law, 28 U.S.C. §1782(a) did not include private international arbitration tribunals under its provisions for ““Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such tribunals.”

In other words, “foreign and international tribunals” didn’t include arbitrations.

Suddenly, last fall, that court view began to change, and an esoteric and once-sedentary point of law is facing upheaval. 

In an article in the new July/August issue of Alternatives, and in the video above, John B. Pinney of Graydon in Cincinnati explains how seemingly settled law has erupted into six federal circuit court cases, and is about to be put before the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court on a cert petition.

Will the nation’s top Court take up the matter?

John ties together the cases and sets out the prospects on whether the Court will decide to incorporate arbitral tribunals into the §1782 definition in his just-posted article, “Will the Supreme Court Take Up Allowing Discovery Under Section 1782 for Private International Arbitrations?” 38 Alternatives 103 (available in multiple formats at https://bit.ly/2ZwUt8N; see altnewsletter.com for full issues and archives).

He also discusses in the video and the article the practice implications—what arbitrators, arbitration users, and providers need to do now in the wake of the evolving caselaw.

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The author edits Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, on publisher CPR Institute’s website here, and on the Wiley Online Library at altnewsletter.com.

Monster Energy and Evident Partiality

Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation Editor Russ Bleemer is joined by veteran arbitrator-litigators Philip J. Loree Jr., in New York, and Richard Faulkner, in Dallas, to discuss the U.S. Supreme Court’s Monday cert denial in Monster Energy v. City Beverages LLC. The panel also discusses a recent Pennsylvania federal court case that follows Monster Energy, Martin v. NTT Data Inc., No. 20-CV-0686 (E.D. Pa. June 23) (available at https://bit.ly/2VwZi0V).   

By Heather Cameron

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning declined to grant certiorari on a petition requesting clarification of the Federal Arbitration Act’s “evident partiality” standard.

This means that the Court, for now, will not revisit the “evident partiality” standard for arbitrators that can be used to overturn an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). And a Ninth Circuit decision overturning an arbitration award because a JAMS Inc. arbitrator failed to disclose his ownership ties to the Irvine, Calif., provider, will stand.

The Court’s docket page for the case, Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages LLC, No. 19-1333, is available HERE.

Monster Energy was an appeal from a Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision last October, throwing out an arbitration award in favor of Monster Energy and ruling that “arbitrators are required to disclose their ownership interests in the organizations they are affiliated with and the organizations’ business dealings with the arbitration parties.” Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages LLC, Nos. 17-55813/17-56082 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2019) (available at http://bit.ly/2PjmXzq); for more background and analysis, see Daniel Bornstein, “Ninth Circuit, Overturning an Award, Backs More Arbitrator Disclosure,” 37 Alternatives 170 (December 2019) (available at https://bit.ly/2NE7Q1x).

The decision is unusual because of its emphasis on the “repeat-player” phenomenon in arbitration.  It highlighted a circuit split over disclosure requirements for arbitrators, and reflected concern over bias in favor of repeat players in arbitration—an issue usually restricted to employment and consumer arbitration cases, not big companies. See Lisa Bingham, “Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 Emp. Rights & Emp. Policy J. 189, 209–17 (1997) (available at https://bit.ly/2VuElDJ).

The questions presented to the Supreme Court were:

  1. What is the standard for determining whether an arbitration award must be vacated for “evident partiality” under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)?
  2. Under the correct “evident partiality” standard, must an arbitration award be vacated when the arbitrator does not disclose that (i) he has a de minimis “ownership interest” in his arbitration firm and (ii) that firm has conducted a “nontrivial” number of arbitrations with one of the parties?

City Beverages, which distributed its adversary’s energy drinks in the Pacific Northwest, alleged that Monster Energy committed breach of contract in 2015 when it terminated their distribution contract without good cause. Monster Energy  exercised the contract’s clause permitting such termination so long as severance of $2.5 million was paid.

Though City Beverages rejected payment, the move was upheld in arbitration and Monster Energy was awarded $3 million in attorneys’ fees.

Overturning that award, the Ninth Circuit agreed with City Beverages’ claim that the arbitrator had failed to adequately disclose his relationship to JAMS and his firm’s relationship with Monster Energy.

In the Supreme Court’s only prior case examining the FAA’s evident partiality  standard, which authorizes vacatur of arbitration awards “where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,” a majority agreed to overturn the award in question, but no clear rationale emerged. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (available at https://bit.ly/3g766Ks); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6–8 (available at https://bit.ly/2Bo3VU7).

Commonwealth Coatings, written by Justice Hugo Black, interpreted evident partiality as coextensive with the judicial standard, finding that arbitrators must not only be unbiased, “but must also avoid even the appearance of bias.” Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150.

Two of the five justices joining Black’s opinion, however, wrote a narrowing concurrence, penned by Justice Byron White, concluding that vacatur was only appropriate where the arbitrator failed to disclose “a substantial interest in a firm which has done more than trivial business with a party” to the arbitration. Id. at 151­–52. They found that the mere “appearance of bias” disqualification standard for federal judges does not establish evident partiality on the part of an arbitrator. See Petition at 19.

A majority of federal circuit courts have applied something akin to Justice White’s reasoning, according to the petition. “The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits require those seeking vacatur of an arbitration award for evident partiality to show ‘a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to an arbitration.’” Id. (Citations omitted; emphasis is in the brief.)

In its Monster Energy decision, the Ninth Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in adopting Justice Black’s less-demanding “reasonable impression of partiality” standard.

In her dissenting opinion in Monster Energy,Ninth Circuit Judge Michelle T. Friedland wrote that such a standard will have the effect of generating endless litigation over arbitral awards, defeating arbitration’s benefits of expedience and finality, echoing Monster Energy’s claims. See Bornstein, supra at 172.

JAMS, noting its role as a neutral organization “that has always refrained from supporting or opposing challenges to the arbitral process or arbitration awards,” filed an amicus brief in support of Monster’s rehearing petition. (Available HERE).

Both Monster Energy’s petition and JAMS’ brief stressed the lack of evidence to support the Ninth Circuit’s assumption that arbitrators might be biased in favor of repeat players since the law review article it cited on the phenomenon described a single study of employment, rather than commercial, arbitrations. See Petition at 31–32.

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Cameron, a second-year Fordham University School of Law student, is a CPR Institute 2020 Summer Intern.