Extinguishing Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties: Recent Developments

By Krzysztof Wierzbowski and Aleksander Szostak

In line with the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (referred to here as the “CJEU”) in Achmea (formerly Eureko) v. Slovakia (the Achmea Decision) and the political declaration issued by the governments of the European Union member states on Jan. 15, 2019, most of the EU member states, with the exception of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland, have entered into a plurilateral treaty for the termination of bilateral investment treaties between the EU Member States (referred to in this article as “intra-EU BITs” and the Termination Treaty).

The Termination Treaty was signed on May 5, 2020, and entered into force on Aug. 29, 2020. See Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT] (available at http://bit.ly/3iqsTn3).

Portugal, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg have made the following formal declarations concerning the Termination Treaty:

  • “Luxembourg calls upon the European Commission and all member states to start, without any delay, a process with the aim to ensure complete, strong and effective protection of investments within the EU and adequate instruments in this regard.” It requests the  European Commission to create a plan for such a process. Declaration of Luxembourg to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].
  • Portugal appears to endorse a view similar to that of Luxembourg and emphasizes its “support to the intensifying of the discussions between the European Commission and Member States with the aim of better ensuring a sound and effective protection of investments within the European Union. To this end, calls to assess the establishment of new or better tools under European Union law and to carry out an assessment of the current dispute settlement mechanisms which are essential to ensure legal certainty and the protection of interests of investors.” Declaration of Portugal to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].
  • The Dutch government confirms that although the Achmea Decision does not affect the Caribbean parts of the Netherlands (as Overseas Countries and Territories), BITs concluded with those territories shall also be terminated pursuant to the Termination Treaty. In this sense and irrespective of the Achmea Decision, the effects of the Termination Treaty will extend to all parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Declaration of the Netherlands to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].

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So what will be the fate of intra-EU BITs and intra-EU investment arbitration?

The conclusion of the Termination Treaty is a direct consequence of the Achmea Decision, in which the CJEU declared that Investor-State Dispute Settlement (the “ISDS”) clauses in intra-EU BITs are not compatible with the EU law. (The decision is available at http://bit.ly/2Kf8OmM.)

In general, the Termination Treaty is based on the premise that all intra-EU BITs shall be terminated and their sunset clauses, providing for the temporarily continued protection of investments existing prior to the termination of the relevant BIT, shall be terminated together with the respective intra-EU BIT and thereby shall not produce legal effects.

Furthermore, it stipulates that new intra-EU investor-state arbitrations may not be initiated and that pending proceedings shall be subject to the management procedure described below.

Interestingly, the Termination Treaty does not resolve the issue of application and compatibility with the EU law of the Energy Charter Treaty (the “ECT”) in the intra-EU investment protection context. In particular, the Termination Treaty stipulates that it does not cover intra-EU arbitrations initiated based on ECT Article 26 and that this issue will be dealt with at a later stage. Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT] at 2. The ECT is available at http://bit.ly/3nUL2u7.

Considering that in recent years we have witnessed rise of the number of intra-EU ECT arbitrations, the uncertainty introduced by the Termination Treaty may put the parties engaged in pending arbitrations, or anticipating initiation of new proceedings pursuant to ECT Article 26, in an adverse position. See,. e.g., Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/45, Decision on the Intra-EU Jurisdictional Objection [25 February 2019]; Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018]; Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, Award [16 May 2018]; Statistics of ECT Cases (as of Oct. 23, 2019) (available at https://bit.ly/3oGCeJz).

Notably, as argued by the Advocate General Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe in his recently issued opinion in joined cases C‑798/18 and C‑799/18, the ECT ISDS clause does not apply in the intra-EU context,  and the ECT may be entirely inapplicable to intra-EU proceedings. This indicates that if the CJEU follows the Advocate General’s reasoning, EU investors may be deprived of procedural and substantive protection under the ECT in the intra-EU relations. Joined Cases C 798/18 and C 799/18, Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe [29 October 2020] (available at http://bit.ly/3bEYEHk).

Management of the pending intra-EU proceedings

Pending proceedings, defined as intra-EU investment arbitration proceedings initiated prior to March 6, 2018—the Achmea Decision linked above–and which have not ended with a settlement agreement or with a final award issued prior to March 6, 2018, where the award was duly executed prior to March 6, 2018, or the award was set aside or annulled before August 29, 2020, shall in principle be subject to the so-called Structured Dialogue, which is a mechanism that aims to assist disputing parties in finding an amicable settlement of a dispute. Art. 1(4) and (5) and Art. 9 Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].

The settlement procedure is overseen by an impartial facilitator who shall find an amicable, lawful, and fair out-of-court and out-of-arbitration settlement of the dispute. Settlement of the dispute shall in principle be reached within six months. Art. 9 (1) – (14) Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT]. It can be observed that the mechanism resembles investor-state mediation.

Going a step further, the Termination Treaty implements an option for investors engaged in pending arbitrations to seek judicial remedies under national law before domestic courts against the host state measure contested in such arbitration proceedings. This option is available to investors under the condition that they withdraw pending arbitration proceedings and waive rights and claims under the relevant intra-EU BIT, or renounce execution of the issued award and commit to refrain from instituting any new arbitration proceedings. Art. 10 Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT]. In such case,  limitation periods would not apply to bringing legal action before domestic courts.

This may have a severe impact on the prospect of lodging a successful claim against a state by the investor, since the legal framework of intra-EU BITs that provided a substantive and procedural legal basis in a pending arbitration will not be applicable in domestic court proceedings.

Doubtful recognition and enforcement of awards

Decisions and/or awards issued in pending, or, as the case may be, new arbitration proceedings may not be effective, because the Termination Treaty stipulates that contracting states shall, in case of domestic court proceedings, request the domestic court, including in any third country, to set the arbitral award aside, annul it, or to refrain from recognizing and enforcing it. Art. 7 (b) Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].

This raises a threat to the effectiveness of guarantees provided under, among others, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the “ICSID Convention”).

It can be recalled that ICSID Convention Article 54 stipulates that each contracting state shall recognize an award rendered by an ICSID Tribunal as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award as if it were a final judgment of a court where recognition is sought. This unique recognition mechanism does not leave room for any ground on which the recognition could be refused.

Considering a rather likely scenario in which a domestic court of an EU member state is faced with a request for recognition of award or decision issued by a tribunal in an intra-EU investment arbitration case, it can be noted that such domestic court will need to resolve uncertain and complex situation concerning the conflict of treaty norms. The domestic court will need to decide whether to recognize the award, or issue a decision in accordance with the ICSID Convention, or to comply with the EU law and refuse recognition and thereby, to undermine the ICSID Convention.

Although not addressed in the Termination Treaty, it appears that the CJEU argument in the Achmea Decision regarding incompatibility of the ISDS clauses in intra-EU BITs with the EU law may potentially extend to extra-EU BITs and arbitrations between EU members states and investors from third states.

Clearly, arbitrations initiated on a basis of ISDS clauses contained in such BITs may concern treatment of investors from third states investing in the EU, and therefore the subject matter of such arbitrations may relate to interpretation and application of the EU law.

Such arbitrations may also pose a risk to the proper interpretation and application of the EU law and have an adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU law. See Case C 284/16 Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV [2018]. Such reasoning, if followed, which is rather unlikely, would further deepen the crisis concerning European Union investment treaty arbitration.

It might be further noted that the competence of the court where the arbitration is seated to set aside the arbitration award may lead to the situation where such court would be a non-EU court and would not be bound by the Termination Treaty.

Furthermore, the winning investor may seek to have the arbitration award recognized and enforced in a non-EU jurisdiction where the defendant’s assets are located.

Taming the lion: The tendency of arbitral tribunals to reject intra-EU jurisdictional objections

Despite the Achmea Decision and clear commitment of EU member states on terminating the intra-EU BITs, arbitral tribunals in intra-EU arbitrations generally reject jurisdictional objections asserting incompatibility of intra-EU BITs.vSee, e.g., Strabag SE, Raiffeisen Centrobank AG and Syrena Immobilien Holding AG v. Republic of Poland, ICSID Case No. ADHOC/15/1, Partial Award on Jurisdiction [4 March 2020]; Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018]; Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, Award [16 May 2018]; UP (formerly Le Chèque Déjeuner) and C.D Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/35, Award [9 October 2018]; Addiko Bank AG and Addiko Bank d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/37, Decision on Croatia’s Jurisdictional Objection Related to the Alleged Incompatibility of the BIT with the EU Acquis [12 June 2020].

As emphasized by the tribunal in the partial award on jurisdiction in Strabag SE, Raiffeisen Centrobank AG and Syrena Immobilien Holding AG v. Republic of Poland, EU law does not form part of the law applicable to questions of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and no extrinsic elements of interpretation under Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can trump the clear expression of the parties’ common intention to arbitrate. Strabag SE, Raiffeisen Centrobank AG and Syrena Immobilien Holding AG v. Republic of Poland, at par. 8.143. It should be noted, however, that the intention of capital importing states to arbitrate disputes may be considered as no longer existent due to the signing and entry into force of the Termination Treaty.

Notably, the tribunal further considered the issue of the enforceability of an award issued in intra-EU arbitration and recognized its duty to render an enforceable award. It noted, however, that it is not able to predict the future validity, or enforceability of the award before enforcing courts. Id. at par. 8.140-8.142.

More recently, the tribunal in Addiko Bank v. Croatia raised several interesting points when rejecting Croatia’s jurisdictional objection related to the incompatibility of the Austria-Croatia BIT with the EU acquis.

The tribunal reasoned that in light of Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the law applicable to the Austria-Croatia BIT consists of the terms of that BIT itself and general principles of international law, which are the sources of law not considered by the CJEU as  incompatible with the EU law.

Furthermore, the tribunal noted that contrary to the BIT concluded between the Netherlands and Slovakia, considered by the CJEU in the Achmea Decision as incompatible with the EU law, the Austria-Croatia BIT does not incorporate EU law as part of its applicable law. Addiko Bank AG and Addiko Bank d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/37, Decision on Croatia’s Jurisdictional Objection Related to the Alleged Incompatibility of the BIT with the EU Acquis [12 June 2020] par.267. The tribunal concluded that the Austria-Croatia BIT does not give rise to the same functional concerns, which the CJEU found to be present in the context of the Achmea Decision. Id. at par.269.

This indicates that intra-EU BITs whose applicable law is limited to the terms of the intra-EU BIT itself and general principles of international law are not incompatible with the EU law. Following this reasoning, it can be assumed that the tribunal would reach a different conclusion if the Austria-Croatia BIT included a provision expressly or impliedly incorporating EU law as the applicable law.

* * *

Some of the solutions implemented under the Termination Treaty may indeed be considered controversial. This is particularly the case with respect to the mode of termination of legal effects of sunset clauses, or more broadly, the retroactive effect of the Termination Treaty.

Investors may decide to seek protection under existing BITs concluded with non-EU states and, thereby, engage in the treaty shopping practice. It remains an open question whether such BITs will be affected by the Achmea Decision.

While the Achmea Decision argument has become a popular strategy for defendants in investment arbitration proceedings to challenge jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, jurisprudence indicates that such arguments are generally rejected.

Although developments contained in mega-regional treaties, such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (available at http://bit.ly/2LXjQh3), may provide a model for the creation of standing investment court, which could replace the ISDS mechanism so far in place, the institutional design of the body must comply with the EU law in order to provide an effective alternative to domestic courts. In this regard, it is important to monitor development of the EU’s initiative concerning the so-called Investment Court System, which could be further developed into a Multilateral Investment Court.

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Krzysztof Wierzbowski is a Senior Partner at Eversheds Sutherland Wierzbowski in Warsaw, Poland. He is a member of the CPR European Advisory Board, which provides EAB posts for CPR Speaks. Aleksander Szostak LL.M. is a lawyer at Eversheds Sutherland Wierzbowski.

[END]

Approach of the European Union to Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded Between the Member States: Initial Thoughts on Draft Plurilateral Agreement for the Termination of Intra-EU BITs

 

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By Krzysztof Wierzbowski[1] and Aleksander Szostak[2]

The compatibility of investment protection treaties entered into between EU member states (the ‘Intra-EU BITs) with the regulatory framework of European Union law has been a controversial issue for quite some time. It can be recalled that the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘CJEU’) in Achmea (formerly Eureko) v. Slovakia (the ‘Achmea Decision’) declared investor-state dispute settlement clauses in intra-EU BITs as contrary to EU law. In particular the CJEU stated that disputes before arbitral tribunals based on intra-EU BITs may relate to matters of interpretation and/or application of the EU law. While a preliminary ruling procedure under Art. 267 TFEU enables courts and tribunals of member states to file a request pertaining to the interpretation and application of the EU law, no arbitral tribunal constitutes a court or tribunal under the meaning of the provision and, therefore, such arbitral tribunal cannot request a preliminary ruling.

As decisions of arbitral tribunals are final and, therefore, in principle, cannot be appealed to the national courts, the CJEU has found here a threat to proper interpretation and application of the EU law, which in turn has an adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU law .

The direct implication of the Achmea Decision is that investor-state arbitrations based on intra-EU BITs are not compatible with the EU law and should not be initiated. This may have a severe impact on foreign investors engaging in the European market and the foreign direct investment protection system in the EU.

In line with commitments contained in political declarations issued by the representatives of the governments of the EU member states on 15 January 2019, EU member states have quite recently reached an agreement on the text of a plurilateral treaty for the termination of intra-EU BITs.[3] Although it appears that the official text of the plurilateral treaty is not publicly available, its draft text has been leaked (the “Termination Treaty”) and may provide much needed insight into the future shape of EU policy towards protection of EU investors in the EU and the fate of intra-EU BITs. [4]

The fate of intra-EU BITs

According to the text of the Termination Treaty, intra-EU BITs listed in an annex to the Termination Treaty are to be terminated and shall not produce legal effects. Intra-EU BITS will therefore be terminated by means of mutual consent of contracting parties through a plurilateral treaty, which may prove to be the most efficient method of terminating all of intra-EU treaties in a consistent manner.

As a matter of certain standard, investment protection treaties provide for a solution applicable in the case of termination of the treaty. Investors enjoy continued protection for a set period of time, thereby not being surprisingly deprived of certain rights that might have been taken into account when the investment decision was made and implemented.

Interestingly, the Termination Treaty provides that such sunset clauses contained in intra-EU BITs, gguaranteeing the continued protection of investments existing prior to the termination of the relevant BIT, shall be terminated together with respective intra-EU BIT and shall not produce legal effects. Whether such termination by the Termination Treaty, without modification of intra-EU BITs by removing the sunset clauses from the legal framework and, subsequently, terminating each of BITs entirely, will be effective may be debatable (in particular by affected investors).

The Termination Treaty adds a degree of uncertainty with respect to the application of the Energy Charter Treaty (the ‘ECT’) in intra-EU relations. The Termination Treaty provides that it does not cover intra-EU proceedings initiated on the basis of the ECT and that this matter will be dealt with at a later stage. This may put many EU member states and foreign investors currently engaged, or considering engaging in intra-EU proceedings based on the ECT, in a disadvantageous position. It is noteworthy that recent years have witnessed a number of intra-EU ECT claims directed by foreign investors against for instance Spain (concerning reform of renewable energy sector).

The Termination Treaty appears to endorse the view that the legal framework of the EU sufficiently protects investors engaging in the European market. After all, by exercising some of the fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of establishment and free movement of capital, investors from EU member state fall within the scope of application of the EU law and enjoy protection under inter alia primary and secondary EU law as well as general principles of EU law.[5] It may however be doubtful that EU law and the national law of member states will always be perceived to de facto guarantee effective procedural and substantive protection to foreign investors engaging in the European market. One may identify a number of concerns associated with the potential bias of national judges, political pressure exerted by governments, corruption and malfunctioning of the domestic judiciary in general, which indicates that the view expressed in the Termination Treaty may be debatable.

One size does not fit all: concluded, pending and new arbitration proceedings

Although the Termination Treaty stipulates that all intra-EU BITs listed in an annex shall be terminated and shall not produce legal effects, it additionally addresses the status of arbitration proceedings under intra-EU BITs. In particular, the Termination Treaty distinguishes between three categories of arbitration proceedings under intra-EU BITs:

  • New arbitration proceedings

The Termination Treaty defines these as arbitration proceedings initiated on or after 6 March 2018 (i.e., on or after the date of Achmea Decision).

The Termination Treaty stipulates that arbitration clauses in intra-EU BITs shall not serve as legal basis for new arbitration proceedings as defined above.[6] This indicates that any intra-EU investment treaty arbitration initiated after the Achmea Decision will be declared as ineffective.

  • Concluded arbitration proceedings

The Termination Treaty defines these as:

Arbitration Proceedings which ended with a settlement agreement or with a final award issued prior to 6 March 2018 [the date of Achmea Decision] where:

  1. the award was duly executed prior to 6 March 2018, even where a related claim for legal costs has not been executed or enforced, and no challenge, review, set-aside, annulment, enforcement, revision or other similar proceedings in relation to such final award was pending on 6 March 2018, or
  2. the award was set aside or annulled before the date of entry into force of this Agreement;[7]

These intra-EU investment treaty arbitration proceedings will not be affected by the Termination Treaty. Accordingly, any award, final decision, or settlement issued before 6 March 2018 will not be considered as invalid, or not effective.

  • Pending arbitration proceedings

The Termination Treaty defines pending arbitration proceedings as arbitration proceedings initiated prior to Achmea Decision (i.e. 6 March 2018), which do not qualify as concluded.[8]

For this category of arbitration proceedings, the Termination Treaty provides a mechanism which aims at assisting the parties to the pending proceedings in finding an amicable settlement of a dispute – the so-called Structured Dialogue.[9] At the outset, it is interesting to note that the Structured Dialogue mechanism to a large extent resembles procedure for investor-state mediation.

The mechanism enables foreign investors to initiate settlement procedure with a state party to the pending arbitration proceedings within six months from the termination of intra-EU BITs, thereby providing the legal basis for respective pending arbitration proceedings to become converted to or substituted by, the specific  kind of mediation.[10] The settlement procedure is overseen by an impartial facilitator whose task is to find an amicable, lawful and out of court and out of arbitration settlement of the dispute. Settlement of the dispute shall be reached within 6 months.

While the facilitator shall be designated by an agreement of parties (i.e. foreign investor and state), and shall possess in-depth knowledge of EU law, the Termination Treaty does not seem to require an in-depth knowledge of public international law, or, more importantly, international investment law.[11] Although it is doubtful that parties would appoint a facilitator that is not an expert in public international and international investment law, the lack of express requirement in this respect may lead to undesirable situations that may undermine of the Structured Dialogue mechanism.

Interestingly, the Termination Treaty provides an additional option to foreign investors that enables them to seek the judicial remedies under national law against a measure adopted by the state, such measure being subject to such initiated arbitration proceedings. In such case, national time limits for bringing legal action do not apply provided that investor satisfies several conditions.[12] It is noteworthy that the provisions of intra-EU BITs that initially provided legal basis for the parties to settle their dispute, will not be considered as part of applicable law in proceedings before a national court. Clearly, this implies that investors will not be able to base their claims on substantive provisions of intra-EU BITs, which may severely limit the possibility to lodge a successful claim against a state.

Pending and New Arbitration Proceedings: what about recognition and/or enforcement?

The Termination Treaty provides that state parties to intra-EU BITs on the basis of which pending and/or new arbitration proceedings were initiated, shall inter alia request the national court of EU state and any 3rd state, to set aside an award issued in such proceedings, or to annul it or to refrain from recognizing and/or enforcing it, as applicable.[13]

Therefore, many arbitration awards issued after Achmea decision will, at least in EU member states, be ineffective.

Although the Termination Treaty covers intra-EU BITs only (as listed in the Annex to the Treaty), it deserves to be noted that one may extend the reasoning of the CJEU in Achmea Decision regarding incompatibility of investor-state dispute settlement clauses in intra-EU BITs with EU law to BITs concluded between EU member states and 3rd states.

In particular, disputes covered by such BITs and settled through investor-state arbitration may relate to matters concerning treatment of foreign investors engaging in the European market and, thereby, interpretation and application of EU law. While it is rather doubtful that tribunals constituted on the basis of such BITs will reject jurisdiction over a dispute, there is a threat to effective recognition and enforcement in the European Union of awards issued in such arbitrations.

The national court faced with a request for recognition or enforcement of such arbitral award, or the CJEU faced with a request for a preliminary ruling, may declare that the arbitration between a non-EU foreign investor and EU member state adversely affects the autonomy of the EU law and, therefore, recognition and enforcement of such awards should be refused. It can be expected that a request for a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on this matter will be made.

This would have a devastating impact on the effectiveness of guarantees contained in such BITs. In addition, this approach, if adopted, would severely impact recognition and enforcement mechanism contained in the ICSID Convention. Namely, Art. 54 of the ICSID Convention provides that each contracting state shall recognize an award rendered by an ICSID Tribunal as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award as if it were a final judgment of a court where recognition is sought. As the mechanism does not leave room for any ground on which the recognition could be refused, potential refusal by national courts to recognize awards issued in arbitrations under ICSID rules would adversely affect the effectiveness of the ICSID Convention and possibly pose a threat to its existence.

Concluding remarks

Although the official text of the Termination Treaty is not publicly available, its leaked draft may serve as a valuable source indicating the fate of intra-EU BITs.

Some of the solutions provided under the Termination Treaty, such as the mode of termination of legal effects of sunset clauses, or retroactive effect of the Termination Treaty with respect to the claims that arose and could constitute the basis of New Arbitration Proceedings, may be controversial and will most probably be contested by affected investors. It remains a matter of separate discussion what avenue the investors may have in order to effectively contest the ex post deprivation of their rights.

Some investors may decide to engage in the treaty shopping practice and seek protection under BITs other than intra-EU ones. It remains an open question whether BITs concluded between EU member states and 3rd states will be affected by the reasoning of the CJEU in Achmea Decision.

ENDNOTES

[1] Krzysztof Wierzbowski is Senior Partner at Eversheds Sutherland Wierzbowski in Warsaw, Poland.

[2] Aleksander Szostak LL.M. is a lawyer at Eversheds Sutherland Wierzbowski.

[3] See. Statement: EU Member States agree on a plurilateral treaty to terminate bilateral investment treaties [24 October 2019] available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/191024-bilateral-investment-treaties_en.

[4] Draft text of the treaty is available at: https://www.iareporter.com/articles/revealed-previously-unseen-draft-text-of-eu-termination-treaty-reveals-how-intra-eu-bits-and-sunset-clauses-are-to-be-terminated-treaty-also-creates-eu-law-focused-facilitation-p/.

[5] See. Point XI of the preamble to Termination Treaty.

[6] Art. 5 Termination Treaty.

[7] Art.1(4) Termination Treaty.

[8] Art.1(5) Termination Treaty.

[9] Art.9 Termination Treaty.

[10] Art.9(1) Termination Treaty.

[11] Art.9(8) Termination Treaty.

[12] Art.10 Termination Treaty.

[13] Art.7 Termination Treaty.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The CPR Institute.