Why You Should Always Mediate

April 28, 2017January 10, 2018 / CPR Staff / Leave a comment

Anna By John R. Goldman and Anna M. Hershenberg (pictured)

If we had a nickel for every time a client instinctively refused to consider mediation to resolve a dispute, neither of us would have to work anymore. We have heard every excuse in the book:

We do not want to come in from out of town.
It is going to be a waste of time.
We are going to outspend them in litigation
so they will give up.
We want to crush them in litigation.

And our all-time favorite:

Suggesting—or even agreeing to—mediation
makes us look weak.

The notion that mediation makes a client look “weak” is an unfortunate gut reaction, typically fueled by the misconception that pounding the table and fighting your adversary on every issue is the only way to show strength in litigation. Sure, there are circumstances where litigation is necessary and a mediated resolution is impossible, but those situations are few and far between. Let us explore why it is almost always prudent to mediate—especially for budget-conscious corporate counsel trying to resolve disputes most efficiently (i.e., cost-effectively) so they and their company can focus on accretive business.

1. You Might Actually Resolve the Dispute. First (and foremost), you might actually settle the case and save lots of dough in unnecessary and unproductive litigation expense. That would be good, right? Look, we all know that litigation is often time-consuming, distracting, expensive and unpredictable. Even if you are convinced you have a “slam dunk” case, elephants sometimes fly in courtrooms (and when they do, it can vastly alter—and increase the cost of —that case you thought was definitely a winner). Mediation gives you a chance to resolve the dispute in a much more controlled environment with a smart mediator you have a hand in selecting. A savvy mediator typically redirects the parties away from unproductive competitions over litigation issues and strategy and towards consideration of a mutually beneficial business solution. Indeed, if mediation happens quickly enough (i.e., before the parties become entrenched in litigation posturing), it is possible—even likely perhaps—that the settlement will include the parties doing productive and mutually profitable business together going forward.

2. You Always Learn Things (and That Is Really Good). Even if mediation does not result in settlement right away, you never leave a mediation empty-handed. Going through the mediation process educates you (hopefully early on) about the strengths and weaknesses of your position, as well as those of your adversary. A good mediator is an expert at helping both sides to most sincerely and realistically evaluate the case—both from a legal perspective and from a practical perspective. That analysis provides critical information as to what a fair settlement might be. This information is always valuable to corporate counsel in setting strategy and managing expectations going forward. The very process of mediation lends itself to this. In trying to push each side toward settlement, the mediator—as a neutral third-party (often a former Judge)—will flag the legal and practical obstacles each side will face should the case continue and will provide valuable insight into how those weaknesses may play out in front of a Judge and/or jury. A neutral assessment of the viability of the claims and defenses in the early stages of the case provides corporate counsel with the opportunity to most effectively manage the case (and the expectations of his or her business people) and be in a much better position to determine strategy—for example, whether to recommend settlement or to recalibrate litigation tactics going forward.

3. In the Immortal Words of the Late, Great Philosopher Yogi Berra, “It Ain’t Over ’til It’s Over.” Even if the case does not settle right away, a good mediator is persistent and stays on the matter. He or she often (indeed, almost always) remains an independent and trustworthy sounding board for both sides. Many times after “unsuccessful” initial mediations sessions, we have reached out to the mediator and so have our adversaries. This means there is always the possibility that the matter will settle at a later point in the litigation. In our experience, we have found that parties who have already had at least one mediation session—even if “unsuccessful”—are often more likely to return to mediation at the mediator’s invitation (or after tiring of throwing more money at the litigation) because they trust the mediator and the process, have a sharper awareness of the strengths, weaknesses and settlement value of their case and, in many instances, because opposing counsel have had an opportunity to establish a productive working relationship.

4. Suggesting or Agreeing to Mediation Is Not Weakness. It Is Strength. This one really is our favorite. It is the one where we scratch our heads, furrow our brows and remind ourselves that when really smart people get really angry, they become their own worst enemy. (Typically, the clients who tell us mediation is a sign of weakness are the same ones who will not attend a settlement meeting unless it is at their office and are the same ones who write us emails thanking us for convincing them to give mediation a try). The goal of litigation should not be to win an award for being the best posturer. It should be to reach the most efficient resolution. Mediation is often the best route to that result. In this context, it is confounding why anyone would think it demonstrates weakness when it is actually just the opposite. In fact, suggesting or agreeing to mediation sends a clear signal that you are ready to persuade an intelligent and experienced neutral that your case is better than your adversary’s. Who would not want to seize that opportunity? And remember, mediators (unlike Judges) have manageable dockets and can spend the time to understand the nuanced arguments that might cause elephant lift-off in a courtroom.

In the end, budget conscious corporate counsel are, and should always be, looking for ways to save—and make—money. Given the reality that almost every case settles before trial anyway, it is in everyone’s best interest to reach that settlement as early in the process as possible. This is especially true for in-house corporate counsel, who have the unenviable task of having to explain to management how the company could possibly have spent so much money on a litigation for the privilege of ultimately settling a case on terms equal to or worse than those that could have been obtained early on (and at a much reduced cost). Mediation is an excellent way to try to avoid that nightmare.

Anna M. Hershenberg has recently joined CPR as its Vice President, Programs and Public Policy. John R. Goldman is a litigation partner at Herrick, Feinstein LLP, Anna’s former firm.

This article was originally published in volume 33, number 3 of the Winter 2015 publication of the Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association. It has been republished with permission.

Removing Anger in a Mediation Allowed Parties to Settle

April 12, 2017January 10, 2018 / CPR Staff / Leave a comment

By Stephen P. Gilbert

I conducted a mediation several years ago between two companies in the healthcare field, one a small high-tech company (“Company A”) and the other a much larger conglomerate. The smaller company had invented certain cutting edge technology (“Technology A”), which held great promise but required a substantial investment of money and personnel (scientists and engineers), each of which Company A had little of, to finish the R&D work and bring Technology A to market.

Company A had entered into a joint development agreement with the conglomerate to conduct the R&D work and, if possible, commercialize the technology, which Company A hoped would be used in some of the conglomerate’s products. The agreement provided that if Technology A were commercialized and used in the conglomerate’s products, the conglomerate would pay a running royalty to Company A. The few scientists and engineers of Company A worked closely with the scientists and engineers of the conglomerate and disclosed significant confidential information to them to aid in the R&D work. The conglomerate also loaned substantial capital to Company A (covered by a promissory note) because Company A was operating on a shoestring. The agreement contained a stepped dispute resolution clause: in case of a dispute, executives of the two companies were to confer to try to resolve the dispute; if that did not work, they would go to mediation; and if that did not work, to arbitration.

A year or two after entering into the joint development agreement, the conglomerate acquired a small company (“Company B”), which had developed its own technology (“Technology B”), which, with sufficient and successful R&D work, could be used instead of Technology A in the conglomerate’s products. Both Technology A and Technology B were also potentially useful in third-party products, not just the conglomerate’s products.

Sometime after acquiring Company B, the conglomerate terminated the joint development agreement, requested payment on the promissory note (as it had the right to do) and eventually started marketing products incorporating Technology B.

Company A accused the conglomerate of purposely trying to harm Company A and prevent commercialization of Technology A. The actions of the conglomerate to which Company A pointed included acquiring Company B, terminating the joint development agreement, demanding payment of the debt, and using Company A’s confidential information to help develop and commercialize Technology B. Company A said it would now have to try to raise money to pay the debt and at the same time would have to try to find a new R&D partner, since it still could not afford the R&D work required (nor did it have sufficient personnel) to commercialize Technology A.

Company A said commercialization of Technology A would now be substantially delayed or altogether prevented and that it might have to cease operations. It noted that the conglomerate would not have to pay any royalty for using Technology B in its products because the conglomerate owned that technology through its acquisition of Company B and, if the conglomerate wished to do so, it could license Technology B to third parties without worrying about competition from Technology A, since Technology A was not yet ready to be commercialized (and might never be).

After reviewing the two confidential mediation statements and speaking ex parte with each side prior to the mediation session, it seemed settlement was possible but getting there would not be easy.

There were about ten people from each side present at the joint mediation session: Company A had business people, investors, technologists, and outside counsel; the conglomerate had business people, in-house lawyers, and outside counsel. There were no technologists from the conglomerate present. I suspected this mediation was make or break for Company A; I doubted it had the money to litigate against the conglomerate.

Each side made a short, polite opening statement, and we then split up for caucus sessions. I started with the Company A team. It was the first time I was speaking in a caucus session with anyone on the Company A team other than its outside counsel. Company A did not mince words: it was positive that all of the conglomerate’s actions had been part of a long-term plan to harm it and delay commercialization of or kill Technology A. Everything it said about the conglomerate was laced with anger.

I went to see the conglomerate team. The conglomerate felt it had done nothing wrong. That was the same message that had been conveyed to me by its outside counsel during my discussions with them before the mediation session.

One of the conglomerate’s in-house counsel who was present had been involved with the joint venture when he was a junior member of the conglomerate’s legal department (he was now significantly higher up in the department). I asked what he had done with respect to the joint venture, and it became apparent he was a goldmine of information. He had participated in drafting the joint venture agreement, had helped “administer” that agreement for the conglomerate, knew about the substantial money it had spent and R&D efforts its technologists had made on Technology A, knew (at a high level) about the technical problems that had been encountered, and knew (at a detailed level) how the decisions to abandon the technology and terminate the agreement had been made. He also knew about the “wall” the conglomerate had put in place between its people working on Technology A and those working on Technology B.

During the pre-mediation session ex parte discussions, I had asked each side that, if possible, people familiar with the joint venture relationship be at the mediation, but the depth and breadth of this individual’s knowledge was more than I could have hoped for. I asked if he would feel comfortable sharing some of this information with the other side, and I also asked lead in-house and lead outside counsel if they would feel comfortable with his doing so. They asked why; I said I thought it might be helpful, added that I didn’t see any downside (since all the information would likely be disclosed during discovery if mediation didn’t work), and received yesses from everyone. Then I went to see the Company A team.

I told them I had had a helpful discussion with the other side and asked if they would be interested in hearing some information directly from the other side (since I could never do as good a job as the conglomerate’s people could of imparting the information). The Company A team said it saw no downside, and I asked both sides to reconvene for a joint session.

It was less than two hours since the original joint mediation session had started. I asked the in‑house counsel who had given me all the information to address the other side. I said that in particular what might be helpful for the other side to hear was the history of the conglomerate’s effort to develop Technology A, the problems it had encountered, and how it had come to make the decisions to abandon Technology A and terminate the agreement.

The conglomerate’s in-house counsel began by recounting the history of his involvement and then turned to the R&D efforts that had been made and the money that was spent. At first, the Company A team just listened but soon started asking questions, which the in-house counsel answered without hesitation. I didn’t speak again until there seemed to be a logical break point, at which time I suggested we have lunch.

After lunch, he was asked more and more questions by a few members of the Company A team, some rather pointed. Others from the conglomerate’s team started to chime in. It was a lively, sometimes loud discussion. I said little except to suggest breaks when I felt it was appropriate and to remind everyone it would be better if people spoke one at a time so everyone could hear what was being said. We broke for dinner and agreed to reconvene the next morning.

The next morning, the Company A team started by discussing what it would like to see in a settlement. Bargaining ensued. Agreement was reached late afternoon, and a heads of agreement (which provided for subsequent negotiation of a comprehensive agreement) was negotiated and executed, after which we all shook hands, each side thanking the other for participating and congratulating it on reaching agreement.

It was then that the key decision-maker of Company A shared with me and with the key decision-maker of the conglomerate the following. At the end of the first day, while the Company A team was returning to its hotel, he said to his team that in view of what they had heard from the conglomerate’s in-house counsel who had spoken at length and provided answers to their questions, they might have been wrong about what had happened and about what they had been sure was the conglomerate’s bad faith. His team sat at dinner that evening talking about what they had heard and came to agree with him. Once that happened, their feelings of anger dissipated and they started to focus on how to resolve the dispute.

We were lucky to have in attendance a smart individual from the conglomerate’s side who had sufficient first-hand knowledge of the entire situation and could present information (including answering probing and pointed questions from the other side) in a non-confrontational, believable way. There is no way of my knowing, but I think it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to have reached settlement at that time if the anger Company A felt and had expressed to me so strongly had not been removed.

Stephen P. Gilbert (www.spgadr.com) is a CPR Distinguished Neutral, CEDR Accredited Mediator, American Arbitration Association Commercial Master Mediator, Fellow of the College of Commercial Arbitrators, Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Fellow of the American College of e-Neutrals, Member/Panelist of the Silicon Valley Arbitration & Mediation Center, and was a computer programmer, a chemical engineer, and a patent attorney.

Gorsuch on Mediation

February 1, 2017January 10, 2018 / CPR Staff / Leave a comment

By Russ Bleemer

U.S. Circuit Court cases referencing mediation aren’t unusual. Since most cases settle before they get to a courthouse, and long before they reach the appellate levels, the intervention of a third-party neutral is commonplace part of the recounting of the case histories that ultimately appear before appeals courts.

But it’s comparatively rare for a U.S. Circuit Court to write and rule on mediation mechanics.

Last night’s nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court, Tenth U.S. Circuit Court Judge Neil M. Gorsuch, of Denver, has written about the mechanics and effects of mediation in his decade on the bench at the circuit’s home in Denver.

In Hand v. Walnut Valley Sailing Club, Case No. 11-3228 (10^th Cir. April 4, 2012)(available at http://bit.ly/2jVWsO7), a unanimous Tenth Circuit panel strongly backed mediation confidentiality in an order and judgment written by Gorsuch—a rare pronouncement on mediation and how it works by a federal circuit court.

For fans of mediation, it’s an instructive and fun read for its support of the ADR process, even though the appeals court’s support of a district court dismissal because a litigant abused mediation confidentiality rules was focused on a pleading technicality.

In the unanimous, three-judge panel order, Gorsuch details a move by the plaintiff, a member of the defendant sailing club, to tell “at least” 44 club members and others why a mediation of the plaintiff’s suit against the club failed.

The email sent by the plaintiff “disparage[ed] the club’s positions and relat[ed] all the details of the mediation, including what the mediator said and the amount of the club’s settlement offer,” the order states.

The plaintiff, according to the Gorsuch judgment, had complained to Kansas’s governor “that a storage shed owned by [the] sailing club didn’t comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act.” The club revoked the plaintiff’s membership, and the plaintiff filed suit.

The plaintiff had claimed ignorance of the mediation confidentiality law, but in dismissing the case, Gorsuch pointed out that the issue hadn’t been briefed in the district court. The Tenth Circuit order says that the plaintiff’s contention that his lack of knowledge of the law was in an accompanying affidavit wasn’t sufficient where “both sides’ briefing, all prepared by retained counsel, proceeded on the premise that he knew the mediation was supposed to remain confidential. [The plaintiff] argued merely that the club’s request for dismissal was a disproportionate sanction.”

That was the sole issue, Gorsuch wrote, that the appeals panel saw as “worthy of mention,” noting that without the briefing, the issue couldn’t be considered.

But that conclusion followed the Tenth Circuit panel’s strong endorsement of mediation confidentiality. “Our review confirms that the district court did not abuse its discretion,” wrote Gorsuch, adding that the plaintiff

committed a serious violation of the confidentiality rule. He didn’t just share a few tidbits about the mediation with a friend, he revealed extensive and prejudicial details about the mediation to over forty people, many likely witnesses in the case. And he did so not accidentally but intentionally. In his deposition, [he] explained that he “absolutely” disclosed mediation information because he believed club members “had a right to know.”

Earlier in the order, Gorsuch reiterated the U.S. District Court holding that his panel was affirming, boosting the ADR process and noting that the plaintiff’s disclosures

“demonstrated complete disrespect for the confidential mediation process.” [Citation omitted.] In discussing the importance confidentiality plays under the congressional scheme created by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, see 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (requiring district courts to “provide for the confidentiality of the alternative dispute resolution processes and to prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution communications”), the court recognized that an assurance of confidentiality encourages parties to participate in mediation with candor and is essential to the success of mediation programs. The need for confidentiality, the court said, is particularly strong where a mediation program is, as here, mandatory, “because participants are often assured that all discussions and documents related to the proceeding will be protected from forced disclosure.” [Citation omitted.]

Still, the Gorsuch-written Hand order isn’t a published opinion and comes with a caveat: “This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.”

***

Gorsuch also had to address the effect of a mediation settlement agreement in A.F. v. Espanola Public Schools, No. 14-2139 (Sept. 15, 2015)(available at http://bit.ly/2ki2QAa).

The case was mediated as per the requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and settled. But the IDEA’s procedures contemplate moves for further relief under other statutes, but only after the act’s procedures have been exhausted.

Both parties took advantage of the mediation step in the act, according to the 2-1 Gorsuch opinion. The case settled.

Then, the plaintiff filed suit on behalf of her daughter under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, making the same allegations in federal court that she had made in her original administrative complaint, and which were successfully resolved in mediation.

The Gorsuch opinion affirmed a district court decision that said the plaintiff hadn’t exhausted her remedies under the IDEA scheme for the second suit.

The plaintiff claimed that because she had mediated her claim under the IDEA procedure scheme, the procedures’ application to her new claim had been exhausted, or were inapplicable.

Gorsuch’s opinion didn’t take issue with the mediation results itself, and even agreed that the plaintiff’s court case could proceed under the other statutes, so long as it followed the IDEA procedures required for the other laws.

But the opinion said that the IDEA procedure enabling the subsequent suit also required exhaustion of the claims, under the statute’s plain terms. The mediation wasn’t enough. For those claims using the statute to launch the plaintiff’s subsequent lawsuit, the opinion said, more is required for exhaustion of the IDEA resolution procedures than the mediation for the first IDEA claim.

A dissent stated that a more reasonable interpretation of the IDEA is that a mediated resolution constitutes exhaustion for the pursuit of other permitted claims.

The author edits Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation for the CPR Institute.

The New Italian Mediation Law: Experimenting with a “Soft” Approach to Mandatory Mediation

February 11, 2016January 9, 2018 / CPR Staff / Leave a comment

By Giulio Zanolla, LL.M., Esq., CPR Speaks Contributor

Giulio Mediation was first introduced as a prerequisite to litigation in the Italian legal system in 2011, when the government issued a decree to implement the EU Mediation Directive of 2008. This legislative measure sparked a mix of enthusiastic reactions and harsh criticisms that culminated with lawyer strikes against its implementation. In 2012, the mandatory provision of the mediation regulation was declared unconstitutional, but the Constitutional Court’s decision was based on the government’s lack of legislative legitimacy to impose the mandatory requirement, rather than on the illegitimacy of the mandatory requirement itself.

The heated debate on the mediation regulation continued inside and outside the rooms of policymakers and led the Italian Parliament to enact a law in 2013 re-introducing mandatory mediation for certain civil and commercial actions in a mitigated form. The new mediation law, which is not affected by the constitutionality issue of the previous regulation, aims to address the concerns brought by a sector of the legal community claiming that the prerequisite of participating in mediation prior to bringing a legal action unjustly burdens and restricts disputants’ rights to access to justice. Unlike the previous regulation, the new Italian mediation law mandates that parties in certain civil and commercial disputes attend only an initial information session with the mediator; it does not require parties to participate in an actual mediation process as a prerequisite to litigation. The parties remain free to opt out of the mediation before the actual process starts and without any consequence for refraining to continue in mediation.

Through the initial information session, the parties have an opportunity to learn about the mediation process and make an informed decision regarding whether to attempt an out-of-court resolution through mediation or to initiate litigation. The information session is free of charge, and parties who refuse to attend the session are subject to sanctions in the subsequent trial. Only if all the parties agree to proceed with mediation will the mediator formally commence the procedure and begin to facilitate discussions of the disputed issues. With the new Italian mediation law, the parties’ participation in the actual mediation process is fully voluntary. The parties’ only mandatory requirement is to educate themselves about the option of mediation through the initial information session.

Recent statistical data available from the Ministry of Justice regarding the first six months of 2014 demonstrates that more than 22 percent of all disputes for which the initial information meeting is mandatory and more than 50 percent of disputes mediated by deliberate initiative of the parties are resolved without recourse to court litigation. In a little over a year since enactment of the law, the benefits of the new law are tangible, not only for those parties who resolved their disputes without litigation, but also—and especially—for the overwhelmed Italian judicial system as a whole, and ultimately for all taxpayers.

Most important, each of the numerous information sessions and mediations that took place but did not result in settlement created a concrete opportunity for parties and attorneys to familiarize themselves with the mediation process and educate users about mediation, thus contributing to the development of the culture of mediation throughout the country.

If we believe that the principle of voluntariness is of fundamental value to the mediation process and if we agree that the need for user education is a critical element in the development of a culture of mediation, the Italian mediation law could represent a balanced solution to the question of how to promote the use of mediation through legislation. The next few years’ statistics will reveal whether the number of parties who choose to continue in mediation past the initial information session, and the concomitant overall settlement percentage, will grow thanks to an increased level of awareness and sophistication among mediation users.

Giulio Zanolla is an attorney, a mediator, an ADR instructor, and the author of the blog The Case for Mediation: An ADR Blog by Giulio Zanolla. This article was first published in the The Weinstein JAMS International Fellow Newsletter, Fall 2015. Mr. Zanolla can be reached at giulio@zanollamediation.com.

ADR Around the World: Taiwan

July 20, 2015January 3, 2018 / CPR Staff / 2 Comments

This article is the third in a four-part CPR summer series that examines ADR in a number of rapidly changing locales around the world. If you missed it, you can find the first post, about Colombia, here, and the second about Mexico here.

ADR in Taiwan: Strong Foundations and a Chance to Build

By Gideon Hanft, CPR Research Assistant and Ngutjiua Hijarunguru, CPR Student Intern

In 2013, research institute Business Environment Risk Intelligence S.A. (BERI) ranked Taiwan as the fourth-best investment environment globally. Taiwan’s largest trading partners are the world’s three largest economies, Japan, China and the United States, and, as a leader in technology production, Taiwan has a dynamic and expanding role in the global economy. Taiwan’s economic growth has corresponded with a growth in commercial litigation, but Taiwan’s government and cultural legacy has also built a strong ADR foundation and offers opportunities for further expansion.

Confucianism has historically cultivated an “anti-lawsuit” attitude, and this heritage has served as “fertile soil for the development of mediation.” However, Taiwan’s strong history of societally promoted mediation has not prevented a rapid expansion of civil litigation. Professor Yun-Hsien Diana Lin of National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan ascribes this development to the “increase in judicial staff…, the progress of economic development and the growing prevalence of education among Taiwanese people.” Despite this expansion of litigation, Taiwan’s government has continued to promote mediation as an alternative through two main avenues.

First, Taiwan has legislation that creates mandatory mediation through Article 403 of Taiwan’s Code of Civil Practice. As Salvatore Casabona, ‎Associate Professor of Comparative Law & International Trade Law at University of Palermo, describes, “Originally provided only for small value claims, the range of civil dispute subjected to mandatory mediation were gradually broadened, including a variety of cases from neighbourhood and real property controversies to traffic accident and medical treatment ones.” This type of mediation is conducted in the courtroom by mediators appointed by the presiding judge. A settlement is legally enforced by the judge, but if mediation does not result in settlement litigation follows. Casabona’s analysis suggests Taiwanese litigants have been resistant to this mandatory mediation; for example, less than 1% of debt discharge cases that provoked mandatory mediation have seen mediation sustained. Nevertheless, the number of successfully sustained mediations has risen over time and this act’s expansion points to recognition of the value of ADR procedures.

The second type of mediation in Taiwan is not conducted through the court but, rather, similarly to mediations abroad, is conducted by outside institutions under mutually agreed upon procedures. For example, mediation under the Chinese Arbitration Association, Tapei (CAA) is regulated under the institution’s rules, passed October 2008, which parties may choose to use unless they mutually agree to other rules. Article 45 of Taiwan’s arbitration law specifies that an arbitrator can propose and accept a mediated settlement with legal enforceability.

Beyond these two main avenues, Taiwan has an additional type of out of court mediation that is more unique. This is called Town Mediation, and many see it as an outgrowth of the Confucian tradition. Regulated by the Town Mediation Act, Town Mediation was first passed in 1955 and this local process has been amended frequently since. Townships and administrative divisions maintain mediation committees of seven to fifteen to mediate civil disputes and minor criminal cases. This act specifies “Mediators are appointed by the mayor of township and county–administered city ‘from the men of eminent fairness, within the administrative district, who have legal knowledge or other expertise and good reputation.’” Mediators are often local elders and are not always lawyers. In recent years, amendments to the Town Mediation Act have increased the role of local courts in overseeing the committees and passed rules to reduce the appearance of bias.

Town mediation retains a distinctly local identity, with traditional mores playing a vital role in the local mediators’ attempts to resolve disputes. As Yun-Hsien Diana Lin, Associate Professor at the Institute of Law for Science & Technology, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan, writes, “Fairness must be judged in the context of…social relations instead of according to strict justice under the law.” Unlike court mediation, town mediation can only be entered into at the request of both parties, decisions are non-binding until certified by a local court, and the process is free of charge to both parties. Town mediation’s popularity has grown in recent years, especially in the context of minor criminal cases. The number of approved town mediation cases exceeded the number of sustained in-court mediations in 2010 and 96 percent of town mediation settlements brought before courts were approved in that year.

In addition to mediation, arbitration has become a more common method of dispute resolution in Taiwan. The leading arbitration institution is the CAA, founded in 1955. The CAA’s main services are arbitration and mediation conducted in Chinese and English. The CAA specializes in civil, commercial, international banking, construction, distribution, financial/investment, maritime, securities and transportation disputes. The arbitration act and rules governing CAA proceedings are the Republic of China Arbitration Act of 2002, modeled after the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985, and the CAA Arbitration Rules.

While most arbitral proceeding in Taiwan are conducted under the auspices of the CAA, specialized bodies performing arbitrations include the Taiwan Construction Arbitration Association, the Labour Dispute Arbitration Association and the Chinese Engineering Arbitration Association.

Despite the expanded use of both town and court mediation, it is hard to say that they have kept up with the expansion of civil litigation. In 2008, the number of civil disputes filed with the Taiwanese District Court increased to 2.81 million from 1.37 million in 1998. While this litigious trend may be a concern, it also means there will likely be a greater market for ADR providers and educators in years to come.

In all, the ADR environment in Taiwan is promising. The growth of civil litigation has been met with governmental expansion of mandatory mediation, suggesting that Taiwan’s leaders are eager for an expansion of ADR. Town Mediation offers an interesting example of local receptiveness to ADR procedures, and judicial willingness to certify proceedings shows a recognition by judges that outside processes can effectively resolve disputes. With these strong foundations, there is room to build an ever stronger ADR culture. As Taiwan’s growing economy and increasingly strong economic ties have made it one of most important and dynamic markets in the world, expanding ADR there could lead to the more effective resolution of disputes in the rest of Asia and beyond.

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Gideon Hanft, a research assistant at CPR, is entering his first year at Columbia Law School.
Ngutjiua Hijarunguru is a LLM graduate from the Center of the Study of Dispute Resolution at the University of Missouri-Columbia.