#CPRAM21: Committing to More Diversity in ADR

If you missed the 2021 CPR Annual Meeting in January—the first free public meeting held online in the organization’s 40-year history—the videos are being posted on CPR’s YouTube Channel. While additional videos will be posted for CPR members only, the first, linked here on CPR Speaks, is open access and features the keynoters, CNN Anchor and Chief Political Correspondent Dana Bash and General James Mattis, who is former U.S. Defense Secretary. Click the Subscribe button at YouTube for alerts and for more CPR content. For information on full access and joining CPR, please visit CPR’s Membership webpage here.

By Amy Foust

The CPR 2021 Annual Meeting’s final panel presentation encouraged participants to take action for a more equitable alternative dispute resolution community, and focused on CPR’s Diversity Commitment

The Jan. 29 third-day panel was hosted and moderated by CPR’s Anna M. Hershenberg, who is Vice President of Programs and Public Policy, as well as CPR’s Corporate Counsel.

The discussion, “Time To Move The Needle! CPR’s Diversity Commitment and Model Clause–and How to Track for Accountability,” included panelists

  • Hannah Sholl, Senior Counsel, Global Litigation & Competition at Visa Inc.;
  • Brenda Carr, Chief Diversity & Inclusion Officer at Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer in Washington, D.C.;
  • Tim Hopkins, a senior consultant at McKinley Advisors, also in Washington; and
  • Linda Klein, a partner in the Atlanta office of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz.

The panel offered insights, simple practice changes, neutral selection templates, and diversity tracking tools for promoting diverse ADR panels.

Moderator Hershenberg kicked off the presentation with a poll of attendees, which asked, “What is the number one reason holding you back from selecting a diverse arbitrator or mediator for your matters?” The most popular answer, with 26% of the audience, was “I’m too nervous to select a neutral I don’t know or who my colleagues haven’t recommended.”

Hershenberg also reviewed the requirements under the CPR Diversity Commitment, including recruiting and hiring diverse neutrals.  She noted early Commitment adopters, including  Baker Donelson, ConocoPhillips Co., KPMG LLP, Shell Group, and Visa, among many others.  (Companies and law firms may sign the commitment on CPR’s website at www.cpradr.org/about/diversity-commitment.) Hannah Sholl discussed Visa’s process of managing diversity in light of adopting and signing the commitment.

These efforts, of course, raise the question of why practitioners don’t know more diverse neutrals.  Linda Klein, acknowledging research into affinity bias, said that in ADR, “the parties choose their judges, the arbitrators, and most people are comfortable with people who come from similar backgrounds.” 

Klein recommended applying the Mansfield Rule, which suggests ensuring that any slate of candidates includes at least 30% candidates who self-identify as diverse in some way. See, e.g., Homer C. La Rue, “A Call—and a Blueprint—for Change,” Dispute Resolution Magazine (Feb. 17 (available at http://bit.ly/2ZZ3zvJ).

The panel agreed that an easy way to identify diverse candidates is to request a slate from an institution like CPR, which strives to include diverse candidates.  Klein suggested that it is appropriate to complain if an institution provides a slate that is not diverse, and to request a substitute slate that includes a significant number of diverse candidates. 

The panel agreed that it might be helpful to reach beyond customary contacts to seek input on a neutral, but noted that inclusion on a provider institution panel alone is an indication that the proposed neutral has been vetted.

The audience and the panel repeatedly noted a variety of resources available to identify and research diverse candidates in addition to CPR Dispute Resolution, including the National Bar Association, the Metropolitan Black Bar Association, the African Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, JAMS, Arbitral Women, the American Arbitration Association, and REAL-Racial Equality for Arbitration Lawyers.  The panel also provided extensive advice for potential neutrals on entering the field and for current neutrals on increasing their exposure and, ultimately, appointments.

Tim Hopkins and others noted that it can be helpful to sign the CPR Diversity Commitment or a comparable business pledge, and then checking to see if other parties to the dispute have signed similar diversity or corporate pledges.  It might be easier to convince other stakeholders to enlist an unfamiliar neutral if they have made a commitment to advance diversity–especially a specific commitment to advance diversity in ADR.

A simple, practical tip the panel provided was adding diverse neutrals clauses to organizations’ standard contract templates, so that there is a default to require specifically a diverse slate. There also was consensus that those clauses rarely generate mark-ups or controversy, and putting them in a template makes it that much more likely they will be added to a draft agreement. CPR provides a model clause that calls for at least one member of a tripartite panel to be diverse. (See link above.)

Other easy, low-cost tips, according to the panel, included praising diverse neutrals, so that their skills are recognized; confronting bias when it arises (e.g., statements like “Are you sure she can handle a $100 million case?”); including diverse neutrals in recommendations to rating services and providers; and, especially with travel restrictions in view of Covid-19 reducing the cost of attendance at virtual hearings, providing exposure by including diverse attorneys in ADR activities so that they are developing the required skills.

Attendee comments presaged the importance of measuring progress, and the panel agreed with the audience comments. Linda Klein proposed setting up a table of neutral qualifications before preparing a candidates’ list to facilitate an impartial selection process.

Brenda Carr presented a spreadsheet for tracking not only the panelists’ individual talents, but also the composition of the slates for those panels, and which candidates were selected.  Carr explained that tracking progress also helps to identify roadblocks—it allows advocates and parties to “have the conversations if you’re presenting a particular arbitrator as a possibility and you notice that the client is constantly turning them down. Maybe you want to follow up and have a conversation about why this person isn’t someone that you are ultimately selecting.” 

Looking at the tracking programs presented by the law firm representatives, Visa in-house counsel Hannah Sholl said that seeing this kind of work, presented in this way, “speaks a lot, and perhaps even more sometimes than … filling in the boxes and the ABA Diversity Commitment  [see https://bit.ly/3sGQ3tc]. You know . . . the firm [that] is tracking this cares about it, . . . is going through a process . . . and they have had a commitment.”

Overall, the panel agreed that the important thing was to start: Whether by signing a diversity commitment or tracking ADR diversity in just one department or working group, that first step is important.

* * *

The author is an LLM candidate studying dispute resolution at the Straus Institute, Caruso School of Law at Malibu, Calif.’s Pepperdine University, and an intern with the CPR Institute through Spring 2021.

[END]

#CPRAM21: Managing Workplace Conflicts, On-site and Remote

If you missed the 2021 CPR Annual Meeting in January—the first free public meeting held online in the organization’s 40-year history—the videos are being posted on CPR’s YouTube Channel. While additional videos will be posted for CPR members only, the first, linked here on CPR Speaks, is open access and features the keynoters, CNN Anchor and Chief Political Correspondent Dana Bash and General James Mattis, who is former U.S. Defense Secretary. Click the Subscribe button at YouTube for alerts and for more CPR content. For information on full access and joining CPR, please visit CPR’s Membership webpage here.

By Antranik Chekemian

Kimberley Lunetta, who represents management in employment matters as of counsel at Morgan Lewis & Bockius, moderated a third-day CPR Annual Meeting panel on state-of-the-art best practices for addressing and resolving workplace disputes. The panel mainly concentrated on managing employees and disputes in the current remote environment, and how to set up an ADR program in order to prevent and resolve conflicts.

The Jan. 29 session included four panelists:

  • Alfred G. Feliu, who heads his own New York firm, is a longtime panelist for CPR Dispute Resolution and the American Arbitration Association’s commercial and employment arbitration and mediation panels. He is past chair of the New York State Bar Association’s Labor and Employment Law Section and a fellow of the College of Commercial Arbitrators and the College of Labor and Employment Lawyers.
  • Wayne Outten is chair and founder of New York’s Outten & Golden LLP, which focuses on representing employees. He has represented employees for more than 40 years as a litigator. He has long advocated for using mediation in employment disputes. His practice focuses on problem solving, negotiating, and counseling on behalf of employees.
  • Cheryl M. Manley is a veteran labor employment attorney with more than 25 years of  experience, and since 2005 has been at Charter Communications, where she is senior vice president and associate general counsel of employment law, leading the broadband/cable operator’s Employment Law Group.
  • Andrew J. Weissler is a partner in the labor and employment group of Husch Blackwell. He is a member of the firm’s virtual office, the Link, based in Bloomington, Ill. Weissler advises and represents public and private clients on workplace issues involving difficult personnel decisions.

Feliu and Outten are on a subcommittee of CPR’s Employment Disputes Committee that is working on a model workplace disputes program, along with a new version of CPR’s Employment Dispute Arbitration Procedure to be issued soon.

A poll conducted at the beginning of the panel showed that remote working was new for most of the participants.

Lunetta launched the discussion by asking Feliu about the threshold questions employers should ask themselves when considering an ADR program.

If the principal goal is avoiding litigation, responded Feliu, then employers “are really focusing on processing existing or incipient claims.” As a result, he said, employers “are going to focus more on arbitration–on ending up with a process that brings an ultimate result.”

But if the employer’s goal is more on problem solving and identifying tensions before they become disputes and the employer views conflict resolution as a strategic imperative, then the alternative approach of problem-solving should be embraced, he said. Here, the focus is different than pure litigation avoidance. Said Feliu, “Litigation avoidance or reduction of legal costs will be part–will be an effect, hopefully–of the problem-solving process but wouldn’t necessarily be the goal.”

This approach would also help the organization become more competitive, he said–to work more constructively and efficiently while, as an after-effect, avoiding litigation.

Feliu explained, “How do you do this? You do this is by opening up lines of communication, by necessarily undercutting to a certain extent the chain of command. You’re empowering employees to come forward with their disputes at whatever level and whatever the nature. And by doing that, you are creating a different kind of an organization that is less hierarchical, less structured, and more fluid.”

Wayne Outten added that ADR is ideal for workplace disputes. Because there already is an important relationship between both sides and the relationship is typically continuing, said Outten, it “is a perfect place for identifying problems and solving them early on.” He then presented two approaches that companies can embrace for dispute resolution procedures, the legal mentality and the human resources mentality.

The legal mentality, said Outten, is, “Let’s find a way to avoid lawsuits and to maximize the chances that we will win them with the least possible costs.” He said the HR approach is better, with goals of making employees happy and providing an environment where workers can be productive and focus on their jobs in an effective and efficient manner.

With the HR approach, Outten said, a program should start identifying problems at the earliest possible stage. “If a problem ripens into a dispute,” he said, the goal is “resolving the dispute in the simplest, quickest way possible and escalating only as and when you need to.” The HR approach also serves the lawyers’ perspective as it “tends to avoid disputes ripening into the possibility of litigation.”

Lunetta then asked the panelists whether having employees working from home in a number of states, possibly new states to the company, would affect the design of an ADR program.

Al Feliu responded that working from home would not alter or change the program itself, but it increases and amplifies “the need for it to be enforceable across 50 states and 50 jurisdictions.”

Wayne Outten discussed some of the positive and negative changes regarding the nature of workplace disputes that come with remote working. On one hand, the kind of disputes that arise from being in the same place, and having interpersonal reactions, presumably will be reduced with the increase in virtual offices, such as sexual harassment claims and bullying.

“On the other hand,” he said, “the opportunities for disputes are exacerbated because you don’t have as much free-flowing communication, and the ability to address things face to face.” Outten added, “Disputes may fester.”

From the management-side perspective, Husch Blackwell’s A.J. Weissler noted that the HR model Outten mentioned “has changed quite a bit in this remote work environment.” If the employees are typically working remotely, then having difficult conversations over the Internet should be acceptable, he said.  

But if a human resources or corporate employee is working from home while the business has essential workers who have been going to the employer’s worksite, then, says Weissler, “there’s a real disconnect there” that can make the on-site workers feel and sense that the employer is not in touch with the employee.

Moderator Kimberley Lunetta then asked panelists whether CPR has resources that can help employers think through these issues if they are considering any of the dispute resolution options that were discussed.

Outten said that this was the reason for CPR to be founded decades ago, with the goal of helping companies figure out how to avoid and resolve disputes.

Outten announced that CPR and its Employment Disputes Committee will be publishing a new set of rules for administered employment dispute resolution.  Accompanying the rules will include “draft programs that companies can adopt and adapt for their own use, which have within them the various different stages that employers can consider […] including things . . . [like] informal dispute resolution and problem solving, . . . open-door policies that invite people to take their problems up the chain of command,” ombudspersons, peer review processes and “all the way up to mediation which . . . is perfectly suited for employment disputes of all kinds.”

The conversation then revolved around the pluses and minuses for an employer of establishing a mandatory arbitration program.

“In reaching the decision that our arbitration program was going to be mandatory,” responded Charter Communications’ Cheryl Manley, “one of the factors that went into play was either reducing the litigation costs, or perhaps not having to deal with court litigation.” She mentioned that her company’s program was built to resolve issues in a timely manner and on an individualized basis.

She further added that her organization has many steps before getting to the arbitration phase to resolve the employment issue. And “when it finally does get to arbitration, we believe that there’s some certainty,” said Manley, “We believe that both parties have some skin in the game, in terms of selecting the arbitrator and primarily, it’s cost effective and efficient.”

Outten then answered a question about CPR’s employment ADR program and how it can help employers not only set up, but also ensure long-term success.

Outten reiterated the program’s strength in early-stage problem solving and early dispute resolution, and added that the program offers room for flexibility and adaptability in different workplaces.

Mediation with a third-party facilitator, he said, “can be extremely valuable and beneficial. It gives the parties an opportunity to air their grievances.” When it comes to arbitration, he said, every successful workplace ADR program really needs to comply “at a minimum,” with due process protocols.”

He then presented several key features of the due process protections (which CPR has adopted here), which include:

  • “The employee isn’t required to pay more than they would pay if they were going to file in court.”
  • “The arbitrator has the authority and power to provide any remedy that a court can provide so that there’s no takeaway of remedies for the affected employee.”
  • “The employee has a fair opportunity to pick the decision maker–the arbitrator–especially given the binding power of the decision of this person to resolve the dispute.”
  • “The employee has to have a full and fair opportunity to gather information in order to present the case and . . . [any] defenses.”
  • “The employee needs to have an opportunity to have counsel of his or her choosing.”
  • “The hearing itself should be reasonably convenient . . .  so the employee doesn’t have to go a long distance to have his or her day in court.”
  • Finally, “the arbitration should end with a reasoned decision, so the parties know what the arbitrator took into account, what the findings were on the evidence, and what the legal conclusions were in determining” the decision.

A.J. Weissler added that “there are great legal reasons” not to “cram down” arbitration in a workplace disputes program, citing fairness. He said that arbitrator selection is an important factor in presenting a fair process, with a say for the employees.

Al Feliu noted that there is a dearth of diverse panelists, but major providers have made strides and continue to work on the problem to enhance and ensure fairness.

Cheryl Manley agreed with the comments, and emphasized that panelists need to reflect the workplace population.

Manley discussed Charter Communication’s Solution Channel, which she described as a 2017 program to compel arbitration use—a mandatory program for newly signed-on employees, with about 10% of the company’s 90,000 employees opting out when it was launched.  She reported that the complaints are restricted to legal claims—non-legal disputes are addressed in other ways–that are submitted through a third-party vendor which create a record over the claim. She said the American Arbitration Association is the provider.  The company absorbs the AAA filing fees and the arbitrator costs. If either side is unsatisfied with the panel, they return to the AAA for more choices.

Weissler says arbitration should be part of any dispute resolution system but if it’s made mandatory and employees are forced to use it, he said, it is counterproductive and it creates problems going forward due to the “asymmetrical” views.

Weissler said he encourages mediation as a best option. He said he is skeptical of programs that outline steps that do not allow a course of mediation to be developed.

Feliu says he has been mediating for 30 years and familiarity has grown during his period of practice after skepticism.  He agreed with Weissler’s points, but noted that mandatory mediation in New York federal court, where he said he would have expected resistance—mandatory is counterintuitive, said Feliu—it has been just as successful as voluntary mediation over about the past 10 years.

Feliu said sometimes there is grumbling but mostly, when parties get to the bargaining table, they try to settle. And he said that while joint sessions are fading, flexibility is needed.  “Every mediation is different,” he said.

Wayne Outten said that he shared Al Feliu’s experience.  In the mid-1980s, he said, the plaintiffs’ bar “viewed this newfangled process as a conspiracy to take away their rights, and I soon discovered that was not necessarily the case and became a big advocate.”

Over the past 35 years, said Outten, mediation “has become quite normal.” He echoed Feliu again,  noting that when parties attempt mediation in good faith, it is successful.

Even in situations with a lot of open issues, he said, mediation “has a very high success rate, . . .  and is always worth trying.”

Cheryl Manley said that pre-pandemic, her company didn’t want anything done virtually or remotely—all depositions, mediations and arbitration hearings were done in person, exclusively.  The change was swift, she said. “Fast forward seven, eight, nine months, . . . when we finally emerge from this pandemic, we aren’t going to go back to all depositions in person, all mediations in person or hearings,” said Manley, adding, “In fact, I think that there is no reason . . . to start putting people back on planes traveling all over the country.  It is expensive. It’s time consuming.  And it is not efficient. “ She said that the “only issues” are “the occasional technological” problems.

A.J. Weissler said he has participated in virtual matters frequently during the pandemic, and found “an incredible benefit.” Having the people resources ready on video, whether from home or for those back in their offices, has “been an incredible thing,” he said, adding that he strongly supports virtual mediations.

Wayne Outten said he always has had a concern whether real decision makers would be in the mediation room.  “Now with virtual mediations,” he said, “that problem can be more readily addressed.”

Al Feliu said he has only done virtual mediations since his first in March.  “All of the impediments, and all of the arguments against them, have been rebuffed, “ he said. For example, he explained, he can evaluate credibility better on close-up video than across a bargaining table.

Feliu conceded that there is a different feel in an in-person gathering where people have committed to the process.  That intensity, he said, isn’t present where people are sitting on their couches, are more relaxed, with their dogs nearby.  “It’s just a different process,” he said.  “I don’t have the shrieking episodes. I don’t have a lot of emotions.  Is it good or bad? It’s just different.”

The result, he said, has been that he isn’t settling cases on the first day as much as he did at in-person mediations.

Addressing audience questions, Al Feliu said he discusses confidentiality with the parties with heightened concerns, noting that a potentially serious issue could be where extra people are present, and not visible on screen, as well as individuals texting on the side. “These are all serious concerns we need to get equilibrium on” going into the mediation, he said.

* * *

The author, a second-year student at New York’s Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, is a CPR 2021 intern. Alternatives editor Russ Bleemer contributed writing and research to this report.

[END]

#CPRAM21: Too Much or Not Enough? The Arbitrator Disclosure Issue, Analyzed

If you missed the 2021 CPR Annual Meeting in January—the first free public meeting held online in the organization’s 40-year history—the videos are being posted on CPR’s YouTube Channel. While additional videos will be posted for CPR members only, the first, linked here on CPR Speaks, is open access and features the keynoters, CNN Anchor and Chief Political Correspondent Dana Bash and General James Mattis, who is former U.S. Defense Secretary. Click the Subscribe button at YouTube for alerts and for more CPR content. For information on full access and joining CPR, please visit CPR’s Membership webpage here.

By Antranik Chekemian

Here are notes on the Jan. 28 closing panel of the second day of CPR’s 2021 Annual Meeting. Moderator Deborah Greenspan, a Washington, D.C. Blank Rome partner focusing on mass torts and complex disputes, served as moderator for the Ethics session.

She introduced the panel, starting with Dana Welch, an arbitrator for nearly 20 years who is based in Berkeley, Calif. Welch focuses on complex commercial and employment matters. She is a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators  and the College of Commercial Arbitrators, where she is an executive committee member. Before she became an arbitrator, she was the general counsel of a San Francisco-based investment bank, and a Ropes and Gray partner.

The second panelist was David Pryce, the managing partner of Fenchurch Law Ltd. in London, which is the first U.K. law firm to focus exclusively on representing policyholders in insurance disputes. His practice focuses primarily on construction industry risks. Wherever possible, said Greenspan, Pryce tries to approach disputes in a way that maintains or ideally strengthens the commercial relationships between those involved

The third panelist was Adolfo Jimenez, a partner in the Miami office of Holland and Knight.  He is a litigation attorney focusing on international disputes. He heads the firm’s International Disputes team, and he is chair of the Miami International Arbitration Society.

Greenspan opened by discussing the ethical challenges faced in arbitration, focusing on disclosure, in a session that provided Ethics continuing legal education to qualifying attendees. The panel’s first topic was the issue of repeat players, where an arbitrator is repeatedly selected or appointed by a particular entity or a law firm.

Pryce started off the conversation by presenting a recent U.K. Supreme Court case, Halliburton v. Chubb. He described the case’s background for the online audience.

Halliburton Co. had provided services for Transocean Ltd., the owner of Deepwater Horizon, the Gulf of Mexico oil rig that exploded in 2010.  Halliburton faced various claims along with oil company BP and Transocean. They were all part of the same proceedings. Halliburton settled those claims against it for about $1.1 billion.

Halliburton made a claim under the general liability policy it had with insurer Chubb. Chubb refused to pay the claim on the basis that Halliburton had entered into settlements that were unreasonable. A dispute ensued and the general liability policy provided for an ad hoc London arbitration with three arbitrators, one arbitrator to be chosen by each of the parties and a third arbitrator chosen by the party-appointed arbitrators.

If the arbitrators couldn’t agree, the third arbitrator was to be appointed by the High Court in London. In front of the High Court, each of the parties put forward several candidates. After a contested hearing, the High Court chose Chubb nominee Kenneth Rokison QC, an arbitrator in Reigate, U.K. Rokison was “a regular arbitrator in uniform arbitrations,” explained Pryce, “and Halliburton’s perception . . . was that he was someone that is generally appointed by insurers rather than policyholders.”

Prior to him being appointed, Rokison disclosed relevant points to the proceedings. Rokison said that he previously acted as an arbitrator in several other arbitrations including Chubb. He acted as a party-appointed arbitrator by Chubb and he was currently acting as an arbitrator in relation to references that included Chubb.

The High Court didn’t regard any of those appointments as being an impediment to his appointment in the Halliburton-Chubb dispute and they didn’t call into question Rokison’s impartiality.

Three months after his first appointment in 2015, Rokison accepted a further appointment by Chubb to act as an arbitrator in relation to a claim against it by Transocean, which as the overall owner of Deepwater Horizon was also facing similar claims to the ones that Halliburton had been facing. The dispute between Chubb and Transocean also related to the reasonableness of settlements which Chubb refused to pay on a similar basis for the reasons it refused to pay Halliburton.

Rokison disclosed his involvement in the Halliburton arbitration to Transocean, but he did not disclose to Halliburton that he accepted the Transocean appointment.

The following year, Rokison accepted another appointment in relation to an arbitration between Transocean and different insurers, and that was not disclosed either.


After finding out about the second and third appointments, Halliburton wrote to Rokison and raised concerns about these appointments.

Rokison responded that it had not even occurred to him that he was under any obligation to disclose the second and third appointments to Halliburton. Halliburton called for him to resign, raising concerns about his impartiality with regard to Chubb.

It’s apparent that Halliburton was just as concerned, explained David Pryce, and perhaps even more concerned, about a second issue–that Chubb would potentially gain a tactical advantage as a result of being able to find out what Rokison’s views were on certain issues, because they would be making submissions in the second arbitration which will be relevant to the decision that Rokison was facing in deciding the Halliburton arbitration.

A High Court claim was issued by Halliburton seeking Rokison’s removal under U.K. Arbitration Act Section 24, dealing with situations where circumstances exist for a justifiable doubt about the arbitrator’s impartiality.

The High Court and the Court of Appeal both dismissed Halliburton’s application, so it went to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court made the following key observations in reaching the decision:

  • First, the obligation of an arbitrator to act fairly and impartially is a core principle of arbitration, and under English law, the duty of impartiality applies just as much to party-appointed arbitrators, sole arbitrators, and presiding arbitrators. Presiding arbitrators like Rokison in Halliburton v. Chubb aren’t required to be any more impartial than party-appointed arbitrators–“Everyone is required to be impartial,” explained Pryce.
  • Second, the Supreme Court confirmed that the test under English law to establish whether an arbitrator had a real possibility of biases is an objective test. “When the fair-minded informed observer is looking at that, they should take into account various considerations including the factual matrix of the case , . . the role of the arbitrator in the case, and expectations regarding what an objective observer may take into account,” said Pryce. In that regard, market practices are relevant, but in some areas, overlapping appointments may be more likely to give rise to an appearance of bias than others.
  • Finally, in relation to the arbitrator’s duty of disclosure, the Supreme Court held the disclosures are not a question of best practices and that disclosures can only be made if the parties that confidentiality obligations are owed give their consent.

The key takeaway from this case is that “disclosure is not an option,” said Pryce, because disclosure doesn’t trump confidentiality.

“The unfair advantage is not the same thing as a lack of impartiality,” Pryce said, adding, “There is just no remedy for unfair advantage.” Even though repeat business might suggest bias in some cases, it is going to depend on market practice.

He further added that in some areas like treaty reinsurance, overlapping appointments are commonplace and parties are not concerned as there are repeat users “all the time.”

Pryce added that it is much more challenging when where there is a one-off user in a dispute with a repeated user. “From the perspective of someone who was a policyholder such as Halliburton,” said Pryce, “a one-time user in this situation, against an insurer who’s going to be a repeat user, the Supreme Court decision for me feels a little bit tougher.”

Panelist Dana Welch said, “I’m not sure a U.S court would have reached the same decision.  . . . We take it for granted in the United States that you have to disclose every business relationship that comes to mind.”

She then shared that California’s Judicial Council has enacted a rule that requires that the arbitrators not only have to disclose looking backward, but they have a duty to disclose looking forward. Arbitrators are required to disclose at the time of appointment whether they are willing to take future business from either a party who is appearing in that case or a law firm that is appearing in that case.

If the arbitrator discloses that they can take future business, they can be disqualified at that point if someone objects. Once the arbitrator accepts the possibility of future business, and then proceeds in the future to take that business, they must provide notice to the previous parties and the law firm that they have done so. At that point, the parties have no right to disqualify the arbitrator.

Panelist Adolfo Jimenez also shared that from an ethical perspective, repeat business in arbitration presents two problems that also were identified in the Halliburton case.

“You can have a situation where you’re going to have one party that’s better informed and an arbitrator that’s hearing evidence that is related to two separate cases,” said Jimenez, “but they are related cases that may influence their view while a set of attorneys who aren’t parties to that other proceeding is ignorant of all . . . that evidence, all that information.”

Second, Jimenez noted, is the risk of inappropriate communications. “Simply because you can does not mean that you should,” said Jimenez, noting that there can be as a result of such contacts an erosion of trust in the process, with one of the parties believing that they’re being affected.

Dana Welch also emphasized that the arbitrators should be careful in order to preserve the integrity of the process in the face of repeat business. She said:

There is a financial incentive if you get repeat business.  And for each one of us who serves as a neutral, every time we get repeat business, we really need to think long and hard about whether we can truly serve as a neutral in a proceeding with a law firm that appoints us a lot or a party that appoints us a lot.  . . . What Adolfo said is right: There’s a difference between ‘can’ and ‘should,’ and it’s an extremely important difference in order to preserve the integrity of the process.

After a participant asked about the future of London-based insurance arbitration in light of the Halliburton decision, David Pryce responded that a single decision shouldn’t call into question the city’s role in insurance arbitration.  He said that when there is a situation with a “one-off” buyer of arbitration services and a repeat user of arbitration services, the court should be extra careful not to go for the appointment of someone who is used frequently by repeat buyers.

“It was an unfortunate choice by the High Court,” said Pryce, adding that if that sort of choice is repeated again and again, “it looks like the deck is being stacked against policyholders,” and that would be a problem for insurance arbitration in London. But he added that as a policyholders’ representative, he did not think the deck is usually stacked against his clients.

[For even more on Halliburton, see the latest issue of Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation: Adam Samuel, “Multiple Appointments, Multiple Biases: The U.K. Supreme Court Does Arbitrator Disclosure,” 39 Alternatives 19 (February 2021) (available directly at https://doi.org/10.1002/alt.21880).

* * *

Moderator Deborah Greenspan then invited panelists to discuss the expectations parties have about the status of a party-appointed arbitrator.

Panelist Adolfo Jimenez started off the conversation by saying that the duty of impartiality permeates throughout the entire U.K. and U.S. legal systems, and that most arbitral institutions require that arbitrators be neutral.

Jimenez also noted, however, that there sometimes are justifications for repeat businesses–for example, specialized arbitration proceedings such as those at the London Maritime Society of Arbitrators, where parties prefer arbitrators that are particularly qualified. When there is a limited number of qualified individuals, repeat business is an option, said Jimenez.

A second justification is to allow for party autonomy.

He further noted that the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes adopted by CPR Dispute Resolution has the assumption that the arbitrators will be neutral. Even in jurisdictions which allow for repeat business, he noted, neutrality is still expected and required.

Panelist Dana Welch also noted an important reality in arbitration. She said, “When a party chooses an arbitrator, even if it’s a sole arbitrator and not a party-appointed arbitrator, all parties hope that the arbitrator is going to rule on their behalf. Therefore, they are looking for somebody who is going to see things from their point of view.”

She further noted that CPR Dispute Resolution rules provide a process for challenging a party-appointed arbitrator if either side believes that a party appointed arbitrator is not neutral. Reading from CPR Administered Arbitration Rule 7.5, she said: “Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist or arise that give rise to justifiable doubt regarding that arbitrator’s independence or impartiality.  . . .” She praised the rule and its challenge process for when neutrality isn’t observed.

Greenspan then asked the panelists about the ideal steps parties should take when selecting arbitrators.

Welch said she is a strong advocate of both parties interviewing the arbitrators to understand their management style or their approach to the issues.

Jimenez added that one should be allowed to communicate with an arbitrator to make sure that the arbitrator is comfortable with the cases’ technical issues but should not get into discussing the substance or facts of the case, noting that a red line exists in between.

* * *

Moderator Greenspan then asked the panelists on how to deal with the reality that people from different backgrounds and different jurisdictions have different expectations when it comes to ethical challenges.

Jimenez agreed that different jurisdictions have different norms. He suggested that practitioners can look to journal articles and general expectations of limits that are employed for international disputes. He pointed out that “what may be improper or incorrect in one place is going to be perfectly acceptable [elsewhere]–that’s a real challenge when you’re dealing with a cross-border dispute.”

Greenspan then discussed how parties can enhance trust when implicit or explicit biases exist. When arbitrators are appointed by a party, Welch responded, “it would be the height of denial, to say that there isn’t some impetus that you feel or allegiance that you feel to that party. You really have to struggle against that and understand that you’re a neutral in all senses.”

Welch added that arbitrators need to be conscious of the kind of bias that arises when a party picks them just like they need to be conscious of the kind of bias that can arise when they have repeat businesses.

* * *

The next topic of the panel was about disclosures.

Welch first expressed that the level of disclosure is an interesting question in this age “where everything is known about everybody,” and so much information is out already on social networks. The question, she asked, is “How much is there an obligation for us to disclose versus a party to investigate?”

She then presented two cases.

In the first case, an arbitrator ruled against a claimant, and the respondent was a law firm. Afterward, the claimant did an Internet search and revealed a 10-year-old resume of the arbitrator with a recommendation from a partner from the respondent’s firm.  An appellate court decided this was enough to vacate the award.

Welch concluded, “What it shows is that the courts will look at the arbitrator for disclosure rather than . . . say to the parties to investigate that.”

The second case she presented was decided just a month ago, she said. An arbitrator rendered an award against the claimant. The claimant then found on the Internet that the arbitrator was a founding member of GLAAD, an organization supporting gay rights. The claimant then argued that because he was active in the Catholic Church, and because the arbitrator is active in social justice causes like gay and lesbian rights, the arbitrator had an inherent bias against the claimant.

The Court of Appeals rejected this claim, Welch reported, as it could not find any relationship between the claimant’s allegation and facts of the case.  She noted that “even California” has limits on challenging impartiality. Welch concluded:

What you need to draw from these cases is that the main obligation of disclosure is on the arbitrator, not on the parties. You need to disclose everything that comes to mind. If it comes to mind, you should be disclosing it, but you don’t need to disclose who you voted for president, or what you are active in unless there is a specific issue in that case before you.

Fenchurch’s David Pryce said that “there is a dividing line between . . . bias, something that gives the appearance of bias and what is simply just having better knowledge.” Having better knowledge on its own, he said, doesn’t give rise to either risk of or appearance of bias.

He further reflected on Halliburton v. Chubb. The disclosures, which relate to the same party in another “really high-stakes arbitration . . . about sums over a billion dollars” and issues that are almost exactly the same in both arbitrations, “aren’t insignificant things.”

But, said Pryce, “if we get to a situation where arbitrators feel they need to disclose lots of insignificant things, then I think everyone’s time is just going to be wasted unnecessarily.”

* * *

Greenspan presented the ethics panel’s final topic: “If you’re a mediator in a case and then you are later asked [in a case that doesn’t settle] to be an arbitrator, or if you are an arbitrator and then you’re asked to mediate the case,” how should such a situation be approached?

David Pryce said the moves are uncommon in the United Kingdom.  He added that huge challenges for the med-arb, mixed-mode ADR setup exist, because in mediation, parties are hoping to take advantage of the ability to share things with a mediator that they wouldn’t share with their opponent–and certainly not with the person that needs to make a decision about their case where the neutral is acting as an arbitrator.

The next question was about a situation where somebody had assisted an entity with developing its internal resolution guidelines or contractual terms to use to resolve disputes, and then also became the arbitrator or the mediator in a dispute which is affected by those guidelines.  The question was whether this would constitute a problem.

Dana Welch noted that such a situation raises fewer ethical issues as the person only designed the process, as opposed to being involved in a dispute, and that the person does not know confidential information about the dispute—he or she just comes in understanding the process. Welch says that courts have backed such arbitrators but the focus must be on extensive consents after disclosure.

* * *

The author, a second-year student at New York’s Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, is a CPR 2021 intern.

[END]

Let’s Schein Again!

The International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution presents a CPR Speaks blog discussion of the 1/25/2021 U.S. Supreme Court per curiam decision dismissing Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc., No. 19-963, and a same-day order declining to hear Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 20-695. Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation Editor Russ Bleemer hosts Prof. Angela Downes, University of North Texas-Dallas College of Law, and arbitrator-advocates contributors Richard Faulkner, also of Dallas, and Philip J. Loree Jr. in New York.

By Russ Bleemer

The panel returns to CPR Speaks and YouTube to analyze the Monday Henry Schein dismissal–a one-line decision–just a month after the Court heard oral arguments on the issue of how a contract carve-out removing injunctions from arbitration affects the delegation of the entire matter to arbitration.

In fact, the Dec. 8, 2020, Henry Schein oral argument repeatedly turned to an issue in the rejected Piersing case on the effectiveness of the incorporation by reference of arbitration rules in designating an arbitration tribunal to decide whether a case is arbitrated, rather than a court deciding whether the matter is to be arbitrated. A cross-petition by Archer and White asking for review of the incorporation by reference of the arbitration contract’s American Arbitration Association rules was declined by the Supreme Court the same day it agreed to hear the carve-out issue last June.

Our panel discussed these issues after the oral argument on this blog.  See “Schein II: Argument in Review,” CPR Speaks (Dec. 9) (available at http://bit.ly/2VXfyIa) (in which the panelists also discuss their work on an amicus brief in the case, a subject that arose in this post’s video).

You can see today’s per curiam decision on the Supreme Court’s website here.

Monday’s Henry Schein dismissal ends a long period of Supreme Court litigation in the case that also included a 2019 U.S. Supreme Court decision. For now, the case returns to the Fifth Circuit for proceedings on whether the parties properly intended to arbitrate the case.

Details on the Supreme Court’s Monday cert denial in Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 20-695, are available on CPR Speaks here.

For more analysis on the Henry Schein dismissal, see Ronald Mann, “Justices dismiss arbitrability dispute,” Scotusblog (Jan. 25, 2021) (available at http://bit.ly/2Yh9U4O), in which the Columbia University professor and Scotusblog analyst concludes that

it seems likely that the justices ultimately decided that they couldn’t sensibly say anything about this matter without addressing the question of whether the contract called for arbitration of the gateway question. Because they had declined to call for briefs on that question, it did not make sense to address it here. A logical course of action, then, was to dismiss the matter from the docket, providing a rare victory for a party opposing arbitration.

* * *

The author edits Alternatives for the CPR Institute.

Scotus’s Henry Schein No-Decision

By Russ Bleemer

If the U.S. Supreme Court appeared frustrated at last month’s arbitration argument in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc., No. 19-963, this morning’s one-line decision confirmed it.

The Court today dismissed the entire case without a decision on the merits.  The entire per curiam decision:  “The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.”

You can view it on the Supreme Court’s website here.

The immediate effect is that respondent Archer and White Sales sees a big win:  It will get the determination of whether its long-running case over a medical equipment contract dispute is to be arbitrated made by a judge, not an arbitrator.  A Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision now stands. See Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 935 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2019) (available at http://bit.ly/2NC7EmL).

Archer and White contended that a delegation agreement sending a matter to arbitration did not “clearly and unmistakably” send the case to arbitration because of a contract carve-out for injunctions.

With a one-line dismissal, it’s unknown why the Court did what it did. In shutting down the case, it may be backing Archer and White’s and the Fifth Circuit’s view. 

Or it may have reconsidered a point that Henry Schein’s successor status to the contract didn’t sustain its arbitration demand.

Or, in a point returned to repeatedly in last month’s argument, the Court may have botched the case on its own. When it granted Henry Schein’s cert petition on June 15 on the carve-out issue, the Supreme Court simultaneously rejected Archer and White’s cross petition challenging the determination of arbitrability of the case on a question of incorporation by reference. The cross petition contended that the “clear and unmistakable” evidence of an intent to arbitrate was insufficient; the contract incorporated American Arbitration Association rules that include a provision that arbitrators decide arbitrability.

Even though the Court rejected the cross-petition, the issue returned in the December arguments, at times overwhelming the discussion of the question of the carve-out’s effect. For more on the argument, see “Schein II: Argument in Review,” CPR Speaks (Dec. 9) (available at http://bit.ly/2VXfyIa).

One thing is certain:  The Court won’t use a follow-up petition to address the incorporation-by-reference issue, which would have interpreted the standard from the Court’s seminal decision on arbitrability, First Options of Chicago Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (available at https://bit.ly/39fAwcR).

That’s because a case that a petitioner and an amicus stated presented the issue cleanly—unencumbered by the carve-out issue and Henry Schein’s long history, including a 2019 U.S. Supreme Court decision—was denied certiorari 30 minutes ahead of today’s one-line opinion. Details on the Court’s cert denial in Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 20-695, are available on CPR Speaks here.

* * *

The author edits Alternatives for the CPR Institute.

[END]

Court Again Rejects Review on Incorporating Rules that Define Arbitrability

By Temitope Akande & Russ Bleemer

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning declined to hear a case that presented a persistent arbitration issue: whether the incorporation of a set of arbitration rules that state that an arbitrator decides whether a case goes to arbitration, instead of a court making the arbitrability decision, provides sufficient “clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties agreed for the tribunal to make the decision.

It was the second time in eight months that the Court has rejected a significant case on the issue.

Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 20-695, would have analyzed the clear-and-unmistakable evidence standard for delegation to arbitrability from the Court’s First Options of Chicago Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (available at https://bit.ly/39fAwcR).  

The question presented by the petitioner, a former employee of two Domino’s franchisers who had a claim against the parent company, was:

In the context of a form employment agreement, is providing that a particular set of rules will govern arbitration proceedings, without more, “clear and unmistakable evidence” of the parties’ intent to have the arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability?

Last June, the Court declined to hear the question on arbitrability in a cross-petition in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer & White Sales Inc., No. 19-1080 (June 15, 2020), while accepting the case on the original cert petition on another, close issue involving the reach of carve-out provisions in arbitration agreements. 

In its December arguments in Schein, which awaits decision, the discussion of incorporation by reference on arbitrability arose.  See “Schein II: Argument in Review,” CPR Speaks (Dec. 9) (available at http://bit.ly/2VXfyIa). In its brief in Piersing, the petitioner “acknowledges that [the] Court recently denied certiorari of a cross-petition presenting a similar question,” citing Schein, adding, “however, the question is presented in this case cleanly and as a stand-alone question.”

In Piersing, the petitioner worked as a delivery driver for a franchisee of respondent Domino’s, and later got an employment offer from Carpe Diem, another Washington state Domino’s franchisee. While the petitioner intended to increase his hours and earnings, the first franchisee fired him based on a no-poach clause in his employment agreement.

He eventually brought a U.S. District Court class-action suit against Domino’s alleging that the hiring rules violated, among other things, antitrust laws.

Domino’s sought to compel arbitration of Piersing’s claims based on the arbitration agreement between the employee and Carpe Diem.  Domino’s asked for arbitration, according to the Sixth Circuit opinion in the case that was the subject of the cert petition (see Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, 962 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2020) (available at http://bit.ly/3sWDlrg)), “because the agreement’s reference to the AAA rules constituted a delegation clause in that the AAA rules supposedly provide for delegation.”

The district court held that equitable estoppel applies to permit franchiser Domino’s to enforce franchisee Carpe Diem’s agreement against Piersing and, according to the petitioner’s cert petition brief, “that the clause providing the AAA rules would govern any arbitration amounted to ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence of Piersing’s and Carpe Diem’s intent to delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.”

Piersing appealed the district court’s decision. Relying on Rent-a-Center, West Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010), and more, the Sixth Circuit held that the incorporation of arbitration rules that permit the arbitrator to resolve questions of arbitrability is sufficient to delegate those questions to the arbitrator.

Piersing’s Supreme Court cert petition brief analyzed the holdings in First Options, Rent-a-Center, West, and the first Henry Schein decision, Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer & White Sales Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019), which wrestled with the question of and the standard for who decides arbitrability, the tribunal or the court.

Based on these precedents, the petitioner argued that the existing circuit court analysis allowing for incorporation of rules that included arbitrators determining arbitrability wasn’t “clear and unmistakable evidence” of the parties’ intent to arbitrate.  It emphasized that, particularly for consumers and employees, the cases weren’t sufficiently thorough in light of the First Options standard. The petitioner also noted that the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with the holdings of several state high courts.

Domino’s countered that an agreement incorporating privately promulgated arbitral rules that assign questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator clearly and unmistakably show the parties’ agreement that an arbitrator, not the court, will resolve whether the case is suitable for arbitration.

Domino’s successfully argued for the nation’s top Court to reject the petition and thereby uphold the Sixth Circuit.

An amicus brief in support of the petitioner was filed by Columbia University Law School Prof. George Bermann, who described the issue in the appeal as “a central but unsettled issue of domestic and international arbitration.” Echoing the petitioner, the brief noted the importance of the issue in both Henry Schein Supreme Court cases, but stated that “the delegation question is presented front and center for review in this case.” It also cited the divergence between state and federal court views.

The amicus brief discussed the principle of “competence-competence” in international commercial law—the international equivalent of the arbitrability question under which the tribunal is presumed to be in a position to determine its jurisdiction, and which the Sixth Circuit invoked.  Bermann’s brief discussed the concept under the “clear and unmistakable” agreement standard of parties to arbitrate.

The amicus noted that the competence-competence language does not constitute “clear and unmistakable” evidence. “[A]ll modern arbitral procedure rules contain a ‘competence-competence’ clause,” the brief argued, “so that treating such language as clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation means that parties will almost invariably lose their right to a judicial determination of what this Court has multiple times referred to as the very cornerstone of arbitration, viz. consent to arbitrate.”

Noting the state-federal divide in the interpretation of whether the incorporation of rules satisfies First Options, the brief concluded, “Only this Court can definitively resolve that issue and ensure that parties do not forfeit their right to a judicial determination of arbitrability unless they manifest that intention clearly and unmistakably.”

For more information on the case and an in-depth discussion of the issues involved, see the Supreme Court’s docket page at http://bit.ly/39Zxed1.

* * *

Akande, who received a Master of Laws in Alternative Dispute Resolution last May at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law in Los Angeles, is volunteering with the CPR Institute through Spring 2021. Bleemer edits Alternatives for the CPR Institute.

[END]

Extinguishing Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties: Recent Developments

By Krzysztof Wierzbowski and Aleksander Szostak

In line with the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (referred to here as the “CJEU”) in Achmea (formerly Eureko) v. Slovakia (the Achmea Decision) and the political declaration issued by the governments of the European Union member states on Jan. 15, 2019, most of the EU member states, with the exception of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland, have entered into a plurilateral treaty for the termination of bilateral investment treaties between the EU Member States (referred to in this article as “intra-EU BITs” and the Termination Treaty).

The Termination Treaty was signed on May 5, 2020, and entered into force on Aug. 29, 2020. See Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT] (available at http://bit.ly/3iqsTn3).

Portugal, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg have made the following formal declarations concerning the Termination Treaty:

  • “Luxembourg calls upon the European Commission and all member states to start, without any delay, a process with the aim to ensure complete, strong and effective protection of investments within the EU and adequate instruments in this regard.” It requests the  European Commission to create a plan for such a process. Declaration of Luxembourg to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].
  • Portugal appears to endorse a view similar to that of Luxembourg and emphasizes its “support to the intensifying of the discussions between the European Commission and Member States with the aim of better ensuring a sound and effective protection of investments within the European Union. To this end, calls to assess the establishment of new or better tools under European Union law and to carry out an assessment of the current dispute settlement mechanisms which are essential to ensure legal certainty and the protection of interests of investors.” Declaration of Portugal to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].
  • The Dutch government confirms that although the Achmea Decision does not affect the Caribbean parts of the Netherlands (as Overseas Countries and Territories), BITs concluded with those territories shall also be terminated pursuant to the Termination Treaty. In this sense and irrespective of the Achmea Decision, the effects of the Termination Treaty will extend to all parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Declaration of the Netherlands to the Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].

* * *

So what will be the fate of intra-EU BITs and intra-EU investment arbitration?

The conclusion of the Termination Treaty is a direct consequence of the Achmea Decision, in which the CJEU declared that Investor-State Dispute Settlement (the “ISDS”) clauses in intra-EU BITs are not compatible with the EU law. (The decision is available at http://bit.ly/2Kf8OmM.)

In general, the Termination Treaty is based on the premise that all intra-EU BITs shall be terminated and their sunset clauses, providing for the temporarily continued protection of investments existing prior to the termination of the relevant BIT, shall be terminated together with the respective intra-EU BIT and thereby shall not produce legal effects.

Furthermore, it stipulates that new intra-EU investor-state arbitrations may not be initiated and that pending proceedings shall be subject to the management procedure described below.

Interestingly, the Termination Treaty does not resolve the issue of application and compatibility with the EU law of the Energy Charter Treaty (the “ECT”) in the intra-EU investment protection context. In particular, the Termination Treaty stipulates that it does not cover intra-EU arbitrations initiated based on ECT Article 26 and that this issue will be dealt with at a later stage. Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT] at 2. The ECT is available at http://bit.ly/3nUL2u7.

Considering that in recent years we have witnessed rise of the number of intra-EU ECT arbitrations, the uncertainty introduced by the Termination Treaty may put the parties engaged in pending arbitrations, or anticipating initiation of new proceedings pursuant to ECT Article 26, in an adverse position. See,. e.g., Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/45, Decision on the Intra-EU Jurisdictional Objection [25 February 2019]; Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018]; Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, Award [16 May 2018]; Statistics of ECT Cases (as of Oct. 23, 2019) (available at https://bit.ly/3oGCeJz).

Notably, as argued by the Advocate General Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe in his recently issued opinion in joined cases C‑798/18 and C‑799/18, the ECT ISDS clause does not apply in the intra-EU context,  and the ECT may be entirely inapplicable to intra-EU proceedings. This indicates that if the CJEU follows the Advocate General’s reasoning, EU investors may be deprived of procedural and substantive protection under the ECT in the intra-EU relations. Joined Cases C 798/18 and C 799/18, Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe [29 October 2020] (available at http://bit.ly/3bEYEHk).

Management of the pending intra-EU proceedings

Pending proceedings, defined as intra-EU investment arbitration proceedings initiated prior to March 6, 2018—the Achmea Decision linked above–and which have not ended with a settlement agreement or with a final award issued prior to March 6, 2018, where the award was duly executed prior to March 6, 2018, or the award was set aside or annulled before August 29, 2020, shall in principle be subject to the so-called Structured Dialogue, which is a mechanism that aims to assist disputing parties in finding an amicable settlement of a dispute. Art. 1(4) and (5) and Art. 9 Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].

The settlement procedure is overseen by an impartial facilitator who shall find an amicable, lawful, and fair out-of-court and out-of-arbitration settlement of the dispute. Settlement of the dispute shall in principle be reached within six months. Art. 9 (1) – (14) Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT]. It can be observed that the mechanism resembles investor-state mediation.

Going a step further, the Termination Treaty implements an option for investors engaged in pending arbitrations to seek judicial remedies under national law before domestic courts against the host state measure contested in such arbitration proceedings. This option is available to investors under the condition that they withdraw pending arbitration proceedings and waive rights and claims under the relevant intra-EU BIT, or renounce execution of the issued award and commit to refrain from instituting any new arbitration proceedings. Art. 10 Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT]. In such case,  limitation periods would not apply to bringing legal action before domestic courts.

This may have a severe impact on the prospect of lodging a successful claim against a state by the investor, since the legal framework of intra-EU BITs that provided a substantive and procedural legal basis in a pending arbitration will not be applicable in domestic court proceedings.

Doubtful recognition and enforcement of awards

Decisions and/or awards issued in pending, or, as the case may be, new arbitration proceedings may not be effective, because the Termination Treaty stipulates that contracting states shall, in case of domestic court proceedings, request the domestic court, including in any third country, to set the arbitral award aside, annul it, or to refrain from recognizing and enforcing it. Art. 7 (b) Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union [SN/4656/2019/INIT].

This raises a threat to the effectiveness of guarantees provided under, among others, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the “ICSID Convention”).

It can be recalled that ICSID Convention Article 54 stipulates that each contracting state shall recognize an award rendered by an ICSID Tribunal as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award as if it were a final judgment of a court where recognition is sought. This unique recognition mechanism does not leave room for any ground on which the recognition could be refused.

Considering a rather likely scenario in which a domestic court of an EU member state is faced with a request for recognition of award or decision issued by a tribunal in an intra-EU investment arbitration case, it can be noted that such domestic court will need to resolve uncertain and complex situation concerning the conflict of treaty norms. The domestic court will need to decide whether to recognize the award, or issue a decision in accordance with the ICSID Convention, or to comply with the EU law and refuse recognition and thereby, to undermine the ICSID Convention.

Although not addressed in the Termination Treaty, it appears that the CJEU argument in the Achmea Decision regarding incompatibility of the ISDS clauses in intra-EU BITs with the EU law may potentially extend to extra-EU BITs and arbitrations between EU members states and investors from third states.

Clearly, arbitrations initiated on a basis of ISDS clauses contained in such BITs may concern treatment of investors from third states investing in the EU, and therefore the subject matter of such arbitrations may relate to interpretation and application of the EU law.

Such arbitrations may also pose a risk to the proper interpretation and application of the EU law and have an adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU law. See Case C 284/16 Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV [2018]. Such reasoning, if followed, which is rather unlikely, would further deepen the crisis concerning European Union investment treaty arbitration.

It might be further noted that the competence of the court where the arbitration is seated to set aside the arbitration award may lead to the situation where such court would be a non-EU court and would not be bound by the Termination Treaty.

Furthermore, the winning investor may seek to have the arbitration award recognized and enforced in a non-EU jurisdiction where the defendant’s assets are located.

Taming the lion: The tendency of arbitral tribunals to reject intra-EU jurisdictional objections

Despite the Achmea Decision and clear commitment of EU member states on terminating the intra-EU BITs, arbitral tribunals in intra-EU arbitrations generally reject jurisdictional objections asserting incompatibility of intra-EU BITs.vSee, e.g., Strabag SE, Raiffeisen Centrobank AG and Syrena Immobilien Holding AG v. Republic of Poland, ICSID Case No. ADHOC/15/1, Partial Award on Jurisdiction [4 March 2020]; Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Decision on the Achmea issue [31 August 2018]; Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, Award [16 May 2018]; UP (formerly Le Chèque Déjeuner) and C.D Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/35, Award [9 October 2018]; Addiko Bank AG and Addiko Bank d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/37, Decision on Croatia’s Jurisdictional Objection Related to the Alleged Incompatibility of the BIT with the EU Acquis [12 June 2020].

As emphasized by the tribunal in the partial award on jurisdiction in Strabag SE, Raiffeisen Centrobank AG and Syrena Immobilien Holding AG v. Republic of Poland, EU law does not form part of the law applicable to questions of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and no extrinsic elements of interpretation under Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can trump the clear expression of the parties’ common intention to arbitrate. Strabag SE, Raiffeisen Centrobank AG and Syrena Immobilien Holding AG v. Republic of Poland, at par. 8.143. It should be noted, however, that the intention of capital importing states to arbitrate disputes may be considered as no longer existent due to the signing and entry into force of the Termination Treaty.

Notably, the tribunal further considered the issue of the enforceability of an award issued in intra-EU arbitration and recognized its duty to render an enforceable award. It noted, however, that it is not able to predict the future validity, or enforceability of the award before enforcing courts. Id. at par. 8.140-8.142.

More recently, the tribunal in Addiko Bank v. Croatia raised several interesting points when rejecting Croatia’s jurisdictional objection related to the incompatibility of the Austria-Croatia BIT with the EU acquis.

The tribunal reasoned that in light of Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the law applicable to the Austria-Croatia BIT consists of the terms of that BIT itself and general principles of international law, which are the sources of law not considered by the CJEU as  incompatible with the EU law.

Furthermore, the tribunal noted that contrary to the BIT concluded between the Netherlands and Slovakia, considered by the CJEU in the Achmea Decision as incompatible with the EU law, the Austria-Croatia BIT does not incorporate EU law as part of its applicable law. Addiko Bank AG and Addiko Bank d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/37, Decision on Croatia’s Jurisdictional Objection Related to the Alleged Incompatibility of the BIT with the EU Acquis [12 June 2020] par.267. The tribunal concluded that the Austria-Croatia BIT does not give rise to the same functional concerns, which the CJEU found to be present in the context of the Achmea Decision. Id. at par.269.

This indicates that intra-EU BITs whose applicable law is limited to the terms of the intra-EU BIT itself and general principles of international law are not incompatible with the EU law. Following this reasoning, it can be assumed that the tribunal would reach a different conclusion if the Austria-Croatia BIT included a provision expressly or impliedly incorporating EU law as the applicable law.

* * *

Some of the solutions implemented under the Termination Treaty may indeed be considered controversial. This is particularly the case with respect to the mode of termination of legal effects of sunset clauses, or more broadly, the retroactive effect of the Termination Treaty.

Investors may decide to seek protection under existing BITs concluded with non-EU states and, thereby, engage in the treaty shopping practice. It remains an open question whether such BITs will be affected by the Achmea Decision.

While the Achmea Decision argument has become a popular strategy for defendants in investment arbitration proceedings to challenge jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, jurisprudence indicates that such arguments are generally rejected.

Although developments contained in mega-regional treaties, such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (available at http://bit.ly/2LXjQh3), may provide a model for the creation of standing investment court, which could replace the ISDS mechanism so far in place, the institutional design of the body must comply with the EU law in order to provide an effective alternative to domestic courts. In this regard, it is important to monitor development of the EU’s initiative concerning the so-called Investment Court System, which could be further developed into a Multilateral Investment Court.

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Krzysztof Wierzbowski is a Senior Partner at Eversheds Sutherland Wierzbowski in Warsaw, Poland. He is a member of the CPR European Advisory Board, which provides EAB posts for CPR Speaks. Aleksander Szostak LL.M. is a lawyer at Eversheds Sutherland Wierzbowski.

[END]

Lincoln & ADR: Pepperdine’s Stipanowich Discusses Evolution in Arbitration

By Alice Albl

The second series of New York Law School’s Conversations in Conflict drew to a close Sept. 23 with an interview featuring Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law Prof. Thomas J. Stipanowich.

The discussion centered around the progress of arbitration since the release of Stipanowich’s five-volume treatise on federal arbitration law in the 1990s; his expansive view included advancing the practice with lessons taken from the life of Abraham Lincoln.

Stipanowich’s theories focused on a tension between familiarity and efficiency. In drawing from what they know as lawyers, neutrals in arbitration may bind the process too closely to the establishment of litigation, he explained.

While neutrals may believe that apparently tried-and-true procedures inspired by litigation form the best avenues to successful dispute resolution, this mindset hinders the use of more creative, and potentially more effective, methods.

Instead, Stipanowich invited neutrals to follow in the footsteps of President Lincoln, whom he considered to be a “super functional” arbitrator. Like Lincoln, modern ADR community members should seek to work for the parties’ interests and not a nominal win.

But when Stipanowich began studying arbitration in the 1980s, neutrals weren’t the focus. Back then, arbitration suffered from a lack of procedural structure, most notably missing protocols for discovery and case management, he said.

In the ensuing years arbitrators filled these gaps. Stipanowich described this as the “legalization” of ADR, a process by which neutrals appropriated features from the practice of law into their work.

While legal processes may be effective in arbitration, their familiarity causes them to monopolize the roles they serve. Stipanowich cited examples in both the United States and abroad to demonstrate that the dominant legal processes are not necessarily the best.

Domestically, Stipanowich discussed the double-blind arbitration process used in contracts by the Writers’ Guild of America. Under this process, the disputants’ and arbitrators’ identities are not known to each other. This has the practical purpose of preventing conflict in the industry beyond the dispute, but it may also prove for a more equitable resolution beyond the reach of “legalized” ADR.

Abroad, Stipanowich, who is former president and chief executive officer of the CPR Institute, which publishes this blog, looked to the “multi-lane” duties neutrals performed in other cultures, such as the way German arbitrators help craft settlements or Chinese arbitrators often double as mediators.

U.S. arbitrators seem to be gradually warming to the idea of building multi-lane brands, something that Stipanowich encourages. He praised those who use a variety of roles and techniques to find the true conflict in disputes.

Stipanowich emphasized that finding the true conflict as early as possible will allow a neutral to spend more time balancing resolution with the interests and relationships among parties. After 40 years of study, he has found that this balance is key to success in ADR.

For Stipanowich, few could exemplify care for interests and relationships more than Abraham Lincoln. He closed the session by emphasizing the icon’s willingness to look beyond wins and vengeance during the Civil War, instead focusing on a goal of rights and equity. To see beyond the fray toward a fair resolution, Stipanowich says, is what ADR is about.

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Recordings of NYLS’s Conversations in Conflict Resolution series are being posted at the school’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Skills Program at https://bit.ly/32A3aAP.  

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The author, a CPR Institute Fall 2020 intern, is a second-year student at Brooklyn Law School in New York.

[END]

Supreme Court Rejects Decade-Old Class Arbitration Employment Discrimination Case

By Cristina Carvajal

A contentious employment discrimination case now focusing on whether an arbitrator is within her authority to bind a class of employees who did not affirmatively opt-in or consent to class arbitration will not resurface now at the Supreme Court.

This morning, in its first 2020-2021 term order list (available at https://bit.ly/3la3Y72), declined to hear Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 942 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2019) (available at https://bit.ly/30yP3eZ).

The Second Circuit decision in the case last year will return the case to federal district court in New York for more proceedings ahead of arbitration in the 12-year-old-case.

The nation’s top Court today denied cert in Sterling Jewelers Inc. v. Jock, No. 1382 (Supreme Court case page available at https://bit.ly/3lgflL2). While the opt-in is the issue most recently litigated, the Court considered and rejected today a petition by the national jewelry chain on an event broader question presented,

Whether an arbitrator may compel class arbitration—binding the parties and absent class members—without finding actual consent, and instead based only on a finding that the agreement does not unambiguously prohibit class arbitration and should be construed against the drafter.

The employment case’s gender-based discrimination claim was first filed in 2008 by then-present and former women Sterling Jewelers employees. All workers were required to sign its Resolve agreement subject to American Arbitration Association rules, which included a mandatory arbitration clause, as well as a litigation waiver. For more, see Anne Muenchinger, “Still No Arbitration: In Its latest Jock decision, Second Circuit Reverses for More Contract Interpretation,” 38 Alternatives 77 (2020) (available at https://bit.ly/2GuxplA).

Not only has this case been moved from New York’s Southern U.S. District Court to the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals four times, but today’s rejection was its second at the Supreme Court. Today’s decision puts the case back on a road to the case’s arbitrator, former New York Southern District magistrate Kathleen A. Roberts, now a JAMS Inc. neutral in the firm’s New York office.

David Bouffard, vice president of corporate affairs at Signet Jewelers Ltd.in Akron, Ohio, notes in a statement,

While we respect the Court’s decision, we believe the claims in this matter are without merit and are not substantiated the relevant facts and statistics. We will continue to vigorously defend against these claims, which do not accurately reflect our company or our culture. Indeed, we have long been committed to fostering a culture of respect, integrity, diversity, and inclusion where all employees feel safe, supported, and empowered—this is a tenet of who we are. In particular, Signet is a recognized leader among companies for gender diversity, with women filling 74% of store management positions and gender parity in both the C-Suite and Board of Directors. Under the leadership of our CEO, Gina Drosos, we continue to champion diversity and inclusion as a strategic priority, as we have been honored to be included on the Bloomberg Gender Equality Index for two consecutive years.

Plaintiffs’ attorney, Joseph M. Sellers, a Washington, D.C., partner in Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, declined to comment on the cert denial.

In its latest decision last year, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s judgment and held “that the arbitrator was within her authority in purporting to bind the absent class members to class proceedings because, by signing the operative arbitration agreement, the absent class members no less than the parties, bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement with respect to class arbitrability.” Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 942 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2019) (available at https://bit.ly/30yP3eZ).

The Second Circuit referred to its previous decisions as Jock I, Jock II and Jock III. (For more on the case’s knotty procedural history, see the Alternatives’ link above). Noting that a court’s standard of review of arbitrator decisions is highly deferential, the unanimous panel in the opinion written by Circuit Judge Peter W. Hall reasoned that the arbitration agreement’s incorporation of the AAA Rules, in particular the Supplementary Rules which give an arbitrator authority to decide if an arbitration clause permits class arbitration, makes it clear that the arbitrator can decide on the question of class arbitrability.

The panel further noted the arbitration agreement itself provides that “’[q]uestions of arbitrability’ and ‘procedural questions’ shall be decided by the arbitrator.” Id.at 624.

The decision underscored that while in Jock II the panel pointed out that Jock I did not address “whether the arbitrator had the power to bind absent class members to class arbitration given that they . . . never consented to the arbitrator determining whether class arbitration was permissible under the agreement in the first place.” (Quoting an earlier decision in the case.)

That fact, however, was not a basis to alter the Second Circuit’s analysis given that class actions in arbitration and courts may bind absent class members as part of mandatory or opt-out classes.

 The Second Circuit noted that its “use of ‘consent’ as shorthand” left unclear “the possibility that the absent class members consented in a different way to the arbitrator’s authority to decide class arbitrability.” Id.at 626.

In remanding the case, the Second Circuit left open for the District Court to decide “whether the arbitrator exceeded her authority in certifying an opt-out, as opposed to a mandatory, class for injunctive and declaratory relief.” The Second Circuit already reversed an affirmative determination on that issue, but in the 2019 decision, the panel states that the lower court may revisit the issue “after allowing the parties an opportunity to present renewed argument in light of any subsequent developments in the law.”

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The author, a third-year student at the City University of New York School of Law, is a Fall 2020 CPR Institute student intern.  Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation editor Russ Bleemer assisted with reporting for this post.

[END]

Dispositive Motions in Arbitration: Authority, Rules and Practical Tips

head shot 1By Janice L. Sperow

As companies, parties, and their lawyers across the nation debate whether they may, or even should, resolve their disputes in court or arbitration, courts and arbitrators—both faced with pandemic-generated, unprecedented backlogs—seem more willing to entertain docket clearing motions.

For some practitioners, dispositive motion practice in arbitration presents a new challenge. Yet, dispositive motions have existed in arbitration almost as long as arbitration itself. Now, however, both parties have embraced them. Recently, arbitrators have witnessed an increase in requests for leave to file them as parties dealing with the economic fallout of the pandemic attempt to resolve disputes sooner, more efficiently, and more cost-effectively. As more practitioners turn to arbitration to resolve disputes, they increasingly look to dispositive motion practice to promptly adjudicate them.

Still, some arbitrators have questioned their authority to entertain dispositive motions. Others hesitate to dispose of the arbitration before it really starts when it may well be the claimant’s only course of redress. Still others, like the author, view dispositive motions as a potential opportunity to narrow and resolve issues fairly and efficiently for both parties. So where do arbitrators obtain the power to consider dispositive motions?

The Parties’ Contract

Like the arbitration itself, the authority often starts with the parties’ contract. The arbitrator can and will allow dispositive motions if the parties’ arbitration clause provides for them. Many litigants now specifically provide in their arbitration agreements that the arbitrator shall have the authority to resolve jurisdiction, arbitrability, and many other threshold or dispositive issues. Indeed, astute drafters will frame their arbitration clauses to include the right to bring a dispositive or threshold motion to avoid the arbitrator’s exercise of discretion. Arbitrators will typically enforce such clauses if both parties may reciprocally invoke them.

Practical Tip: Explicitly provide the arbitrator with the authority to entertain dispositive and threshold motions directly into the parties’ arbitration agreement rather than incorporating them indirectly by reference to court rules, civil procedure rules, or forum administration rules. Court, civil procedure, and forum rules might include other provisions, which the parties may consider less desirable and which they may not want to incorporate wholesale into their agreement. The parties should also determine if they want to have the automatic right to bring such motions or merely grant the arbitrator the authority to entertain them at her discretion or upon a specified showing. If the parties intend to provide contractually for the application of a specific arbitral forum’s rules, review that forum’s dispositive motion rule and determine if the parties wish to modify it in the contract. Most arbitral fora expressly allow the parties to modify in writing the application of any rule. Finally, provide for reciprocity to enhance the clause’s enforceability.

Post-Dispute Agreement

If the contract itself does not mention the authority to hear dispositive motions, the parties may always agree to them in a written stipulation or even orally after the dispute has arisen or after the arbitration has begun. Contentious litigants may yet find common ground and agree to resolution of a threshold issue upfront if it will save time and expense. They will also routinely agree post-dispute to motions to resolve choice of law, jurisdiction, contract formation, forum rule applicability, and other threshold issues which will govern the rest of the case moving forward.

Practical Tip: Reduce the post-dispute agreement to writing whether by stipulation or in the arbitrator’s order. Identify the specific scope of the agreement including the precise issues to be determined by motion, page limits, and a briefing schedule. Decide if, pending the motion’s resolution, discovery should be stayed, continued, or restricted to information necessary to adjudicate the motion. Agree upon an early deadline for the resolution of the motion to maximize its cost savings and efficiency. Also set a cutoff date by which all dispositive or threshold issues must be brought. Early resolution saves the most time and expense; a dispositive motion brought on the eve of arbitration merely disrupts the process and often adds to, rather than minimizes, the costs of arbitration. Finally, proffer a dispositive motion agreement in writing to opposing counsel even if he will not likely agree; then track the fees spent on that issue at hearing and seek to recover them if the arbitrator rules in your favor on that point. Even if your side loses on the ultimate merits of a claim, the arbitrator may offset the prevailing party’s fee award if the other side incurred unnecessary fees on an issue, which could have been summarily adjudicated.

The Arbitral Forum’s Rules

The arbitration rules applicable to the dispute will usually permit dispositive motion practice. For example, in 2011, the pioneering  International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR) specifically allowed for dispositive motion practice in the arbitral forum when it issued its 2011 Guidelines. In 2013, the American Arbitration Association also championed the arbitrator’s authority to entertain dispositive motions when it amended its rules to explicitly permit the filing of dispositive motions. Likewise, CPR’s first edition of Administered Rules promulgated in 2013 expressly authorized dispositive motions. Now, most arbitration associations include a dispositive motion rule. For example, JAMS’ Comprehensive Rule 18 explicitly authorizes them. Only the Financial Industry Neutral Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which involves primarily customer complaints, generally prohibits them; but even FINRA allows them under a few exceptions. We will explore the AAA and CPR rules in more depth because they provide parties with the most specific and comprehensive guidance.

The AAA Dispositive Motion Rules

Notably, the AAA did not adopt a uniform dispositive motion rule. Instead, it wisely chose to tailor its rules to the type of arbitration. The AAA Commercial Rule 33 now provides: “[t]he arbitrator may allow the filing of and make rulings upon a dispositive motion only if the arbitrator determines that the moving party has shown that the motion is likely to succeed and dispose of or narrow the issues in the case.” Likewise, the AAA Consumer Rule 33 and Employment Rule 27 state: “[t]he arbitrator may allow the filing of a dispositive motion if the arbitrator determines that the moving party has shown substantial cause that the motion is likely to succeed and dispose of or narrow the issues in the case.” The AAA Construction Rule 34 provides: “[u]pon prior written application, the arbitrator may permit motions that dispose of all or part of a claim or narrow the issues in a case.”

Interestingly, the dispositive motion rule applicable to consumer and employment cases, which involve individuals arbitrating against companies, require a higher initial showing than the dispositive motion rule applicable to commercial cases, which involve two companies arbitrating against each other. The consumer and employment rules require the moving party to show “substantial cause” that the motion is likely to succeed while the commercial rule only requires the moving party to show that the motion is likely to succeed. “Substantial cause” suggests more ample, considerable, or abundant cause whereas “likely to succeed” evokes mere feasibility and reasonableness – a fair chance rather than a good chance.

Conversely, the construction rule does not require proof of a likelihood of success but merely a written application showing that the motion will “dispose of all or part of a claim or narrow the issues in a case.” Of course, the written application itself will be more persuasive if it demonstrates the motion’s likely success. Unlike the construction rule, the AAA employment, commercial, and consumer dispositive motion rules do not technically require a written application. However, most arbitrators require them, nonetheless. At a minimum, arbitrators will expect an email requesting leave, not just an oral request.

While the specific rules differ in some key respects, they also share some important commonalities. For example, all the AAA dispositive motion rules – and indeed many if not most arbitral fora rules – allow dispositive motion practice only at the arbitrator’s discretion. AAA Commercial Rule 33, Consumer Rule 33, and Employment Rule 27 (“arbitrator may allow”); Construction Rule 34 (“arbitrator may permit”). Unlike civil litigation, arbitration does not include an automatic right to file a dispositive motion. Parties must request leave to file a motion, which the arbitrator may grant or deny within her discretion.

The three rules all also require the moving party to make some initial showing to convince the arbitrator why she should exercise her discretion to permit the dispositive motion. AAA Commercial Rule 33 (“only if the arbitrator determines that the moving party has shown”); AAA Consumer Rule 33 and Employment Rule 27 (“if the arbitrator determines that the moving party has shown substantial cause”); AAA Construction Rule 34 (“upon prior written application”).

All three also require the moving party to show that the motion will “dispose of or narrow the issues in the case.” Hence, in addition to the required degree of success, the moving party must demonstrate that the motion, if granted, will eliminate an issue, or at least narrow the scope of the hearing. Basically, the AAA’s rules all require two different types of proof: merit and efficiency – some likelihood of success and some cost savings over a hearing on the issue or claim.

But the AAA’s rules all require only either disposition or narrowing of the issues, not both. Accordingly, if the motion will achieve some economies of scale, the arbitrator can and should properly entertain the motion even if it does not completely dispose of an issue.

Practical Tip: Practitioners who wish to use the rules to narrow, rather than dispose of, issues should still present adequate proof of efficiency. For example, the moving party may want to demonstrate that early resolution of the issue may eliminate the need for expert or other witnesses who would not otherwise testify, may reduce the number of exhibits, may limit the necessary scope of discovery, or may reduce hearing time in some other way or even encourage settlement. 

Arguably, the rules do not require the complete disposition of a claim. For example, Construction Rule 34 explicitly provides that the motion may dispose of all “or part” of a claim. While the AAA’s Commercial, Employment, and Consumer Rules do not contain the same express language, they likely also permit partial disposition of a claim because they all permit the motion if it would narrow an issue and an arbitrator will likely find that partial resolution of a claim will indeed narrow the issues in the case.

Practical Tip: As noted, the parties can choose to include the right to file motions in their arbitration clause or post-dispute agreement rather than leave it to the arbitrator’s discretion. They can also set the applicable standard that they want to govern the grant or denial of the motion if they do so in writing. If the rules apply as written, consider a two-step proffer to save costs: during the first step, the moving party shows the rule’s satisfaction in a short letter or email without a response from the opposing party during which time the case and discovery proceed; then, in the second step, if the arbitrator finds that the moving party has satisfied the applicable standard, the parties set a full briefing schedule and suspend all or some discovery pending the motion’s resolution. In whatever manner litigants decide to tackle dispositive motion practice in arbitration, plan ahead and raise the issue early in the initial case management conference to allow sufficient time to schedule the motion(s) well before the hearing date in order to maximize cost savings for all parties. Consider the desirability of two different deadlines: an early one for purely legal or threshold questions and a later one at the close of discovery, if appropriate, for remaining disputes.

CPR’s Dispositive Motion Rule

In 2013, ADR industry leader CPR also issued its rules to expressly provide for dispositive motion practice. Under Rule 12.6, a party may apply to file “a motion for early disposition of issues, including claims, counterclaims, defenses, and other legal and factual questions.” CPR 2019 Administered Arbitration Rules, Rule 12.6(a). Rule 12.6 then instructs the applicant to include the issues to be resolved, the basis for the motion, the relief requested, how early disposition would “advance efficient resolution of the overall dispute” and a proposed procedure for resolving the issues. Rule 12.6(b).

CPR’s standard for the granting of the application differs slightly from the AAA’s Rules. CPR requires the arbitrator to find “a reasonable likelihood that hearing the motion for early disposition may result in increased efficiency in resolving the overall dispute while not unduly delaying the rendering of a final award.” Rule 12.6(c). If the arbitrator finds the motion “appropriate,” she will then establish the governing procedure, which may involve “written submissions, witness testimony by affidavit or other written form, limited hearings, or in any other manner.” Rule 12.6(d).

While the CPR and AAA Rules may differ somewhat in terminology, they represent a fairly uniform standard at least in the commercial arbitration context. The AAA Commercial Rule 33 requires “likely” success whereas the CPR Rule 12.6(c) requires “reasonable” success. Yet, they essentially require the arbitrator to undertake the same analysis in evaluating the burden of proof since “likely” evokes a fair, reasonable chance of success, whereas the AAA Consumer Rule 33 and the AAA Employment Rule 27 with their “substantial cause” requirement demand a higher quantum of proof.

But the rules do differ slightly more when it comes to what the applicant must prove: under the AAA Rules, the arbitrator will determine if the applicant has shown that the motion will dispose of or narrow the issues whereas the CPR Rule requires the arbitrator to focus on the motion’s overall efficiency without added delay. The CPR Rule technically does not focus on the likely success of the motion itself but rather reasonable likelihood of gaining efficiencies if the arbitrator grants the motion. The difference is nuanced, however, and may ultimately result in the same outcome as motions which dispose of or narrow the issues will necessarily promote efficiency.

The real difference between the AAA and CPR rules centers on the concept of delay. CPR specifically directs the arbitrator to consider the potential delay caused by adding a dispositive motion practice to the arbitration process, while the AAA rules do not mention delay to the final award as a specific consideration. Under the CPR Rule, an arbitrator may rightfully deny an application for leave to file a dispositive motion if it would unduly delay the rendering of the final award. Thus, under the CPR Rule, an arbitrator is much more likely to deny leave to file a dispositive motion the closer the parties get to the scheduled hearing. Indeed, CPR’s emphasis on “early” disposition of issues encourages the parties to use dispositive motions during the preliminary stages of the arbitration before or after limited discovery.

Practical Tip: As the applicant, counsel should consider raising issue identification and disposition, especially of legal questions, at the very first case management conference to forestall any delay argument. If the parties and the arbitrator calendar the motion from the outset of the case, the nonmoving party will be hard pressured to argue undue delay. To further minimize delay, allow discovery to proceed on the factual issues while the arbitrator considers the legal issues. Conversely, as the nonmoving party, counsel should insist on the discovery necessary to fully adjudicate the issues before any motion practice. Be prepared to identify with particularity the discovery needed on each issue for which the applicant seeks early disposition.  

CPR’s Dispositive Motion Guidelines

More than just a rule, CPR provides arbitrators and parties well-considered guidelines on the process. CPR issued formal “Guidelines on Early Disposition of Issues in Arbitration,” (“Guidelines”), which strike a fair balance between unmeritorious motions and issue winnowing. The Guidelines clarify that the parties may use dispositive motion practice to narrow and simplify the issues for hearing and not just to dispose of the entire case. They also encourage arbitrators to take an active role in promoting early issue identification and disposition. Guideline 1.1. They also warn the parties and the arbitrator to consider efficiency to the case overall. In other words, the arbitrator may properly deny leave to file a dispositive motion if, even if granted, it would not materially reduce the total time and cost involved in the arbitration. Guideline 2.4.

Court Approval & Inherent Authority

The Sixth Circuit recently relied upon AAA Rule 27 to uphold an arbitral tribunal’s summary judgment disposition in a AAA employment arbitration. McGee v. Armstrong No. 18-3886, October 29, 2019. McGee did not explicitly address Rule 27’s language. McGee merely cited R-27 and held “as such, the arbitrators did not exceed their power.” While the court based its decision upon Ohio’s state vacatur statute, the statute contains nearly identical grounds for vacatur as the FAA. Consequently, McGee teaches us that courts will not likely vacate a dispositive award by arbitrators under the FAA or state law as an excess of power if it satisfies the requirements of the applicable arbitration rules authorizing arbitrators to summarily dispose of matters. However, even before the AAA and the CPR adopted their dispositive motion rules, the courts routinely held that arbitrators had inherent authority to entertain dispositive motions. See, e.g., Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1096 (Cal. App. Ct. 1995).

Types of Dispositive Motions

Dispositive motions typically fall into three groups: (1) threshold or pre-discovery motions; (2) post-discovery summary adjudication motions; or (3) tactical motions. Threshold motions often raise procedural issues, such as venue, necessary parties, arbitrability, jurisdiction, applicable arbitral rules, scope of the arbitration, mootness, standing, res judicata, collateral estoppel, joinder, small claims election, or consolidation. But they can present substantive issues as well, such as contract formation, contract existence, contract validity, waiver, laches, plain meaning, estoppel, choice of law, failure to state a claim, right to punitive damages, right to attorneys’ fees, statute of limitations, tolling, statutory construction, statute applicability, consent, irrevocable consent, contract provision enforceability, liquidated damages availability, injunctive relief, defenses based upon contractual covenants, statutes of fraud, release, and more.

Substantive post-discovery motions are akin to partial or complete summary adjudication but can also include a motion to amend the claim based upon newly discovered facts, a failure to state a claim based upon undisputed facts, or even a motion on the pleadings.

Parties sometimes use tactical motions, not necessarily for their merits, but to educate the arbitrator early on about a key issue or to get a pre-mediation or pre-settlement “read” from the arbitrator on a key issue. They may seek to eliminate an expert or other witness by removing the issue from the arbitration’s scope. They may simply hope to delay the proceedings, raise the costs to the underfunded party, or disqualify counsel. Fortunately, CPR’s rule specifically considers any delay caused by the motion as an explicit factor in denying leave to seek a dispositive ruling. Some have even used AAA Commercial Rule 57 to defeat jurisdiction: they move to amend the claim, increasing the amount of damages, which in turn increases the AAA administrative fees, which defeats jurisdiction pending payment of the augmented fees.

Practical Tip: Regardless of the type of motion, all should result in a written award or order, which specifies the basis for the denial or grant of the motion. The movant should craft a well-written proposed order for the arbitrator as part of the motion but so should the opponent. Consider whether to request an opportunity for renewal after the completion of discovery or an aspect of discovery if the arbitrator denies the motion. The proposal should also identify the discovery completed up to the motion to circumvent an attack based on incomplete discovery or evidence. The opponent should identify the discovery still needed before the arbitrator can fairly resolve the issue. If the motion only partially disposes of the dispute, identify the remaining issues to be decided at the hearing.

Bottom line: As long as an arbitrator provides the parties a fair opportunity to present their cases, she can grant a dispositive motion without violating the right to a fundamentally fair hearing—the touchstone for whether or not a court will vacate an arbitral award. So, when you can, consider threshold and dispositive motion practice in arbitration as a way to cost-effectively narrow or resolve the arbitration.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of The CPR Institute.

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Janice Sperow is a full-time arbitrator, mediator, hearing officer, and prevention facilitator. She serves on the CPR’s mass claims, employment, commercial, banking, financial services, dispute prevention, mediation, flat fee mediation, and pro bono panels as well as the AAA’s commercial, large case, employment, technology, healthcare, consumer, pro se, and workplace investigation panels. Also serves as a neutral for the San Diego Superior Court (where she sits as a Judge Pro Tem), the Financial Industry Neutral Regulatory Authority, the National Arbitration FORUM, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the National Futures Association, the National Association of Arbitrators and Mediators, and the Better Business Bureau. Member, National Academy of Distinguished Neutrals. Serves as Hearing Officer for the Port of San Diego. Former President of the National Association of Women Lawyers and Vice-President of California Women Lawyers, Member, ABA Dispute Resolution and Business Law Sections. www.sperowadr.com.