The Dissent, and the Majority’s Push Back

By Russ Bleemer

The divisive battle over class waivers associated with mandatory arbitration, settled today in the Supreme Court with strong backing for Federal Arbitration Act supremacy over the National Labor Relations Act, was almost destined for a closely divided Court.

It’s unlikely any Court watchers were surprised by the majority’s 5-4 opinion in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285 (opinion in the consolidated cases is available at https://bit.ly/2rWzAE8), written by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court’s newest member, especially in light of the arguments, which kicked off the term last Oct. 2.  [For details on the arguments, see the CPR Speaks: Mark Kantor, “Supreme Court Oral Argument on NLRB Class Actions vs. Arbitration Policy,” (Oct. 2)(available at http://bit.ly/2fLwU9C), and Russ Bleemer, “The Class Waiver-Arbitration Argument: The Supreme Court Transcript,” (Oct. 3) (available at http://bit.ly/2yWjWuf).]

The Court delayed the case from the previous term apparently with an eye to a full Court that would avoid a 4-4 split that would have allowed different laws depending on the circuit decisions.  In the interim, Gorsuch was confirmed.

His opinion today for the majority strongly backs the waivers and employers’ ability to require workplace disputes to be resolved in individual arbitration.  It is summarized on this CPR Speaks blog here: bit.ly/2KEuXFN 

Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurrence is summarized on CPR Speaks here: https://bit.ly/2wYEKEB.

And the generally expected lengthy dissent emerged too, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who was joined by Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.

“The Court today subordinates employee protective labor legislation to the [Federal] Arbitration Act,” notes Ginsburg at the dissent’s outset. “In so doing, the Court forgets the labor market imbalance that gave rise to the [Norris-LaGuardia Act] and the [National Labor Relations Act], and ignores the destructive consequences of diminishing the right of employees ‘to band together in confronting an employer.’ NLRB v. City Disposal Systems Inc., 465 U. S. 822, 835 (1984).”

The dissenters immediately asked for an intervention: “Congressional correction of the Court’s elevation of the FAA over workers’ rights to act in concert is urgently in order,” Ginsburg writes.

Ginsburg outlined her attack on the majority’s view in two intertwined points:  an analysis of “the extreme imbalance once prevalent in our Nation’s workplaces, and Congress’ aim in the NLGA and the NLRA to place employers and employees on a more equal footing,” as well as a counter-analysis of the FAA’s reach, which “does not shrink the NLRA’s protective sphere.”

Tracing the history of the nation’s labor movement, Ginsburg notes that actions enforcing “workplace rights collectively fit comfortably under the umbrella ‘concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.’ 29 U.S.C. § 157”—the NLRA’s Sec. 7, at the heart of the consolidated cases decided by the Court.

She notes that the Court’s view that the NLRA doesn’t protect class litigation is counter to the statute’s “text, history, purposes, and longstanding construction.”

The core dissent argument over Sec. 7 is the activity it enumerates.  Gorsuch, writing for the majority, describes a “regulatory regime” for the law that offers “specific guidance” for protective activities.  Ginsburg attacks the majority’s view that the NLRA doesn’t discuss employees’ collective litigation, about which Gorsuch noted that “it is hard to fathom why Congress would take such care to regulate all the other matters mentioned in [§7] yet remain mute about this matter alone—unless, of course, [§7] doesn’t speak to class and collective action procedures in the first place.”

But the dissent counters that NLRA Sec. 7 only discussed collective bargaining representatives’ selection with specificity. Ginsburg notes that the section didn’t offer “specific guidance” about forming labor organizations, the right to strike, or “other concerted activities” as provided in the law.

Later specific guidance on “some of the activities protected” under the law doesn’t “shed[] any light on Congress’s initial conception” of Sec. 7’s scope, which protects “numerous activities for which the [NLRA provides no ‘specific’ regulatory guidance.”

The dissent blasts the Court’s view that the employees should realize that with class action rules they use also provide inherent limits—that they can be contracted away in favor of individualized arbitration.

“The freedom to depart asserted by the Court,” writes Ginsburg, “is entirely one sided.” She concludes the section noting that NLRA Sec. 7 rights include the right to pursue collective litigation, and therefore “employer-dictated collective-litigation stoppers, i.e., ‘waivers,’ are unlawful.”

* * *

Similarly, Ginsburg analyzes the FAA’s history to conclude that it should not override NLRA protections she and her colleagues say are present in the labor statute. “In recent decades,” the dissent says, “this Court has veered away from Congress’ intent simply to afford merchants a speedy and economical means of resolving commercial disputes.”

Specifically, the dissent cites Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 23 (1991)—which provided that the FAA authorized arbitration of Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims as long as the remedies available in courts were also available in arbitration—and Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 109 (2001), which opened FAA application up to a wide range of employment contracts containing arbitration clauses.

“Few employers imposed arbitration agreements on their employees in the early 1990’s,” Ginsburg writes. “After Gilmer and Circuit City, however, employers’ exaction of arbitration clauses in employment contracts grew steadily. “

The dissent calls that application “exorbitant,” and said it pushed the National Labor Relations Board to confront the issue in In re Horton, 357 NLRB No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012)(PDF download link at http://1.usa.gov/1IMkHn8).

“As I see it,” Ginsburg writes, “in relatively recent years, the Court’s [FAA] decisions have taken many wrong turns. Yet, even accepting the Court’s decisions as they are, nothing compels the destructive result the Court reaches today.”

She continues her FAA analysis by noting that the NLRA prohibition doesn’t discriminate against arbitration in violation of the arbitration law. “That statute neither discriminates against arbitration on its face, nor by covert operation,” notes the dissent, adding, “It requires invalidation of all employer-imposed contractual provisions prospectively waiving employees’ §7 rights.” [Emphasis in the opinion.]

The dissent concluded with a plea on behalf of U.S. workers, who Ginsburg writes will be subject to under-enforcement of federal and state statutes. “In stark contrast to today’s decision,” she writes, “the Court has repeatedly recognized the centrality of group action to the effective enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes.” The dissent passage cites a 2015 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau study that pre-dispute agreements cut off consumers’ claims; the study was used to outlaw mandatory consumer arbitration in financial services contracts, but was overturned by the Senate under the Congressional Review Act when Vice President Mike Pence cast the deciding vote to kill the regulation last October.

* * *

Justice Gorsuch countered the dissent arguments as vehemently as Ginsburg’s dissent took on the majority decision.

“In its view,” writes Gorsuch at the beginning of a section addressing the minority dissent, “today’s decision ushers us back to the Lochner era when this Court regularly overrode legislative policy judgments. The dissent even suggests we have resurrected the long-dead “yellow dog” contract. [Such contracts prohibited unionization; citation to Ginsburg’s opinion omitted.] But like most apocalyptic warnings, this one proves a false alarm.”

First, Gorsuch says that the decision doesn’t override Congressional policy. Workers’ rights to unionize and bargain collectively “stand every bit as strong today as they did yesterday,” the majority opinion states.

“[T]oday’s decision merely declines to read into the NLRA a novel right to class action procedures that the [NLRB’s] own general counsel disclaimed as recently as 2010,” the opinion says.

The minority’s problem, according to Gorsuch, is that it doesn’t like the Court’s FAA jurisprudence:

Shortly after invoking the specter of Lochner, it turns around and criticizes the Court for trying too hard to abide the Arbitration Act’s “‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,’” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 83 (2002), saying we “‘ski’” too far down the “‘slippery slope’” of this Court’s arbitration precedent.  . . . [Internal citation omitted.] But the dissent’s real complaint lies with the mountain of precedent itself. The dissent spends page after page relitigating our [FAA] precedents, rehashing arguments this Court has heard and rejected many times in many cases that no party has asked us to revisit.

Similarly, Gorsuch and the majority also hammer the Ginsburg-minority NLRA view. “The dissent imposes a vast construction on Section 7’s language,” the opinion notes, “But a statute’s meaning does not always ‘turn solely’ on the broadest imaginable “definitions of its component words.” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 7). Linguistic and statutory context also matter. We have offered an extensive explanation why those clues support our reading today. By contrast, the dissent rests its interpretation on legislative history.  . . . But legislative history is not the law.” [Internal citations omitted.]

Gorsuch writes that the Court’s decision wasn’t between the laws the justices preferred but on the precise issue:

[T]he question before us is whether courts must enforce particular arbitration agreements according to their terms. And it’s the [FAA] that speaks directly to the enforceability of arbitration agreements, while the NLRA doesn’t mention arbitration at all. So if forced to choose between the two, we might well say the Arbitration Act offers the more on-point instruction. Of course, there is no need to make that call because, as our precedents demand, we have sought and found a persuasive interpretation that gives effect to all of Congress’s work.  . . .

Finally, the majority rejects the dissent policy arguments, noting that that the “respective merits of class actions and private arbitration as means of enforcing the law are questions constitutionally entrusted not to the courts to decide but to the policymakers in the political branches where those questions remain hotly contested.”

Gorsuch then, immediately, notes that the Senate’s repeal of the CFPB’s move to ban mandatory arbitration.

 

Russ Bleemer is the editor of CPR’s award-winning publication, Alternatives

Future Challenges Nixed? Thomas Writes That Public Policy is Not FAA Illegality

By Russ Bleemer

There were two opinions in addition to the five-justice majority opinion this morning in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285, covering three consolidated cases that declared that employers may require their employees to use mandatory individual arbitration to resolve workplace disputes, and waive their rights to class processes in either traditional litigation class actions, or in class arbitration processes.

[Our first blog post on the majority opinion here: https://bit.ly/2KEuXFN  Opinion here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-285_q8l1.pdf.%5D

Justice Clarence Thomas, who joined the majority, wrote separately to explain why he believes that the Federal Arbitration Act Sec. 2 savings clause relied upon by the employees didn’t apply.

Thomas’s concurrence explains that the Sec. 2 ground for revocation of an arbitration agreement—“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” (9 U. S. C. §2)—concern the contract’s formation.

But the employees, Thomas writes, said the National Labor Relations Act makes the class waivers illegal, which is a public policy defense.

Because “‘[r]efusal to enforce a contract for public-policy reasons does not concern whether the contract was properly made,’ the saving clause does not apply here,” according to Thomas, quoting his concurrence in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 353, 357 (2011).

The position is a significant distinction and expands the majority opinion’s view that there was no Sec. 2 violation because the National Labor Relations Board interfered with a fundamental attribute of arbitration, also from AT&T Mobility.  Thomas’s position could be used by the Court to reject future challenges to arbitration contracts.

AT&T Mobility was the case in which the Court permitted mandatory individual arbitration with class waivers in consumer contracts.  Today’s Epic Systems decision mirrors AT&T Mobility in the workplace.

More on the Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg-authored dissent soon.

 

Russ Bleemer is editor of CPR’s award-winning publication, Alternatives.

Supreme Court Backs Federal Arbitration Act’s Power to Require Mandatory Individual Arbitration

By Russ Bleemer

The U.S. Supreme Court this morning has affirmed the ability of companies to use mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements that are accompanied by waivers of class processes in litigation and arbitration.

In 5-4 decision by Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of employees’ agreements to mandatory individual arbitration. Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., and Associate Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, held that the employees’ arguments that the FAA’s Sec. 2 Savings Clause, which would exempt arbitration agreement provisions from enforcement when they run afoul of “generally applicable contract defenses,” and the National Labor Relations Act, do not counter the FAA’s mandate.

The case is available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-285_q8l1.pdf

The long-running controversy involves arbitration provisions that kick in due to class waivers which prohibit employees from joining class processes—litigation or arbitration—in favor of mandatory, predispute, individualized arbitration to resolve disputes with their employers.

The cases—NLRB v. Murphy Oil (No. 16-307), from the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals; Ernst & Young v. Morris (No. 16-300), from the Ninth Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit’s Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (No. 16-285)—had been consolidated into the Court’s 2017-2018 term’s kickoff argument on Oct. 2, with Epic Systems as the lead case, and four attorneys arguing the case on behalf of the parties in all three cases.

The class waivers in question require workers, from collectively bargained rank-and file to executive suites, to address disputes with their employers in individual arbitration. While unions can agree to mandatory predispute arbitration on behalf of their members, the cases involve white-collar employees and nonunion workers with little bargaining power.

The Court previously definitively permitted mandatory arbitration contract clauses accompanied by class waivers for products and services contracts where consumers have little or no bargaining power. The Federal Arbitration Act-focused decision today now settles how arbitration is used in workplace matters.

Gorsuch’s opinion rejects a 2012 National Labor Relations Board administrative that held that FAA Sec. 2 removed mandatory individual arbitration from FAA application for employee agreements.  The Court’s opinion notes that the reasoning interfered with a fundamental attribute of arbitration.

After rejecting the Sec. 2 argument, Gorsuch dismantled the employees’ other arguments.  He develops the Supreme Court precedent concerning two clashing federal statutes, finding that the National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935, didn’t override 1925’s FAA to require class or collective actions.

“Section 7 focuses on the right to organize unions and bargain collectively,” Gorsuch writes. “It may permit unions to bargain to prohibit arbitration. Cf. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U. S. 247, 256–260 (2009). But it does not express approval or disapproval of arbitration. It does not mention class or collective action procedures. It does not even hint at a wish to displace the Arbitration Act—let alone accomplish that much clearly and manifestly, as our precedents demand.”

Moreover, Gorsuch notes that NLRA Sec. 7’s definition of protected employees’ “concerted activities” didn’t include, nor was it amended to include, class-action litigation. “[W]e’ve stressed that the absence of any specific statutory discussion of arbitration or class actions is an important and telling clue that Congress has not displaced the Arbitration Act,” the majority opinion states.

Similar arguments regarding claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act also were rejected.

Finally, Gorsuch, a longtime critic of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U. S. 837, which provides Court deference to agency determinations made in the areas of the agency’s expertise, writes that the NLRB’s decision that launched the case, In re Horton, 357 NLRB No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012)(PDF download link at http://1.usa.gov/1IMkHn8), didn’t meet the Chevron deference standards.

The NLRB, the opinion notes “has sought to interpret this statute in a way that limits the work of a second statute, the Arbitration Act. And on no account might we agree that Congress implicitly delegated to an agency authority to address the meaning of a second statute it does not administer. One of Chevron’s essential premises is simply missing here.”

Gorsuch, after countering the lengthy dissent—we will return to the dissent and majority’s counterpoints in a subsequent CPR Speaks post later today–concludes:

The policy may be debatable but the law is clear: Congress has instructed that arbitration agreements like those before us must be enforced as written. While Congress is of course always free to amend this judgment, we see nothing suggesting it did so in the NLRA—much less that it manifested a clear intention to displace the Arbitration Act. Because we can easily read Congress’s statutes to work in harmony, that is where our duty lies.

 

Russ Bleemer is editor of CPR’s award-winning publication, Alternatives

Uber Eliminates Mandatory Arbitration of, and NDAs for, Sexual Assault and Harassment Claims

AnnaBy Anna M. Hershenberg, Esq.

Uber Technologies Inc. announced that it will no longer require its customers, drivers or employees to arbitrate sexual assault or harassment claims, and that it would allow victims to decide whether to enter into non-disclosure agreements or confidentiality provisions as a part of any settlement with the company.

Uber is the second tech company to announce it has changed its dispute resolution policies in response to the #MeToo movement, following Microsoft’s December move.  Brad Smith, “Microsoft endorses Senate bill to address sexual harassment,” Microsoft blog (Dec. 19, 2017)(available at http://bit.ly/2mR65jR).

In a blog post yesterday, “Turning the lights on,” Uber’s Chief Legal Officer Tony West announced the details of three major changes to Uber’s policies. Tony West, “Turning the lights on,” Uber blog (May 15, 2018) (available at https://ubr.to/2KrVhD1).

First, Uber states it “will no longer require mandatory arbitration for individual claims of sexual assault or sexual harassment claims by Uber riders, drivers or employees.” The company instead will allow victims to choose whether to mediate, arbitrate or litigate their individual claims.

In an interview with the New York Times, West confirmed that the “waiving of arbitration only applied to those claims and not for other legal claims, like discrimination.” Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Uber Eliminates Forced Arbitration for Sexual Misconduct Claims,” New York Times (May 15, 2018)(available at https://nyti.ms/2GjbBTW).

West also noted that the new policy applies “to people currently in arbitration with Uber over sexual assault or harassment claims.” Id. 

The Uber blog post specifically states that the company waives application of mandatory arbitration to “individual” claims, still barring class actions. Notably, as of the writing of this blog post, Uber’s driver agreement still contains a mandatory arbitration clause.  Uber US Terms of Use (Dec. 13, 2017)(available at https://ubr.to/2jrKPBW).

Second, Uber will no longer require people who settle sexual harassment or abuse claims with the company to sign confidentiality provisions or NDAs that forbid them from speaking about their experience in order to “help end the culture of silence that surrounds sexual violence.” Tony West, “Turning the lights on,” Uber blog (May 15, 2018)(available at https://ubr.to/2KrVhD1).

This does not appear to prohibit victims from agreeing to keep the terms of the settlement confidential. “Whether to find closure, seek treatment, or become advocates for change themselves, survivors will be in control of whether to share their stories,” the blog post states.

Third, Uber has committed to publishing “a safety transparency report that will include data on sexual assaults and other incidents that occur on the Uber platform.” Id.

Soon after Uber announced these changes, competitor Lyft announced the same changes, and said on Twitter it would join Uber in producing a safety report.  Johana Bhuiyan, “Following Uber’s lead, Lyft is also allowing alleged victims of sexual assault to pursue cases in open court.” Recode (May 15, 2018)(available at https://bit.ly/2ILLXfO).

Some news sources have linked Uber’s policy change to its hopes for an initial public offering in 2019, and mounting public pressure following a CNN investigation, which found that 103 U.S. Uber drivers had been accused of sexual assault or abuse in the past four years.  Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Uber Eliminates Forced Arbitration for Sexual Misconduct Claims,” New York Times (May 15, 2018)(available at https://nyti.ms/2GjbBTW); Stephanie Forshee, “Uber CLO Explains Decision to Scrap Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and NDAs Around Sexual Harassment, Assault,” Corporate Counsel (May 15, 2018)(available at https://cnnmon.ie/2I35QyI); see also Sara Ashley O’Brien, Nelli Black, Curt Devine and Drew Griffin, “CNN investigation: 103 Uber drivers accused of sexual assault or abuse,” CNN Money (April 30, 2018) (available at https://cnnmon.ie/2I35QyI).

Uber’s Tony West, however, insists that the new policies are aimed at winning back the “public’s trust,” “respect of customers [Uber] lost through [its] past actions and behavior,” and, in the words of the company’s new “cultural norm,” to “do the right thing, period.”  Tony West, “Turning the lights on”, Uber blog (May 15, 2018) (available at https://ubr.to/2KrVhD1); see also Dara Khosrowshahi, Uber’s new cultural norms, Linked In (Nov. 7, 2017)(available at https://bit.ly/2jaoiL7)(the author is the company’s chief executive officer).

The legal profession’s use of mandatory employment arbitration also has recalibrated, at least at some firms, in the wake of the #MeToo movement. In March, major law firms, including New York-based Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, San Francisco’s Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe and Los Angeles’ Munger, Tolles & Olson announced they would no longer require employees to sign onto mandatory employment arbitration agreements. The moves followed a Twitter attack invoking #MeToo directed primarily at Munger.

And on Monday, Yale Law School sent a letter on behalf of top law schools asking law firms that recruit on their campuses to “disclose whether they require summer associates to sign mandatory arbitration agreements and nondisclosure agreements related to workplace misconduct, including but not limited to sexual harassment.” Staci Zaretsky, “Elite Law Schools Demand That Biglaw Firms Disclose Whether Students Will Be Forced to Sign Arbitration Agreements,” Above the Law (May 14, 2018)(available at https://bit.ly/2ILJMZU).

 

Ms. Hershenberg is Vice President of Programs and Public Policy at CPR. She can be reached at ahershenberg@cpradr.org.

Success: Many Controversial Amendments to CPLR’s Article 75 on Arbitration Via NY State 2018 Budget Bill Removed

By Ginsey Varghese

Via budget bill AB 9505 for fiscal year 2018-2019, the New York State (NYS) Assembly proposed several amendments to Article 75 of the NY Civil Practice Law & Rules (CPLR), rules governing arbitrations. AB 9505, print 9505c §§ 6-10, p.189-192 (Jan. 18, 2018).

In responses in late March, arbitral institutions, including CPR and AAA, as well as the New York State Bar Association’s Dispute Resolution Section and the New York City Bar Association’s Arbitration Committee and International Commercial Disputes Committee, issued comments about the proposed amendments to Article 75 of the CPLR, raising concerns and highlighting the expected negative impact on New York’s pro-arbitration reputation.

Some of the key concerns on the earlier draft of the bill (AB9505c) were as follows:

  • NY CPLR § 7507, as currently written, requires that an arbitration award must be in writing. The proposed amendments would have required that all arbitral awards “state the issues in dispute and contain the arbitrator’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.” at §8, p.191 lines 31-34.  This proposal was criticized for importing litigation concepts – “findings of fact and conclusions of law” –  incongruent with arbitration, creating additional cost and confusion.  Moreover, parties in an arbitration, especially sophisticated ones, often do not seek formal court-like decisions, rather, “reasoned” awards and the freedom to design a process for the parties involved.  The proposed amendment would have essentially rendered impossible creative and collaborative approaches to dispute resolution.
  • In proposed amendments to NY CPLR § 7511, the bill would have codified “manifest disregard of the law” of an arbitrator as additional grounds to vacate an award. Id at 9, p. 191 lines 51-52. Manifest disregard of the law is a highly controversial doctrine, and courts across the country have not considered it uniformly because it is often criticized as diminishing the finality of arbitration awards. Claudia Salomon, New York Vacates Arbitral Award with Manifest Disregard Doctrine, 258(25) N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 7, 2017) (available at http://bit.ly/2DL3vCq).  New York courts have rarely used the “manifest disregard” standard, reflecting respect for the arbitral process and thereby maintaining New York State’s pro-arbitration reputation.  Id.
  • Under the proposed amendments to NY CPLR § 7504, concerning the “appointment of an arbitrator,” the bill requires all arbitrators to be “non-neutral third-party arbitrator[s],” adding also that it was a non-waivable requirement. AB 9505 §6, p.190 lines 1-9. Would the common practice of party-selected arbitrators on a panel render the arbitrator “non-neutral”?  What about choice for sophisticated parties desiring an expert to adjudicate? The core concerns were the lack of clarity concerning the definition of “neutrality” and the failure to respect the principle of party autonomy, a fundamental benefit of arbitration.
  • Proposed amendments to NY CPLR § 7504 would also have allowed the parties to wait until the eve of the arbitration hearing to raise objections to the arbitrator(s), even if the party knew of grounds earlier, setting the stage for disruption and delay tactics in the arbitration. (AB 9505 § 6, p. 190 lines 45-48.)

The Ways and Means Committee omitted the proposed amendments to Article 75 of the CPLR in its latest draft (9505d) on March 28, 2018 – a major victory for the New York arbitral community, which had cautioned that “considering amendments of this magnitude in the context of a budget bill does not provide the level of due process and scrutiny decades of New York arbitration practice deserves” and had urged the legislature to “allow a thorough review, hearings and an opportunity for public comment.” CPR, Comments on Sections 6-11 of New York Assembly Bill 9505 (Mar. 23, 2018)(available at https://bit.ly/2ElR9Rp); 2017 Bill Tracking NY A.B. 9505.

On March 29, 2018, the bill (without the above-referenced amendments) passed both floor votes in the NY State Senate and the NY State Assembly and is awaiting Governor Andrew Cuomo’s approval. AB 9505, §§ 6-10, p.189-192 (Jan. 18, 2018).

The entire bill – AB 9505 – in its latest form is available at: http://bit.ly/2pvMTcv.

Another piece of budget legislation to monitor is S7507-C/AB9507-C, which will impact the arbitration of sexual harassment claims. AB 9507, Part KK, Subpart B, §1, p.80-81, lines 22-54 (available at https://bit.ly/2uMRmxu).

The bill renders mandatory arbitration clauses in sexual harassment claims “null and void.” Id. at p. 80, line 52.

On March 30, 2018, S7507-C/AB9507-C also passed floor votes in the NY State Senate and the NY State Assembly and is currently before the Governor Cuomo. Id.

Governor Cuomo is expected to sign the bill into law. Vivian Wang, New York Rewrites Harassment Laws, but Some Say the Changes Fall Short, N.Y. Times (Mar. 30, 2018) (available at https://nyti.ms/2HfX11O).

The bill is a part of broader state proposal to address sexual harassment in the workplace. See Summary of the Assembly Recommended Changes to the Executive Budget, Legislative Reports, at 76 (Mar. 13, 2018) (available at https://bit.ly/2Hwt64p).

According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, NY’s move to address sexual harassment mirrors a larger effort nationally as “29 states have introduced [similar] sexual harassment bills in 2018.” Wang, supra.


The author is a CPR Institute 2018 intern. She is a law student at Pepperdine University’s School of Law in Malibu, Calif.  

Appropriations Bill to Prohibit Fed Contractors from Mandatory Arbitration of Employee or Independent Contractor Claims under Title VII or Torts Related to or Arising Out of Sexual Assault or Harassment

By Mark Kantor

Kantor Photo (8-2012)On March 21, Congressional negotiators reached last-minute agreement on a 2232-page “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018” to implement the bipartisan budget agreement from earlier this year (available at http://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20180319/BILLS-115SAHR1625-RCP115-66.pdf). Such “must pass” legislation is always a popular vehicle for “policy riders.” This year, one such rider that appears to have successfully made its way into the final legislation prohibits Federal contractors or subcontractors, under Federal contracts exceeding $1 million, from entering into or enforcing pre-dispute arbitration provisions under which an employee or independent contractor agrees in advance to resolve through arbitration “any claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort related to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment, including assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, or negligent hiring, supervision, or retention.” Title VII, of course, covers all employment discrimination, not just sexual assault or harassment (https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm). There is an exclusion in the provision for agreements that may not be enforced in US courts. In addition, the Secretary of Defense can waive the prohibition if “the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary personally determines that the waiver is necessary to avoid harm to national security interests of the United States, and that the term of the contract or subcontract is not longer than necessary to avoid such harm.”

The agreed text reads as follows:

24 SEC. 8095. (a) None of the funds appropriated or
25 otherwise made available by this Act may be expended for
1 any Federal contract for an amount in excess of
2 $1,000,000, unless the contractor agrees not to—
3 (1) enter into any agreement with any of its
4 employees or independent contractors that requires,
5 as a condition of employment, that the employee or
6 independent contractor agree to resolve through ar-
7 bitration any claim under title VII of the Civil
8 Rights Act of 1964 or any tort related to or arising
9 out of sexual assault or harassment, including as-
10 sault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional
11 distress, false imprisonment, or negligent hiring, su-
12 pervision, or retention; or
13 (2) take any action to enforce any provision of
14 an existing agreement with an employee or inde-
15 pendent contractor that mandates that the employee
16 or independent contractor resolve through arbitra-
17 tion any claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act
18 of 1964 or any tort related to or arising out of sex-
19 ual assault or harassment, including assault and
20 battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
21 false imprisonment, or negligent hiring, supervision,
22 or retention.
23 (b) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise
24 made available by this Act may be expended for any Fed-
25 eral contract unless the contractor certifies that it requires
1 each covered subcontractor to agree not to enter into, and
2 not to take any action to enforce any provision of, any
3 agreement as described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of sub-
4 section (a), with respect to any employee or independent
5 contractor performing work related to such subcontract.
6 For purposes of this subsection, a ‘‘covered subcon-
7 tractor’’ is an entity that has a subcontract in excess of
8 $1,000,000 on a contract subject to subsection (a).
9 (c) The prohibitions in this section do not apply with
10 respect to a contractor’s or subcontractor’s agreements
11 with employees or independent contractors that may not
12 be enforced in a court of the United States.
13 (d) The Secretary of Defense may waive the applica-
14 tion of subsection (a) or (b) to a particular contractor or
15 subcontractor for the purposes of a particular contract or
16 subcontract if the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary per-
17 sonally determines that the waiver is necessary to avoid
18 harm to national security interests of the United States,
19 and that the term of the contract or subcontract is not
20 longer than necessary to avoid such harm. The determina-
21 tion shall set forth with specificity the grounds for the
22 waiver and for the contract or subcontract term selected,
23 and shall state any alternatives considered in lieu of a
24 waiver and the reasons each such alternative would not
25 avoid harm to national security interests of the United
1 States. The Secretary of Defense shall transmit to Con-
2 gress, and simultaneously make public, any determination
3 under this subsection not less than 15 business days be-
4 fore the contract or subcontract addressed in the deter-
5 mination may be awarded.

The agreed legislation is now expected to pass Congress very promptly. But, if the appropriations bill is not signed by the President before midnight Friday, then the US Government will once again shut down for lack of funds (https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/21/politics/congress-unveils-spending-package-fix-nics/index.html). Observers expect the bill to pass Congress on a bipartisan vote, just as the original agreement did earlier this year. But the timing of passage, and thus the possibility of another very short Government shutdown, may be affected by opponents’ parliamentary maneuvers.

 

Mark Kantor is a CPR Distinguished Neutral. Until he retired from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Mark was a partner in the Corporate and Project Finance Groups of the Firm. He currently serves as an arbitrator and mediator. He teaches as an Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center (Recipient, Fahy Award for Outstanding Adjunct Professor). Additionally, Mr. Kantor is Editor-in-Chief of the online journal Transnational Dispute Management.

This material was first published on OGEMID, the Oil Gas Energy Mining Infrastructure and Investment Disputes discussion group sponsored by the on-line journal Transnational Dispute Management (TDM, at https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/), and is republished with consent.

No Notice: NJ Federal Court Declines to Compel Arbitration

By Elena Gurevich

Morgan Stanley has lost a bid to compel arbitration against a former employee.

A New Jersey federal district court ruled that the arbitration agreement circulated by the company via email could not be constituted as adequate notice, and therefore was not binding on the plaintiff.

This is not the first time a New Jersey court has struck down a motion to compel arbitration. There seems to be a trend in the approach that New Jersey state and federal courts take in examining the ADR process. The courts are looking closely at arbitration clauses in light of the state’s consumer protection and employment discrimination laws. See “Examining New Jersey’s Arbitration Scrutiny,” CPR Speaks blog  (July 12, 2016)(available at http://bit.ly/2GMH0A5).

In Schmell v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Civ. No. 17-13080 (D.C. N.J. March 1)(available at http://bit.ly/2FZnmiY), the court did not even look at the cases Morgan Stanley relied on, saying that the fact the plaintiff—a senior vice president in the financial services company’s Red Bank, N.J., office—had notice of the agreement was in dispute.

The court found that the defendant company’s evidence that the plaintiff was working and accessing emails on the day the email in question was sent could not be considered as proof of adequate notice.

U.S. District Court Judge Anne E. Thompson also found that the plaintiff’s certified statements that he had no recollection of receiving and viewing the email were indicative of the fact that there had been no meeting of the minds, and therefore no mutual assent to the agreement.

Noting the plaintiff’s certification, the opinion also stated that the email notification and the plaintiff’s continued employment did not constitute notice, despite contrary case law. Therefore, Thompson reasoned, the court did not have to “consider whether this dispute falls within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement.”

She declined to compel arbitration, rejecting Morgan Stanley’s motion. The firm had fired the plaintiff last October, alleging discrimination for past conduct involving drug and alcohol abuse that the plaintiff detailed in a book about his life. The Thompson opinion states that the plaintiff was terminated even though he had made the changes to the book that Morgan Stanley had demanded he make, in order to continue working at the company.

According to the plaintiff’s attorney, Joshua Bauchner, a partner in the Woodland Park, N.J., office of Ansell Grimm & Aaron, no notice of appeal has been filed in the case. Attorney for Morgan Stanley, Kerrie Heslin, a partner in Chatham, N.J.’s Nukk-Freeman & Cerra, has not responded to an email request for comment.

The New Jersey treatment of arbitration agreements continues to evolve. A December attempt to make legislative changes died in committee, but it is likely that similar initiatives will emerge.

A Senate bill attempted to bar provisions in employment contracts that waive rights or remedies as well as agreements that conceal details relating to discrimination claims. Though the bill didn’t mention arbitration, the accompanying statement makes its intention clear, noting that “provision in any employment contract or agreement which has the purpose or effect of concealing the details relating to a claim of discrimination, retaliation, or harassment, including claims that are submitted to arbitration, would be deemed against public policy and unenforceable.”

The proposal can be found here: http://bit.ly/2IEKtBl.

* * *

The author is a CPR intern.

 

 

District Court Overrules Arbitrator’s Authority on Class Certification

By Ginsey Varghese

A recent decision in a long-running New York case permitting federal review of an arbitrator’s authority in class arbitration may have substantial implications for arbitration law.

In January, a New York Southern District Court decision vacated an arbitrator’s class certification award to protect the due process rights of more than 70,000 absent class members in a gender discrimination matter, Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., No. 08 CIV. 2875, 2018 WL 418571 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2018) (available at http://bit.ly/2EjEQWp).

U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff held that the arbitrator exceeded her powers under the Federal Arbitration Act because an arbitrator cannot bind non-parties when the arbitration agreement does not allow class-action procedures. Id. at 2018 WL 418571, at *5; 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(statute available at http://bit.ly/120BmfV).

The FAA authorizes vacatur in four limited circumstances, one of which Rakoff employed in this case, “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a . . . final and definite award upon the subject matter was not federal made.” 9 U.S.C. §10(a).

The case began in March 2008 with several female Sterling employees filing a class action discrimination suit against the company. The district court compelled arbitration. Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 307, 310-12 (S.D.N.Y 2008).

The case has since endured several procedural appeals, with the latest decision resting in part on U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.’s concurrence in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, where Alito distinguished “absent members,” reasoning that “it is far from clear [whether] they will be bound by the arbitrator’s ultimate resolution of the dispute.” 569 U.S. 564, 574 (2013).

This case appears to be the first time that Alito’s concurrence has been used to overrule an arbitrator’s authority. See Andrew C. Glass, Robert W. Sparkes III, Roger L. Smerage, and Elma Delic, “A First in Second (Circuit): On Remand, District Court Breaks New Ground by Vacating Arbitrator’s Class Certification Award,” K&L Gates blog (Feb. 1, 2018)(available at http://bit.ly/2ELn66I).

At this stage, Rakoff’s decision provides protection for companies with arbitration provisions that are silent on class action procedures, but it undermines and challenges arbitrator authority.

As has been a constant in the litigation, there’s more to come. Rakoff’s decision is the subject of a Jan. 18 notice of appeal, and is now, once again, pending review before the Second U.S. Circuit of Appeals. Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 18-153.

More on Jock, including its long history and pending appeal will appear in the April issue of Alternatives. March is out now, free here for CPR members, and here for the public.

The author is a CPR Institute 2018 intern. She is a law student at Pepperdine University’s School of Law in Malibu, Calif.

U.S. Supreme Court Grants Cert to Decide “Who Decides” “Independent Contractor” Employment Arbitration Case

Kantor Photo (8-2012)By Mark Kantor

On February 26, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, Case No. 17-340, a 1st US Circuit Court of Appeals decision in which the appeals court ruled on two questions: (1) Whether, under a contractual arrangement where the parties have delegated arbitrability questions to the arbitration, a court facing a motion to compel arbitration must first decide whether the US Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) covers or excludes the dispute or instead leave that question to be decided first by the arbitrators and (2) does the provision of Sec. 1 of the FAA excluding contracts of employment of transportation workers  from arbitration apply to an agreement that purports to establish an independent contractor relationship rather than an employer-employee relationship.

This case raises two questions of first impression in this circuit. First, when a federal district court is confronted with a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, in a case where the parties have delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, must the court first determine whether the FAA applies or must it grant the motion and let the arbitrator determine the applicability of the Act? We hold that the applicability of the FAA is a threshold question for the court to determine before compelling arbitration under the Act. Second, we must decide whether a provision of the FAA that exempts contracts of employment of transportation workers from the Act’s coverage, see id. § 1 (the § 1 exemption), applies to a transportation-worker agreement that establishes or purports to establish an independent-contractor relationship. We answer this question in the affirmative.

Oral argument in the matter will occur during the Fall term of the Supreme Court.

The underlying contractual agreements are easily summarized (footnotes omitted):

Among the documents Oliveira signed was an Independent Contractor Operating Agreement (the contract) between Prime and Hallmark.3 The contract specified that the relationship between the parties was that “of carrier and independent contractor and not an employer/employee relationship” and that “[Oliveira is] and shall be deemed for all purposes to be an independent contractor, not an employee of Prime.”4 Additionally, under the contract, Oliveira retained the rights to provide transportation services to companies besides Prime,5 refuse to haul any load offered by Prime, and determine his own driving times and delivery routes. The contract also obligated Oliveira to pay all operating and maintenance expenses, including taxes, incurred in connection with his use of the truck leased from Success. Finally, the contract contained an arbitration clause under which the parties agreed to arbitrate “any disputes arising under, arising out of or relating to [the contract], . . . including the arbitrability of disputes between the parties.”6

Ultimately, Oliveira filed a class action in US District Court against Prime notwithstanding the arbitration clause.  Oliveira alleged that Prime violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, as well as the Missouri minimum-wage statute, by failing to pay its truck drivers minimum wage. Oliveira also asserted a class claim for breach of contract or unjust enrichment and an individual claim for violation of Maine labor statutes.  Prime moved to compel arbitration under the FAA.

The provision of the FAA at issue in this dispute is Section 1, which excludes from the coverage of the FAA “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”

Section 1 of the FAA provides that the Act shall not apply “to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Id. § 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted this section to “exempt[] from the FAA . . . contracts of employment of transportation workers.”

On the “who decides” issue, the Court of Appeals held in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira that the courts, rather than the arbitrators, are the proper place to decide whether these disputes are covered by, or exempted from, the FAA.  Having decided the “who decides” question to place the resolution in the courts, the appellate judges then concluded that, on the particular facts of the case, “a transportation-worker agreement that establishes or purports to establish an independent-contractor relationship is a contract of employment under § 1,” and thus excluded from the FAA.

Given the dramatic increase in “independent contractor” agreements in the workplace over the last decades, this case may determine whether a large variety of labor disputes are heard in court or may instead be subjected to mandatory arbitration agreements.  The Scotusblog.com case page with the appellate decision and cert filings is here – http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/new-prime-inc-v-oliveira/.

 

Mark Kantor is a CPR Distinguished Neutral. Until he retired from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Mark was a partner in the Corporate and Project Finance Groups of the Firm. He currently serves as an arbitrator and mediator. He teaches as an Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center (Recipient, Fahy Award for Outstanding Adjunct Professor). Additionally, Mr. Kantor is Editor-in-Chief of the online journal Transnational Dispute Management.

This material was first published on OGEMID, the Oil Gas Energy Mining Infrastructure and Investment Disputes discussion group sponsored by the on-line journal Transnational Dispute Management (TDM, at https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/), and is republished with consent.

Predispute Arbitration Would be Barred for Sex Harassment Claims Under Legislative Proposal

By Elena Gurevich

The Federal Arbitration Act is being targeted in Congress in a bill that seeks to ban predispute arbitration in matters involving sexual harassment.

Last month, Sen. Kirsten E. Gillibrand, D., N.Y., along with 13 co-sponsors., introduced U.S. Senate bill S-2203, titled “Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017.”

The act makes predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable for sex discrimination disputes.  It would put the responsibility for determining arbitrability on courts, not arbitrators.

The Dec. 6 proposal was immediately referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.  It was introduced in the House by Rep. Cheri Bustos, D. Ill., on Dec. 26, with seven co-sponsors, and sent to the Judiciary Committee.

The act would amend United States Code Title 9—the FAA—by adding a new Chapter 4 “Arbitration of Sex Discrimination Disputes” at the end.

In a proposed Section 401, the legislation would define “predispute arbitration agreement” as “any agreement to arbitrate a dispute that had not yet arisen at the time of the making of the agreement,” and “sex discrimination dispute” as “a dispute between an employer and employee arising out of conduct that would form the basis of a claim based on sex under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [citation omitted] if the employment were employment by an employer [as defined in the act], regardless of whether a violation of such title VII is alleged.”

Proposed Section 402, on validity and enforceability, states that “no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of a sex discrimination dispute.”

According to a blog by employment attorneys at the law firm of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, if the act is passed into law, it “would not make employment arbitration agreements altogether unenforceable.” Joe Liburt, Allison Riechert Giese and Akasha Perez, “The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act: A Legislative Response to #MeToo,” Orrick Employment Law and Litigation blog (Dec. 14) (available at http://bit.ly/2rmpHSx).

The blog post notes that the proposal “would require employers and employees to litigate sexual harassment claims, while leaving unaffected all other arbitration-eligible claims.  This could potentially require employees who bring both harassment and non-harassment legal claims to litigate some claims in court while simultaneously submitting other claims to arbitrators.”

The proposed law, however, does not prohibit workers and employers from agreeing to arbitration after a dispute arises.

The Orrick blog notes that the legislative proposal “has a long journey” before it is signed into law, explaining that “the bill must be assigned to a committee for consideration, withstand debate” and “pass a vote.” The blog post predicts that it “could take months or even years to complete, if ever.”

A USA Today article notes that Congress also “is wrestling with incidents of sexual harassment,” referring to a resolution passed by the Senate that requires sexual harassment training for senators and staff.

The article discusses a bipartisan bill that was introduced in November that would “overhaul the congressional complaint process and provide better protections for accusers.” The article also notes that “other lawmakers are looking to reform the secret process lawmakers have used to settle numerous workplace harassment and discrimination claims.” See Jessica Guynn, “‘Enough is enough’: Gretchen Carlson says bill ending arbitration would break silence in sexual harassment cases,” USA Today (Dec. 6)(available at https://usat.ly/2ynUM6y).

Some companies already have taken action in the light of the proposed legislation. Last month, Microsoft became the first Fortune 100 company to support the bill. Microsoft President and Chief Legal Officer, Brad Smith, stated that the company should “act immediately and not wait for a new law to be passed.” Brad Smith, “Microsoft endorses Senate bill to address sexual harassment,” Microsoft blog (Dec. 19)(available at http://bit.ly/2mR65jR).

The author is a CPR intern.